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# West Europe Report

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24 September 1985

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POLITICAL

AUSTRIA

STEYRER ON PROSPECTS, PLANS FOR PRESIDENCY

Vienna KURIER in German 28 Jul 85 p 5

[Interview with Kurt Steyrer, Minister for Health and Environmental Protection, by Hans Rauscher and Hubert Wachter; date and place not specified: "Kurt Steyrer: This is How He Would Be as President!"]

[Text] Kurt Steyrer admits openly and genially: losing the election would be a disappointment to him. He sees similarities between himself and the incumbent president: like Kirchsclaeger as a judge, he as a physician had learned how to deal with people.

[Question] Minister Steyrer, why should you be elected president?

[Answer] If you evaluate Steyrer as to his past reliability: is he honorable; is he a man to keep a cool head even in times of crises; does he adhere to principles; will he detach himself from his party after being elected--and he must do that, I want to state this very clearly--then you will find your answer. Why would one vote for me? Well, as a physician I have learned to be nonpartisan. As a physician I have tried to help people in any situation. I believe that I have succeeded in that to a sufficient extent. I am willing to collaborate politically; my principle is tolerance. Should I win, I will be a president for all Austrians. One who, above all, speaks the language of the people and understands them. If one looks at me, I think I am a very normal person!

[Question] What is your opinion of President Kirchsclaeger going on television and taking the parties to task in the matter of Zwentendorf? Would you do the same, or is that a bit much for a president?

[Answer] I believe that the president has a strong position. Kirchsclaeger has added a new dimension to that office. He is extremely close to the people. Any future president will have to practice that. In addition, he is an enormously humane president. I can well imagine that he became impatient in the question of nuclear power. Because it demonstrated what was almost an inability to function on the part of the parliament and other authorities. So the president acted out of concern.

[Question] You are minister of health and environmental protection. What mistakes did you make, what failures did you have?

[Answer] Mistakes? I can't think of one. Failures? Certainly; in the case of Hainburg I often ask myself what we could have done better.

[Question] During the "hot" phase of Hainburg, where actually was Minister Steyrer?

[Answer] Unfortunately, I had no official responsibility during any of the phases. I only possessed a moral responsibility. And I certainly used it! The result was the government's strong acceptance of concerns for environmental protection.

[Question] Why are you not resigning your ministerial office before the election campaign?

[Answer] It is an imputation by the OeVP [Austrian People's Party] that I am only a part-time minister. I had to consider whether there could be certain incompatibilities in the election campaign. There are none. Also, I still have so much to do as minister: I still will conclude international environmental agreements (CSSR, GDR), the law on chemicals must be pushed through, and also the law on smog alarm.

[Question] But that is work stretching far into 1986?

[Answer] Certainly! I will finish all that, I don't want to leave any disorder for my successor?

[Question] Regarding the "third republic." Would you really refuse to swear in a concentration government [Konzentrationsregierung]?

[Answer] I must clear up something. I never said that I would not swear in such a government. It is true that I don't think much of such a government. But as president, any government is acceptable to me which controls a sufficient parliamentary majority. But I would not be happy with a minority government! That experiment, I think, could not be repeated. And so for the third republic: our constitution rests on a very firm foundation, and the political climate is very good, in relative terms. Compared to other countries. There is one problem--that we cannot talk with each other in certain areas. But that can be changed.

[Question] The SPOe [Socialist Party of Austria] complains more and more that the OeVP pursues a hard line of opposition politics.

[Answer] I believe that it isn't all that hard. Certainly, "the tone makes the music" [German proverb, meaning that it is not what one says, but how one says it]. I am a politician in favor of cooperation; consensus is the secret reason that Austria progressed so well after 1945. That is our advantage, and in the last analysis, that is what the people want. They don't really want us to knife each other in the back.

[Question] A head of state also has foreign policy functions. Your rival Waldheim claims that he is the man with greater international experience who can talk to the greats of this world.

[Answer] That is surely correct. But we should not overestimate Austria's position. The federal president is a president for Austrians and not for foreign countries. If I am criticized for my lack of foreign policy experience, then that is incorrect. I was a member of the National Council, and in this capacity I have traveled in the United States, Egypt, Israel, and China; I attended international conferences, visited Nairobi, Iraq, and, and, and...

[Question] Actually a president who can be shown off abroad?

[Answer] Yes, I do fancy that I would not come off badly...

[Question] You turned 65 the other day. Do you actually have only one presidential term (6 years) in mind?

[Answer] First one must be elected for a term in office. And then I would say further that--thank the Lord--there are many biological differences in people. I fancy myself as being in very good shape at the age of 65. Although I had a bad skiing season this year because--pardon the expression--I landed a few times on my behind.

[Question] Back to the office of president. Would you favor an obligatory people's referendum in case of a popular initiative with 500,000 signatures?

Captions:

Steyrer on his chances of becoming president: "It will be very close! It is quite possible that there will even be a second ballot because of the third candidacy (Scrinzi)."

Steyrer on a possible defeat: "Then I will also resign as minister. Because this office is too important to be occupied by a loser. Also, there would be disappointment."

9917

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POLITICAL

AUSTRIA

## CONTROVERSY OVER TRADE MINISTER STEGER

### Krejci Calls for Resignation

Vienna KURIER in German 21 Jul 85 p 6

[Article by Hubert Wachter]

[Text] The bungled nuclear power situation, Austria's international decline, Social Minister Alfred Dallinger's visions of co-determination, and a low point of the OeVP: this setting disgusts "general" of industry Herbert Krejci and causes him deep concern. In a talk with KURIER he predicts a "hot" autumn, because the amending law on labor relations will strain management-labor relations.

There is only one thing left to do for the secretary general of industry after this past "nuclear week"--to shake his head.

Krejci: "Large segments of the population, and not only industrial circles, ask themselves how much longer the government will tolerate a minister in charge of energy questions, who reacts in such a fashion to the admonitions of the president? In wide circles of industry there is growing incomprehension of the way Norbert Steger manages energy policy!"

Furthermore, the number of those in the SPOe, [Socialist Party of Austria] who "have had enough" of the leader of the small party in the coalition is growing steadily: "It is said that this can't go on in the long run!" In his conversation with KURIER, Krejci refers to leading SPOe functionaries who had confided their frustration to him in private talks.

All in all: the red-blue coalition does "not progress" at the moment, and "Austria's political immobilization at this time is a danger!"

What Krejci is saying is this: the regard for politics is being damaged, and the government is doing nothing that could be considered dynamic. In the long run, "a small coalition is not good for this country because it is incapable of really solving problems."

Krejci is also critical of the OeVP: at present, there exists a fundamental incapability of the large parties to calmly talk to each other.

"I deliberately do not want to join in the cheap criticism by messieurs Graff and Schieder, but there are people who evidently have only one purpose, which is to prevent a calm and matter-of-fact discussion." The OeVP had undergone a "certain low" in recent weeks. "But in the interest of the state we need a people's party which overcomes its internal illnesses and can stand before the public, strong and united!"

In this context, Krejci surprisingly lifts a corner of those "secret talks" which had been held in the spring of 1985, during the Reder/Frischenschlager affair.

Krejci says that, at that time, the OeVP had a real chance to break up the small coalition. "I can say that decisively from talks with government members. The SPOe was ready for a break at that time, suffering from low morale. Large segments of the SPOe said that matters could not go on like that with the FPÖe [Austrian Liberal (Freedom) Party]."

This rather bold alternative was bungled by misguided OeVP strategists in the Kaerntner Strasse. According to Krejci, Sinowatz was ready for the switch. Now the chance had passed. Despite the nuclear power question.

The secretary general of industry also regrets the "uncoupling" of Austria from the rest of the world, especially through government actions, such as Social Minister Alfred Dallinger's planned revision of the labor relations law.

According to Krejci, this would lead to a great strain on management-labor relations this fall, and might even bring about the breakup, namely, if the OeGB [Austrian trade union] and Workers' Chamber should support Dallinger's ideas. Krejci stresses that these co-determination ideas were disliked even by the top managers of nationalized enterprises--an alarm signal for industry. For this reason, there will be a "hot" autumn. Krejci calls for Energy Minister Norbert Steger's dismissal from the cabinet; in Dallinger's case, chancellor Sinowatz will have to show "leadership quality," will finally have to tell him where to draw the line.

#### Grabher-Meyer Defends Steger

Vienna KURIER in German 22 Jul 85 p 2

[Article by Paul Cech]

[Text] Walter Grabher-Meyer, secretary general of the Liberal Party [FPÖe], agrees on one point with Herbert Krejci, secretary general of the industrial association: the OeVP has missed its--legitimate--chance to break up the coalition. Krejci called it "bungled," while Grabher-Meyer goes further and accuses the opposition party of "foolishness." The FP secretary verbatim:

"That the OeVP has tried with such foolish methods to destroy the coalition is its own fault and that of its leadership duo, Mock-Graff. It will certainly strengthen the coalition."

At the same time, Grabher-Meyer--who stresses that there are no great difficulties with the SPOe even on the question of nuclear power--opposes the demands of the OeVP and industry that Trade Minister Norbert Steger resign in order to clear the way for the Zwentendorf start-up: "Of a certainty, Steger will remain Minister for Trade and Energy until the election of 1987!"

Just as energetically he rebuts all allegations that it is the fault of the FPÖe that there is still no decision for a referendum on putting the nuclear power plant into operation. According to Grabher-Meyer, the responsibility lies solely with the OeVP which has not given the citizens the chance to determine whether or not the nuclear restriction law is to be kept in its present form. "Everything else is a lie," the FP secretary fumes, "which is played up by the OeVP because it knows very well that the majority of VP members cannot and do not want to understand this attitude of the VP leadership, that is, of the Mock/Graff duo!"

"Irresponsible GKT Managers!"

Grabher-Meyer has even harsher words for GKT, the company running Zwentendorf, than for the OeVP. The FPÖe politician accuses the GKT management of having opposed "in an irresponsible fashion" the nuclear restriction law, and thus the will of the population. He called the power plant operators "illiberal and undemocratic" since, 7 years after the nuclear referendum, they still had not executed the will of the people.

Grabher-Meyer: "One should ask these people (of GKT, annotation) with what justification they continue to misuse 700 shillings annually, although they were aware that the nuclear restriction law is based on a plebiscite!"

FP Nuclear Power Policy Not to Be Changed

The attitude of the Liberals regarding nuclear policy will not change, however. Grabher-Meyer is satisfied that chancellor Sinowatz and OeGB president Benya are of the opinion that the Liberal Party was acting fairly: "I assume from this that no change in procedure is desired..."

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POLITICAL

DENMARK

### THREE TROTSKYITES EJECTED FROM SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 Aug 85 p 6

[Article by Ole Dall and Thorkild Dahl]

[Text] "In the Social Democratic Party we do not feel we can accept other ideologies and therefore the executive committee has expelled three members with Trotskyite sympathies."

SDP secretary Steen Christensen told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that after Kim Bo Schjott, Alborg, Rune Lunell, Alborg, and Charlotte Stage, Copenhagen, were expelled from the party.

"It is quite clear that DsU [Danish Social Democratic Youth] acted quickly to nip an infiltration by Trotskyites in the bud. And since the three were also party members we held a hearing with local party branches which agreed that the three should be expelled," said Christensen, who added that the party does not fear a larger infiltration.

"Elections show that there is no fertile soil for this kind of extremism. The organized Trotskyites in SAP [Socialist Workers' Party] received few votes in the last election although many people gave them an opportunity to run," Christensen said.

The British Labour Party's youth division contains a majority of Trotskyites and DsU and the Social Democratic Party do not want that to happen in Denmark. Steen Christensen said that there have been British attempts in the past to persuade Social Democrats in Denmark and Sweden.

"In Sweden there have been many more expulsions while there was one case in DsU a few years ago," Steen Christensen told us.

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CSO: 3613/188

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

PRC'S GERMAN POLICY SEEKS EQUIDISTANCE BETWEEN FRG, GDR

Bonn DIE WELT in German 13 Jul 85 p 5

[Article by Oskar Weggel: "Equidistance To Bonn and East Berlin"]

[Text] From 1949 to 1982, China's Germany policy was structured like a reflecting mirror: Peking treated Bonn with hostility as long as it enjoyed "brotherly" relations with East Berlin (1949 to 1963); it began to turn its back on the GDR when its relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany improved (1964, but especially from 1972 on).

This stalemate is over now. The Chinese want to replace their "either-or" tactic with one of "both-and," and to establish an equidistance to both German states, at least in the political realm. To be sure, the FRG retains a natural advantage in the areas of science and technology. This is clear in terms of China's foreign trade, since in 1984 the volume of trade with the FRG reached about DM 5 million, while the corresponding figure for the GDR was only around 660 million marks.

This new tendency originated in both the GDR and China:

- East Berlin, which is interested in diversifying its political connections and in expanding its foreign trade relations, derives its carte-blanc from two Soviet China-initiatives, i.e. the opening of Sino-Soviet "normalization talks" (1982) and Archipov's visit to Peking (December 1984). Since the time of the latter initiative, GDR representatives have even dared to enter the discussion concerning Chinese reform experiments, a topic that is both fascinating and disturbing to all of the CEMA states (with the exceptions of Hungary and Yugoslavia).
- The Chinese, on the other hand, who, because of ineptness, i.e. a rigid counteracting of whatever Soviet policy happened to be in force, have maneuvered into a kind of indirect piloting of their foreign policy by Moscow, have moved, as a result of their reform policies, to an "independent" foreign policy, as they put it, and they intend in the future to act more flexibly, especially with regard to the CEMA member states.

For two of China's five major foreign policy objectives, furthermore, the GDR (as well as the FRG, by the way) is particularly important, i.e. because it can

offer assistance in terms of modernization and also as an "anti-hegemonic" power. For no matter how one turns and twists things-the majority of the GDR's population represents a powerful "anti-hegemonic" potential, something that is also true of the other CEMA states.

China knows this-and is acting accordingly. Can it be pure coincidence that the word "independence" occurs again and again in official Chinese statements? In a formal sense, this key word is only used to define China's own foreign policy, but China would not be China if it did not desire simultaneously to offer itself as a model to be followed.

An additional motive should not be overlooked here: the Chinese like their Germans-no matter from the East or from the West. In view of the "personal" style of Chinese foreign policy, this is a factor that should not be underestimated.

The new policy is directed at the state, the people and the mass organizations (including the "League for Friendship Among People"), but not the SED. Ideology is dead! Instead of relations between political parties, it is significant that China suggests contacts between top "people's representatives" on both sides and that it invited Sindermann, the president of the People's Chamber, for a visit.

With regard to the question of reunification, China expresses itself cautiously, but nonetheless clearly, for example at Zhao Ziyang's press conference in Bonn on June 12, 1985, where he stated that the reunification question must be resolved in a peaceful way by the German people themselves. Is it likely that the government in East Berlin welcomed this simple but wise formulation?

Although "normalization" between Peking and Moscow is still a long way off, it has been almost reestablished between Peking and East Berlin (as well as with most of the other Eastern European countries).

It is no wonder that the Soviet Union has been following these developments with mixed feelings: should it intervene? This would mean that the delicate blossom of the normalization talks would soon wither away, for Peking is allergic to nothing so much as to "hegemonism," the elimination of which it has called for as a prerequisite for "normalization." On the other hand, if the USSR allows matters to take their own course, China could soon bring about a rift in the East Bloc countries.

It is possible that Moscow is already regretting having allowed its CEMA partners too much freedom in their dealings with China. For the China of 1985 is no longer the China of 1955; it has in the meantime proffered a credible alternative to the neostalinist model of the Soviet Union.

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CSO: 3620/485

POLITICAL

FRANCE

## LEFT VIEWS MODERNIZATION OF POLITICAL SYSTEM

### Preliminary Analysis of Political Development

Paris INTERVENTION in French Apr-May-Jun 85 pp 2-6

[Article by Jacques Julliard: "Defeat Before Battle?"]

[Text] Until just recently, the issue seemed clear: with the adoption of the double principle of the primacy of a president elected by universal suffrage and bipolar organization of the political space, the left wing had definitively consolidated the Fifth Republic and put an end to the institutional warfare which had raged in this country since the revolution disrupted monarchic legitimacy. In a major book, Olivier Duhamel had demonstrated the scope of this agreement.

Francois Mitterrand played a decisive role in this development, precisely because he had long been the most eloquent of the advocates who spoke out against de Gaulle. Unlike Mendes France, he was nonetheless willing to turn the page. By running for president, and then by stating, after the system of alternation in power had worked to his benefit, that these institutions suited him perfectly, he in a way washed away their original sin.

The civil peace France has enjoyed since 1958 is in large part a consequence of these institutions and the return to this position. Now in deciding on proportional representation, the president and the government have taken the risk of destroying the consensus and reviving the institutional battle. Just after the resignation of Michel Rocard from the government, Lionel Jospin went farther: "We are not the guardians of the temple," he stated. The socialists should "respect" the institutions of the Fifth Republic, but not "defend" them. If possible, they should "change" them. Still more surprising, the first secretary of the PS [Socialist Party] did not hesitate to undertake the rehabilitation of the Fourth Republic, and to add that "to discredit the Fourth Republic is to make the birth certificate of the Fifth Republic respectable" (LE MONDE, 10 April 1985). And there we are, taken back in history more than a quarter of a century at a single stroke. Everything then would have to be begun again. I would like to explain why, if it were to continue along this line, the Socialist Party would be moving in the wrong direction, with effects which could be catastrophic to itself and to the nation as a whole.

Historically, the present constitution is less the work of the Gaullist sector than the result of a traditional creation in which the people and chance have, each in its fashion, played a decisive role. Who would dare to state that the way in which the institutions are functioning today is purely the result of the 1958 text?

At the outset, then, a man--de Gaulle; a situation--the collapse of the Fourth Republic; and a text--that the French people approved in September of 1958 by an unprecedented four-fifths majority vote. It has been reiterated ever since then that the new institutions were tailored to measure for de Gaulle. This statement, the result of the poverty of the commentators' minds, is false and ill-thought out. It is a glaring fact that de Gaulle, because of the situation and his personal equation, was on the contrary the only person in that era to be able to do without it. The proof is that he governed from 1958 to 1962 without the two ingredients which comprise the regime today: the election of a president by universal suffrage and the existence of a presidential majority. It is precisely because de Gaulle feared, after the settlement of the Algerian affair, that the new institutional order he had contributed to establishing would not survive the end of his term or his premature death that he decided to take the plunge, one he had not taken either in Bayeux (1946) nor on his return to political affairs (1958): by means of a referendum, he got the election of the president by universal suffrage approved. At the time, the political parties were persuaded that only the abusive moral tyranny de Gaulle exercised over the country, or in more measured terms, his famous charisma, had enabled him to triumph over their coalition (the cartel of the "naysayers") and republican tradition, believed to be hostile to direct democracy. Again, this is wrong. Are people aware that, since 1945, 50 percent of the French population has favored the direct election of the president? An IFOP [French Public Opinion Institute] poll at the time confirms this. This fact is the more remarkable since in that era, no one, not a single individual, even de Gaulle, and no party, favored such a procedure. Too often, due to a failure to analyze the situation, the left wing thus attributed to the fascination de Gaulle was supposed to hold for the people of France what was only an intuitive response on his part to their aspirations. One could say the same of a good portion of the foreign policy. And that is how the 1958 constitution, that precisely which Maurice Duverger termed "Orleanist," then became presidential.<sup>2</sup>

It is here that chance and the institutional creation by the people which I mentioned earlier come into play. First of all, chance. The establishment of the majority electoral system with two rounds was decided upon by de Gaulle, in part at the urging of Guy Mollet and the SFIO [French Section of the Workers International (French Socialist Party)] and against the advice of Michel Debre, who would have preferred balloting of the English type (majority on one round). That he agreed to the demand of the socialists shows rather clearly that at that time, he did not nurture any hope of governing without the parties, or rather with his own, but was resigned to a coalition.

And then, the people. The electoral body, won over to the presidential system, set out to perfect it. With majority balloting helping, it gave de Gaulle a majority which he himself had not hoped for, and which was without

precedent in the history of the republic. On that day, the concept of a presidential majority was born, while the notion of a parliamentary republic, that is to say an executive branch subject to the law of the Assembly, faded. In brief, it was the people who gave the institutions a logic which they did not by any means have at the outset. Doubtless for the same reason, and contrary to all expectations, this provided Valéry Giscard d'Estaing with a "respite" in 1978, until the end of his term of office, by renewing the right-wing majority. Similarly, in 1981, it presented Mitterrand with a truly unparalleled chamber in which the socialists themselves generously outweighed the absolute majority. By rejecting the majority ballot, that is to say excluding the possibility of victory at the outset, he made a "miracle" of the 1978 type impossible. Did he not underestimate the constitutional logic of the French people?

Like the railroad, which represents the intersection of two separate inventions, rail traction and the steam engine, the constitutional formula of the Fifth Republic is a combination, brought about by the electoral body, of two independent provisions, which were, moreover, not initially foreseen: direct election of the president and majority balloting for the Assembly. This is why returning so suddenly and so late to the thesis of the legitimate origins of our institutions is not only very opportunistic, but also extremely debatable. Similarly, one can not, without risking error, invoke the republican tradition in support of the weakening of the executive branch. The most recent and most incisive historians of the early Third Republic<sup>3</sup> have shown very clearly that the majority of the "founding fathers," the likes of Gambetta, Ferry, Clemenceau and Poincaré, were advocates of a strong presidency and of direct dialogue with the people. The indirect, Orleanist and parliamentary republic of which Jules Grévy is the symbol could not have been established except thanks to the misunderstandings brought about by the Mac-Mahon episode first of all, and then the vicissitudes of the Boulangist era.

There can be no doubt that the adoption of proportional representation reintroduced a parliamentary logic into an institutional system which is of itself presidential in essence. It was indeed inevitable that one of the two give way to the other. Under these conditions, a return to the Fourth Republic is not at all impossible. The decision of the president, motivated by the desire to "save" the last 2 years of his 7-year term, is designed to weaken the control which a possible right-wing majority in the Parliament could exercise over him. But paradoxically, it serves in the end to reintroduce the preeminence of the Parliament. What would remain of the famous presidential prerogative on the day it comes up against a deliberately hostile Assembly, and one basically assured of its reelection? I would add that the hope of forcing a triumphant right wing, but one lacking an absolute majority thanks to the election of National Front deputies, to compromise with him, which is the entire basis of the president's maneuver, is an extremely faint one. Without having Le Pen in the government, the right wing might perfectly well reach agreement with him to make life impossible for the president. Didn't the economic experiment serve any purpose, then? The left wing will probably pay dear in 1986 for the administrative errors committed in 1981 and 1982. Was it necessary, in addition to this heavy burden, to incur blame for putting a constitution, that of 1958-1962, which gave us a quarter

of a century of stability and civil peace, at risk? I can imagine Francois Mitterrand making purposeful use of surprise and counterattack, as de Gaulle was able to do in 1968, when he canceled the devaluation order at the last minute--Francois Mitterrand announcing to the people that he is taking the risk of majority balloting and appealing to their sense of responsibility. However risky this maneuver and however slim its chances of success, it would, all things considered, be worth infinitely more than sending the troops into battle with the public admission that they had no chance of winning a victory.

#### Rocard's Departure

The withdrawal of Michel Rocard from the government clarifies a situation in which he has long felt ill at ease. All that I have just said about the institutions and the method of balloting, all that has been written in this periodical on the subject, shows rather clearly that there are a number of us here who share his concern. One would thus be wrong in thinking that this departure is based on a futile question, not to say a pretext. If the electoral law is a technical matter, the choices that it involves are well and truly political, and even have to do with a philosophy of government. And the consequences, alas, are like to demonstrate this.

That having been said, Michel Rocard might in addition be legitimately worried about the consequences of the change in the method of balloting on his personal situation and that of his faction within the Socialist Party. Paradoxically, the establishment of the slates for proportional balloting, and in particular the order in which the candidates are presented, is likely to strengthen a ponderously "majority" logic in the departmental bodies, for which the CERES [Center for Socialist Studies, Research and Education], the friends of Michel Rocard, and perhaps in some cases those of Pierre Mauroy, may have to pay the cost. Hypocrisy in political discourse has become second nature to the point that this question, in the back of the minds of all of us, practically never rises to the surface.

After all, Michel Rocard, who was in charge first of planning and then agriculture within the government, was never in fact in charge of any ministry except that of public opinion. The candidates of the PS, all factions taken together, are well able to remember this when they wage a campaign. And even Francois Mitterrand himself! The question being asked more frequently than ever is whether an apparatus, in this instance that of the PS, can in the end admit that democratic logic requires that it abandon its discretionary power when it comes to presenting candidates for the various elective posts and, as is the custom in the United States, agree to compromise with the preferences of the citizens when it comes to candidacies. Where the president is concerned, in particular, this goes without saying. Neither de Gaulle nor Pompidou nor Giscard d'Estaing was presented by his party. They asked for its support, which is not the same thing. The dissociation between parliamentary logic and presidential logic is brilliantly clear in the right wing at present, where we see the majority of the voters preferring the RPR [Rally for the Republic] to the UDF [French Democratic Union], while choosing Raymond Barre over Jacques Chirac. This personal maneuver was pursued by Francois Mitterrand as well in 1965, when he asked for and obtained support for his candidacy from the Socialist Party and the Communist Party. We will soon know

what role the Socialist Party would like Michel Rocard to play. This matter is important, not only of course for his personal career, but above all perhaps because of the concept the Socialist Party has of its future. In fact, either its majority will allow Michel Rocard, with what he represents, to figure as one of the key sociological and ideological components of the socialist left wing, so that then the renewal of the 1970s could survive a possible electoral setback, and the forward advance could continue. Or, on the contrary, this majority will continue, in an atmosphere of pettiness, intolerance and internal hatred, to close the opening initiated in 1974 at the time of the Assizes of Socialism, and the PS will soon return to its traditional equation, having become a minority factor in French society. The error in 1981 was in fact having imagined that the left wing had regained the majority situation which it had enjoyed for some time just following World War II. This was not at all the case. The socialist thrust was to a great extent that of presidential legitimacy, as I said earlier. A few months later, the tide ebbed and the left wing returned to its normal level which, under the Fifth Republic, in the opinion of experts, represents about 40 to 43 percent of the electoral body.

A great opportunity was lost then, as it had been a first time just after the war, despite the entreaties of Leon Blum. The Socialist Party, triumphant, could for a whole year or almost, by its behavior, its actions and its undertakings assert its hegemonic situation within the left wing and pursue its main mission within French society. It could, in brief, become the equivalent of what the Radical Party, at the turn of the century, or the Gaullist faction, in the 1960s, had been. It was necessary to open doors and windows, to affirm that this party belonged to no one, not even, as Ferry said of secularity, to those who had been the builders of it. It was necessary--let someone give me the formula--to make a gift of the PS to France, and not to its own hierarchy.

Instead of which we had the Valence Congress, the Rocard supporters were forced out, and patronage spread. Once again, the eternal Mollet attitude gained the upper hand. This narrowness of view sealed the fate, at least as much as the economic and financial escapades, of the near future of the PS. No secret should be made of the fact that it will for some time be difficult for it to work its way upstream again and find as favorable an opportunity.

Not that I wish to give credit to the "Rocard faction," as it is called, for all the virtues and all the trump cards which I see the Socialist Party as lacking. The course this party has followed in the past 4 years has not spared the Rocard apparatus itself. Its social impact is limited, and the greater part of the majority socialists are pleased thereby. Doubtless this latter group has the means today of expanding its "victory" still further. But this would be to the detriment of the Socialist Party clientele. The battle which is likely within this party when its next congress is held in Toulouse will be important above all in terms of its symbolic stakes, more than for its real results.

## Setting Off Again

In order for the left to have a future again, it will not suffice, and above all it is not necessary, for it to reject all that constituted its identity in the past. The storm of government service has destroyed enough dead branches to make it useful to stress this. To list the sectors in which the PS has changed since 1981 is to make an almost exhaustive list of the points on which in the past it opposed the right wing. The demands of those of us who asked of it greater realism have been met. Never, whatever they did, has anyone progressed as fast as Laurent Fabius. The question which is being asked is rather how, on the day when power changes hands, the departure from realism will be effected. Although in this connection, the socialist tradition has accustomed us to everything, it is hard to imagine a cynical return to the ideological games of the past, as if government power had been no more than parenthetical. It will be as difficult for the PS to recreate its youth by drawing on the tradition of state socialism as it will be for the FEN [National Education Federation] to activate Pavlovian reflexes to the benefit of secularity. The risk then is more of a certain confusion. And what in any case is in the process of ending is a cycle of variable chronological factors, some of them dating back to the 18th century and the revolution, others to 1917, still others to 1971 and 1972, and, finally, some to 1981. Our next issue will deal with precisely this basic problem--the crisis in the intellectual models of the socialist left wing.

Without wishing to anticipate the conclusions in this issue, I would like to emphasize the following: it is time for the left wing to think of the social aspect as other than a simple political duplication of the trade union aspect. Since the end of the 19th century, the socialist struggle has been focused mainly on the improvement of conditions for the workers in their direct labor relations: wages, hours, protection against unemployment and sickness, pensions and leisure time. To say that in this realm everything has now been achieved and that nothing remains to be done would be absurd. And yet, one can hardly imagine great new "conquests" in the immediate future of the type won in 1936 and 1945. The future of "socialism," to use the traditional term, is linked with its capacity to be something other than "laborite," in other words the defender of labor. Henceforth, the social organization of time, the distribution and control of knowledge, and the attitude toward life and biological manipulation are the problems which must be taken up in political fashion, in other words in terms of control and mastery. The question facing French socialism today is not that of a new Bad Godesberg, which would achieve nothing but the penetration of the open gates of revisionism, but rather showing the men and women of this era that it can still be their contemporary.

Postscript: Our friend Patrick Viveret, who, after serving as editor in chief of FAIRE, has served in the same capacity at this periodical since its establishment, must for professional reasons leave these duties. He will be replaced by Jean-Luc Pouthier, an associate of Pierre Bouretz. To eulogize Patrick might suggest that he is leaving us, which is not the case at all. He will remain one of the sponsors of this periodical. However, I hope I may be allowed, on behalf of the entire periodical, to express to him our gratitude for the talent and the devotion of which we have been the beneficiaries.

## FOONOTES

1. Olivier Duhamel, "The Left Wing and the Fifth Republic," PUF [French University Press], 1980.
2. I am not unaware that experts on constitutional law prefer to speak of the "semipresidential" system, reserving the term "presidential system" to describe that in the United States. However, the guiding genius of language will always balk at the term "semipresidential" to describe a regime which is in reality ultrapresidential.
3. I am thinking in particular of the book "The Absolute Republic," by Odile Rudelle, Sorbonne Publications, 1982, to which I make permanent reference.

### Public Opinion on System

Paris INTERVENTION in French Apr-May-Jun 85 pp 45-53

[Article by Florence Haegel and Dominique Reynie: "Public Opinion and the Political Elites"]

[Text] It is a well-accepted idea today that we are seeing a crisis in political representation. But beyond this statement with which anyone may be able to agree, one must ask what is truly affected by this crisis.

The bubbling political activity of the summer of 1984 culminated in the month of September in the publication in the columns of LE MONDE of a poll taken by the SOFRES [French Opinion Polling Company]. It attempted to establish the opinions held by the French people of politicians. Beyond the events which characterized the year 1984, it seemed legitimate, after a political alternation in power which saw the replacement, at least in part, of one leading group by another, to ask about the image the public has of the political elites.

The poll published in LE MONDE and the commentaries to which it gave rise concluded that there has been a reaction of rejection of politicians as a class. This rejection was reflected mainly in the French citizen's mistrust of political discourse, which was seen as archaic, far removed from the real concerns of the citizens (62 percent of those interviewed expressed the view that politicians do not deal with the real subjects pertaining to the life of French citizens); the discourse of the various actors on the political scene was perceived as basically the same; and, finally, the ultimate proof of this discredit, the commentators said that 82 percent of the French people believed that politicians did not speak the truth. This fact seemed both unanswerable and crushing.

The conclusions of this survey on the rejection of politicians as a class does however raise several questions. The SOFRES poll was the last in a series of articles published earlier on the subject of the rejection of politics. The entire phenomenon, according to the LE MONDE journalists, was related to the overall crisis in the representative system, and the increasing favor

socioprofessional personalities seem to be enjoying to the detriment of politicians. Now there is a shift between the rejection of politicians to the rejection of politics itself which is not without its own problems, particularly since the conceptual uncertainty went so far as to take views about political discourse as the priority indicator of the opinion of French citizens about politics. Thus an equivalence was postulated for political discourse, politicians and politics.

Comparing the LE MONDE-SOFRES poll with older data, the authors of OPINION PUBLIQUE 85<sup>1</sup> then introduced a distinction between the distrust voiced about politicians as a class and a continued interest in politics. "The paradox in the current situation," they wrote, "is that despite the deterioration of the image they have of political activity, the interest of French citizens in politics remains for all practical purposes stable. In December of 1983, 57 percent of them (as compared to 59 percent in 1979) said they were more or less interested in politics."<sup>2</sup>

In a more general way, this survey suggests the need to stress the extent to which the taking and interpretation of polls are delicate matters, although this after all does not affect their interest in terms of political research at all. For example, on the subject of the rejection of politicians as a class, it is very difficult to distinguish precisely between the cause and the effect. At the end of a summer dominated by a juridical political quarrel in which the French people did not seem to be taken into account (68 percent of the French people, as compared to 26 percent, followed the discussions on the proposed referendum with rather or very limited interest),<sup>3</sup> hasn't this poll amplified a structural phenomenon in connection with this affair?

A constant factor would thus have been made an event, simply because of the decision by a press organ to order a survey at a time when public opinion was still reacting to an unusual political quarrel, and one particularly far removed from the concerns of the individual. When a poll focuses on a permanent and underlying factor in French society, there is a risk of assigning a halo to the phenomenon.

In order to consider the image of French politicians as a class in the public eye, it would thus seem necessary to take into account the earlier polls and to place last summer's poll in its place in a lengthier historical series. Such an approach makes it possible to identify three sequences.

--Until 1981, the reaction against politicians as a class seems mainly to have been attributed to young people. But the phenomenon was approached then solely from the point of view of incomplete political socialization. It all appears as if the attitude of rejection noted in the young had to do only with an imperfect assimilation of a political culture of which recognition of politicians would be one component. The year 1979 was, however, an exception. The "diamond affair" and the suicide of Robert Boulin led to the publication of a number of polls on the traditional theme of political scandal and politicians' integrity.

--In 1981, the proposed Coluche candidacy brought a question on the role of "nonpolitical" personalities into temporary prominence.

--But it was above all beginning in 1983, in connection with the actions of Yves Montand and the socioprofessional slates during the 1984 European elections, that this concept of rejection of politics seemed to be confirmed, while at the same time questions about politicians as such arose repeatedly. The date of this emergence suggests the following hypothesis: it all seems as if, following the right-wing failure, disenchantment with the left wing led to the dismissal of both camps, back to back, in a general disdain for politicians as a class. This would lead to the belief that the rejection of politicians is not solely the result of the vicissitudes of the summer of 1984, but one of the effects, perhaps perverse, of alternation in power.

A study of all of this material brings forth three outstanding points which might constitute the framework for a question about politics as a profession.

#### The Perception of the Politician

The public, when asked to choose among certain images of politicians proposed in polls, makes a rather negative judgment. The 1979 IFOP-VSD poll seemed to be organized in terms of a polarity between general and private interests. This duality does indeed seem to describe the status of the politician in society. Where the picture of the motives of politicians is concerned, we have placed the items in two groups corresponding to this duality.

Table I

In Your Opinion, What Motivates the Majority of Those  
Who Want To Become Politicians?

The desire to serve others or their country	17%
The conviction that their ideas are just	17%
The desire to change society	9%
General Interests	43%
A taste for power	28%
Desire for profit	13%
A desire for honors	10%
Personal Interests	51%

Note: Data taken from an IFOP-VSD survey conducted between 15 and 21 November 1979.

The structure adopted here stresses the important role played in the eyes of the public by motives of a personal nature in choosing a political career. Among these, a taste for power (28 percent) predominates by far over the factors having to do instead with the general interests, such as altruism (17 percent) or devotion to a cause (17 percent).

What is the extent of a politician's integration in the public sphere? What part of his life should be subjected to public view? Table II makes it possible to outline a response. Those interviewed seem to set a limit to protect the family life of the politician (78 percent), as if general

interests were no longer involved beyond that point. The demand for full knowledge pertains mainly to the financial income of politicians (72 percent) as well as how much they pay in taxes (64 percent). Along the same lines, it is not surprising that 81 percent of the French people "find it normal" to know how electoral campaigns are financed. Here we are in the heart of the public domain.

Table II

Does It Seem Normal or Abnormal to You for the Public  
To Know the Following Things About a Politician?

(in %)

	<u>Normal</u>	<u>Abnormal</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
How his electoral campaigns are financed	81	13	6
What he earns, what his income is	72	24	4
How much he pays in taxes	64	31	5
What his net assets and wealth are	46	47	7
What his family life is like	19	78	3

Note: IFOP-VSD survey taken between 15 and 21 November 1979.

As can be seen, the public does not by any means want increased investigation into the lives of politicians, leaving nothing excluded from the public view. It does not desire to exercise its judgment in an area beyond a certain limit where, perhaps, politics would no longer be the issue.

#### Nonpolitical Personalities

The very term "nonpolitical," which is now in significant use, certainly reflects a crisis in the image of politicians as a class. Behind this concept, defined in terms of removal from the political world, phenomena of very different natures and scope are in reality concealed. Obviously Coluche, Yves Montand and Bernard Tapie, although all three are situated outside the political world, occupy substantially different positions.

The proposed Coluche candidacy in the 1981 presidential election was specific in nature in that it was situated not only outside the area of politicians as a class but, above all, against it. The comic--and who could be surprised?--launched this attack in derisive fashion. It is true that this form of opposition to the world of politics derives in large part from a tradition of protest also symbolized by the chansonniers and caricaturists. But to understand the "Coluche phenomenon," one must also bear in mind the repercussions it provoked:

--among the people, first of all, because as Table III shows, 72 percent of those questioned assigned a critical dimension with regard to political figures and discourse to the Coluche candidacy. The humorist is also the interpreter of an antipolitical state of mind; and -- among politicians

themselves, on the other hand, since as Pierre Bourdieu stressed, they rose as a group to oppose the comedic candidate, in an eminently predictable reaction. However the frequently made charge of similarity with the Poujade concept is more surprising. After referring to the classic work by Stanley Hoffman on the Poujade movement, showing that Coluche, the candidate of the excluded, made use of none of the Poujade themes (racism, nationalism, anti-Parisianism, moralism), Pierre Bourdieu concluded: "And so the professionals, the politicians and journalists, try to refuse the 'rule breaker' the right of access given him by the mass of ordinary people (two-thirds of them approve the principle of his candidacy). Without a doubt, this is because by entering into the game without taking it seriously, without taking himself seriously, this extraordinary player threatens the very basis of the game, that is to say the belief and credibility of the ordinary players. The agents of power are caught red-handed abusing it."<sup>4</sup>

Table III

Here are various reasons for desiring to vote for Coluche in the presidential election. Is each of these, in your opinion, an important or an unimportant reason for such a desire?

(in %)

	<u>Important</u>	<u>Unimportant</u>	<u>Don't Know</u>
The French people have had enough of politicians, their promises and their speeches	72	16	12
The French people want to vote for Coluche because he enlivens the electoral campaign and his candidacy makes everyone think	52	33	15

Note: IFOP poll published in LE POINT on 12 January 1981.

Far removed from the derision Coluche embodies, Yves Montand represents a very different version of the nonpolitical personality, one more enduring and self-confident and less radical, in the sense that it does not emerge as hostile to the political game, but as a form of discourse on politics different from that of the professional politicians. But it also appears that while Yves Montand finds his right to speak out in a political debate confirmed, he is far from representing a credible alternative in the eyes of the public. In this connection and with all the usual reservations, one might point by way of illustration to an IFRES-LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS poll (30 October 1983). It showed that while 60 percent of the French people recognize the right of Yves Montand "to adopt a public position on the main current problems," 81 percent of them do not, on the other hand, want him to use his profession to engage in politics. Thus Yves Montand, legitimately entitled to participate in public debate, should not as a result thereof become a professional politician, but should remain outside this sphere of action to retain his credibility.

Those who have come to be called "socioprofessionals" represent a third category of "nonpolitical" personalities. The arrival on the public scene of individuals from the world of business, such as Francine Gomez, Gilbert Trigano or more recently, Bernard Tapie, in fact illustrates another way in which "nonpolitical" individuals relate to politics. This form is very different from that represented by Coluche or Yves Montand. What is evident here is the success of discussion of technical competence and practical efficiency closely related to the realities which really count. Professional success, of a private sort, in principle, becomes the privileged argument making the participation of these businessmen in the world of politics legitimate.

#### The Special Case of the Mayor

If the image of the political class as a whole seems rather negative, the privileged situation enjoyed by the mayor in the eyes of the public should however be emphasized.

From 1975 to January 1983, the SOFRES polls revealed a 6-point advance, placing him ahead of the deputy. The prestige accorded the mayor's post varies with the size of the community. When asked which elected official served the most useful function in their opinion, 39 percent of the persons interviewed in settlements with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants mentioned the mayor. The percentage increased to 44 percent in communities of 2,000 to 9,000 inhabitants, but on the other hand dropped to 34 percent for all communities with 9,000 or more inhabitants.<sup>5</sup> The determining factor here is visibly how close the elected official is to the population he represents. The same poll showed, moreover, that 51 percent of the French people feel that "to be a good mayor, one must be close to the people's concerns." Honesty (51 percent) and administrative ability (49 percent) are the two other qualities most often demanded of a mayor. It should be noted that none of these three criteria falls into the strictly political sphere, if we take that to mean representation of the voters' preferences in terms of parties.

This placement of numerous polls concerning the image of politicians in perspective makes it possible to set forth a series of hypotheses. Their validity is obviously limited by the nature of the material on which they are based, which is partial and contains some gaps. On the other hand, it pertains only to the image of politicians, and thus justifies no conclusions as to their real nature.

What appears to be the main focus of collective concerns today? The SOFRES-LE MONDE poll to which we have already referred clearly reveals the hierarchy of these concerns. To a question as to whether greater importance should be assigned to any one of the items on the list, the four items most often mentioned were crime (45 percent), unemployment (63 percent), the future of industry (42 percent) and purchasing power (37 percent).

Obviously, it is in no way surprising that the economic crisis should have an effect on what the citizens would like to see better dealt with in public action and discussion, that is to say, basically, the content of the concept of the public good. This suggests the formulation of the hypothesis that we

are seeing today a sort of shrinkage in the image of the public good, which is tending toward limitation to the economic sector. But this change affecting the nature of the public good could also be related to the discredit affecting our national politicians, while at the same time a relatively positive image of the roles and the individuals in local politics is developing. Would one not then be justified in venturing the notion that the selective discredit of which our national politicians are the victims has to do with the fact that it developed first as a reflection of differences on political choices, while the relative prestige enjoyed by the mayors is a result of the fact that they are seen mainly as administrators? When the public good tends to be viewed in terms of immediate economic problems, the valued figure is that of the administrator capable of managing matters at close hand.

Table IV

Which of the Following Elected Officials Serves the Most Useful Function, in Your Opinion?

	LA CROIX- SOFRES September 1975 Poll	NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR- SOFRES January 1977 Poll	January 1983 *
Deputy	39	42	35
Senator	6	5	4
Mayor	31	28	37
County councilman	10	9	8
Regional councilman	4	3	4
None especially	--	2	6
No opinion	10	11	6
	100%	100%	100%

\* SOFRES-LA CROIX survey conducted between 6 and 12 January 1983.

#### Concept of the Public Good

This development might take into account a certain deterioration in the concept of the political project. If the image of the public good is reduced to material and economic demands, what will become of the great projects which have marked the Fifth Republic, from the desire to create a "new society" to the hope of "altering life"?

#### Failure of the Representative Method?

At this point a difficulty arises. If it is agreed that the concept of the public good has been reduced to economic satisfactions, and moreover that there is a deterioration in the concept of the political project, one might wonder what elite groups will be responsible for embodying this utilitarian approach. Here we are indeed seeing the return, via another route, of the elite groups of technicians whom we said above seemed to be finding favor in the eyes of the French people.

An analysis of the polls reveals two characteristics which, it appears, alter the classic model of political representation, or at least the most common interpretation of the representative concept. In fact, what is usually meant by representative governments is political regimes wherein the governing leaders reflect and implement the attitudes and opinions of those who elected them, or more precisely, the majority of them.

The SOFRES-LE MONDE poll published on 6 September 1984 showed that 62 percent of the French people believe that "politicians do not deal with the main subjects affecting their lives." There is indeed there the stamp of discredit pertaining to current or potential government leaders. But this discredit affects politicians selectively. It affects elected officials (for example, deputies) more than administrators (for example, ministers). Thus it would seem that the role of representing political opinions and differences is being challenged more than the social administration function or that of government as such. But this takes us back to a basic difficulty in the representative government concept. If representation means reflecting the attitudes and opinions of the citizens, the conflicting political aspirations and interests of a society, and if on the other hand governing involves deciding between different solutions, and thus making choices inevitably going against the preferences of certain social groups, one can see that the very idea of representative government incorporates within it considerable ambiguity. The task of the elected official, who is both a representative and an administrator, bears the stamp of this tension.

The difficulty in representation is moreover increased by the plurality of mandates which makes the elected official simultaneously deputy, mayor and county councillor, the representative of different groups with sometimes differing interests.<sup>6</sup> Recent works on this subject indicate that a distinction must be made, both because of their nature and because of their effects, among different types of plurality of office (plurality in time, horizontal plurality and vertical plurality). These various forms invest the representative system with different distortions, which we will describe briefly.

--Plurality in time, by keeping elected officials in successive terms of office, at the very least hinders the free turnover of the elite, while at the same time contributing heavily to their professional competence and the personalization of the posts occupied.

--Horizontal plurality, defined as an accumulation of elective posts and executive, administrative or judicial functions, weakens the separation of powers.

--And finally, the holding of several elective posts (vertical plurality), apart from threatening the quality of the work done (which is often, moreover, delegated, in order to cope with the increase in the task load), concentrates political functions in the hands of a group which is limited by this very fact. For example, in December of 1983, 71.3 percent of the deputies held several posts. This is a substantial figure, and it would have been 82.1 percent (December 1982) if the results of the municipal elections had not

somewhat modified the situation. The widespread practice of allowing plurality of office, by favoring oligarchic tendencies and the professionalization of politicians, increases the distance between the elected official and the voter and directly attacks the representative principle itself.

A last point: the failure of the representative principle seems however less clear in the case of the mayor, the only elected official of whom the public has a positive image. As we have seen, this phenomenon is particularly clear in small communities. This is a result, naturally, of the proximity between the elected official and the voter, but it also has to do with the fact that almost all of the mayors of small communities devote all of their public activity to their municipal duties, as Table V shows.

Table V

Percentage of Mayor-Parliamentarians by Size of Community

<u>Size of Community</u>	<u>%</u>
Under 30,000 inhabitants	0.5
Over 30,000 inhabitants	36.0
Over 80,000 inhabitants	100.0

Note: Table based on data provided by Michel Reydellet in "Plurality of Office," REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC ET DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, May-June 1979, p 752.

Can one conclude from all this that the representative model has failed? A hasty answer might well be incomplete and fail to take into account the difficulty inherent in the representation concept itself, which is characterized by a plurality of meanings. In fact, as we have suggested above, there are not just one, but rather two representative models, just as there are two concepts of representation.

The one focuses on the reflection of diverse opinions, concerned with the recognition and reproduction in the representative body of the multiplicity of the conflicts, thus crystallized, in the social body.

The other places emphasis on the one hand on the representation of unity, the image of which, a contrario, conceals the reality of opposition, and on the other hand, on the delegation of power and the authority to decide and act in the name of the community.

This plurality in the meaning of the concept of representation allows us to imagine the extent to which each is a part of a different theoretical tradition. However, it is difficult within the context of this outline to link reflective representation with a trend of thought which could make a forceful impression. In the search for such a relationship, it would be necessary to disentangle a multiplicity of influences. On the other hand, what we term unity-authority representation, in that it establishes political

leadership by deciding instead and in place of the community, very clearly harks back to the political philosophy of Hobbes.

Thus it is not easy to conclude that there is a crisis pure and simple in the representative model. If there is, it remains to be determined which concept of representation is affected. Is it the representation which reflects diversity or that which provides the image of unity and authority, or again, is it both? The relatively positive image enjoyed by the socioprofessionals, the perceptible favor accorded elite groups of technicians, and simultaneously the discredit of which elected officials seem to be the victims--all of this could lead one to think that when it comes to a crisis in the representative system, it is more specifically a crisis in the concept of representation termed here "reflective representation."

Thus it does seem that, faced with the difficulties in the principle of reflective representation, another model is taking shape, placing stress on the function of delegation or administration to the detriment of the function of representation, viewed as a reflection of the attitudes adopted by the voters. This model results in emphasis on administrative competence as a criterion for the selection of elite groups. In any case, the dominant opinion seems to be moving toward a view of democracy which would regard it more as a means of selecting leaders. One cannot help but think here of Schumpeter and his rehabilitation of the "leadership" in a democratic direction. Schumpeter wrote that the only function of election is "to cause a national executive power, that is to say a government, to be born."<sup>7</sup>

#### What Kind of Crisis?

The prestige accorded the socioprofessional elites by the public is clearly visible in the answers to the question posed by the SOFRES. "Ministers can be chosen mainly from among those elected by universal suffrage or mainly from among expert technicians. Which seems to you to be the best solution?" Given the choice of solutions, 60 percent of the French people chose the second, while 26 percent preferred the first. Here again we encounter the notion that the majority of the people do not demand of the elite, as a priority, that they represent political opinions, but expect of them instead administrative competence, above all.

In this choice of a technocratic elite one can glimpse an important phenomenon: criticism of the political elites, but at the same time recognition of the social elites.<sup>8</sup> What is being challenged here is not then the authoritative position of a leading minority, but its claim to speak on behalf of the collective. Moreover, the vanity in the adamant insistence of the political elites on representation takes on its full meaning in the distortion noted between their discourse and the concerns of the public. Moreover, the fact that 69 percent of the individuals surveyed recognize political activity as a profession, which cannot as a result be pursued by "everyone," indeed seems to indicate acceptance of professionalization. When asked which of two opinions was closest to their own with regard to politicians, 69 percent of those surveyed chose the answer "it is better to have professional politicians, because this is a special line of work in which competence is necessary," while 22 percent said that "everyone should be able

to hold political office for a time, because it is not a specialized profession."<sup>9</sup> There is no criticism of the oligarchy here, justified by a rejection of the delegation of power to a minority, but rather a refusal to grant the leading elite the representative aspect it claims. As Jean-Marie Colombani and Jerome Jaffre wrote, the issue is not "professionalizing politics, as the second left has long urged,"<sup>10</sup> but of depoliticizing it.

Thus two basic characteristics seem to emerge. On the one hand, there is acceptance of professionalized politics, leading to a process of selection closer to delegation than reflective representation, since technical competence rather than proximity in terms of political choices is made the main criterion for choice. On the other hand, there is a tendency toward depoliticization, evidenced in the crisis of the concept of the political project. The success of Laurent Fabius with the public would strengthen this thesis. His image in fact links modernization and the technical aspects, while his statements, which he tries to represent as reflecting a consensus, minimize the ideological aspect.

The acceptance of political professionalization takes the form of a kind of division of labor between a political sector of which professional administrators take charge and a private (or local) sector into which the citizens retreat. Recognition of the leading function of the elite groups clearly shows that while politics is affected, it is not as a power phenomenon, since the authority of the elite group is not challenged, but as a claim to representation and reflection. From which one can deduce the fact that it is the nature of the mediation between the governors and the governed which remains to be defined.

From this point of view, the choice of a proportional voting method may seem a paradox. By risking a change in governmental authority in the interests of better representation of the diversity of political opinions, the government appears to be proceeding in a direction precisely opposite from what the public wants.

It would be well, however, to recall that the technique of polling the public to establish its view of politicians says nothing about the real development of this group of people or its functions. The image thus established could at first glance lead to the belief that what we are seeing here is a new version of the hackneyed "end of the ideologies" theme and of a consensual society. Such a conclusion would however be in serious danger of error. On the one hand, conflicts of opinion and interest remain within society, while on the other, even supposing that technical competence were to become ever more important as the criterion for selecting the elite, the very logic of the competitive game among the various elite groups forces them to differentiate themselves from each other politically. Finally, the fact that economic goals seem to constitute the basic concern is not, quite the contrary, a measure of consensus. By its nature, in fact, economic policy produces selective and unequal results. It affects different groups and interests differently (unlike the policies on defense or public order, for example) and by that very fact becomes the source of conflict.

FOOTNOTES

1. SOFRES, "Public Opinion 85," Paris, Gallimard, 1985.
2. SOFRES, op. cit., p 27.
3. SOFRES, op. cit., p 50.
4. P. Bourdieu, ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES, No 36-37, February-March 1981, p 7.
5. SOFRES-LA CROIX poll, published in LA CROIX, 3 January 1983.
6. On the phenomenon of the plurality of office, one can refer to the works of Michel Reydellet, in particular "Plurality of Office," REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE, May-June, 1979, pp 693-768, as well as "Plurality of Office and Political Representation," by Jeanne Becquart-Leclerc, a report to the Second Congress of the French Political Science Association within the framework of the round table on "Ancient and New Forms of Representation," Grenoble, 1984.
7. J. Schumpeter, "Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy," Paris, Payot, 1983 (second edition), p 355.
8. See Marc Guillaume and Claude Gilbert, "Political Obstinacy or the Representation Effort," a report to the Second Congress of the French Political Science Association, in connection with the round table on representation. The authors propose therein a definition of elite groups, social or political, in connection with the representation study.
9. SOFRES poll, LE MONDE, 6 September 1984.
10. LE MONDE, 6 September 1984.

Effects of Proportional Representation

Paris INTERVENTION in French Apr-May-Jun 85 pp 35-42

[Article by Daniel Prat: "Representation and Governability--Why the Proportional System?"]

[Text] It is decided. There will be no more discussion. It is not the time for moods! The battalions have already been marshaled for the conquest of the polls in 1986. The haste in concluding the debate on electoral reform has only been equaled by the energy expended a short time previously to persuade us of its importance. Why are we so convinced that the contemporary nature of this question, however, will not be exhausted with its transfer to the parliamentary agenda? Doubtless because the return to proportional balloting serves as a formidable catalyst for analysis of the present status of politicians and their relationship with the nation.

The choice of a new method of voting in fact condenses the main questions concerning the difficulty of democratic life under a representative system, beginning with the idea of representation itself, which has historically been built on a double paradox.<sup>1</sup> The representative system, that is to say the advent of assemblies with deliberative powers, won out over the concept of representation of private interest, around which the body politic was organized in the era of royal sovereignty. In order to be able to speak out on behalf of the nation as a whole, the representative had to be independent of the faction which had chosen him. But this same system could only be adapted to democratic ideals through the later combination of the representative mandate with the concept of representation, which presumes an adequate proportion between the representatives and those represented. The paradox is extended if we note that election, the great ritual of democratic legitimacy, borrows techniques which were perfected within the religious orders as a method of interpreting the will of divine providence.<sup>2</sup> The fascination of the clergy of all orders with the forms of balloting methods was characterized by almost alchemic aspects carried over into the mystery of mathematical distribution, with the conversion of votes into seats, thus making it possible to change lead into gold, or in other words the vanquished into the victor. It is in this way that the left wing would have been able to win a majority beginning in 1978 if there had been proportional representation for the legislative elections, but could have lost the 1981 presidential election with this same voting method.<sup>3</sup>

For all that, electoral law does not have founding status in all political systems. In the Anglo-Saxon tradition, it constitutes a basic and intangible factor, the veritable replacement of coronation and as such linked with the authority to command. On the other hand, in the French republican tradition, it is first of all viewed as a means for the expression of the various political movements, and therefore adaptable as situations develop. De Gaulle tried to reconcile the two traditions in 1958 by reestablishing district balloting to establish a government majority, while refusing, to the great detriment of Michel Debre, to make of it a provision on the constitutional level. The hostility of the greater part of the left wing toward this method of balloting derives from its rejection of the Fifth Republic, but also from its memory of the workers movement. The attachment of that movement to proportional representation was born of its initial search for legitimacy and its rejection of the political exclusion to which it was condemned by a regime administered by notables who controlled their districts by patronage. Both the communists and the socialists are the heirs to this common tradition, but they do not experience it in the same manner. For the PCF [French Communist Party] the proportional choice is a categorical imperative resulting from its general concept of political action, focused exclusively on the party and rejecting the very principle of representative democracy.<sup>4</sup> For the Socialist Party (PS), it is a tool of justice which must be reconciled with the need to prevent excessive scattering of the political forces. These positions of principle seemed doomed to diverge because of the unilateral benefit the PS derived from majority balloting with two rounds, which guaranteed its dominance within the union of the left, and then the winning of its position as a dominant party in 1981. The 47th Proposition of the candidate Mitterrand did indeed call for establishing proportional representation, but it left the door open to all formulas for mixed balloting while maintaining powerful

majority corrective measures, making it possible to foresee the concept of "instillation."<sup>5</sup> Now in the final analysis, the chief of state opted, against the will of a number of socialist leaders and elected officials, for the logic of rupture rather than adaptation. To understand the reasons for and the consequences of this choice, it is necessary first to assess its scope.

#### The Effects of Voting for Several Candidates on One Slate

This evaluation effort is hindered by three types of difficulties, as with every electoral reform.

1. The balloting method involves a multiplicity of dimensions, each with its specific nature (number of posts to be filled, delimitation of the districts, methods of voting, principle of converting votes into seats).

2. It constitutes but one variable factor in an institutional whole, the effects of which are combined with those of the other components in the political system.

3. Reform falls within a context in which the tropisms of national history intersect with the stakes in the current situation. This complexity explains the major disparities between the actual potential of a voting method and the expectations of the politicians. They share, to a very great extent, a mechanistic concept of the electoral apparatus, developed by means of hasty comparisons and predictions based on so-called sociological laws.<sup>6</sup> The fact that these convictions rest on an erroneous basis is secondary. The important thing is that they determine behavior.

The most spectacular change for the voters in 1986 will have to do with the abandonment of the slate with a single name for which to vote to the benefit of several. The dispute between these two systems gave rise to impassioned controversy during the history of the Third Republic. The slate with but one candidate was denounced as one of the main sources of political instability, to the extent that it encouraged individualistic conduct on the part of elected officials, working against the emergence of a system of modern parties.<sup>7</sup> However, nothing like this has developed since 1958. Taking the presidentialization of the system into account, the system of voting for a single name on a slate prevented neither the generalization of voting discipline in the National Assembly nor the gradual nationalization of electoral behavior. All in all, a relative point of equilibrium was established between the respective influence of the parties and the voters. The almost total control of nominations by the large parties allowed a structuring of the political space in terms of national ideological divisions. The search for solid local support through work pursued in the districts did, however, remain profitable for the deputies. Until these recent years, the influence of the prominence of the winner has remained perceptible, for example in the establishment of the poles of resistance to the communist decline or again the differential in the support available for the RPR and the UDF. With the system of voting for several names on the departmental slate, this balance has now been destroyed, to the benefit of the party apparatuses. By establishing the order of the candidates, they have the capacity to

anticipate the vote of the electors, thus invited to participate in a ratification process.

The control of the candidacies by the parties provides politicians with certain opportunities, if they want them. They can obtain a good place on the slates of candidates when, because of their "atypical" nature, they might have little chance of nomination if the slate carried a single name. Candidates who are women<sup>8</sup> or workers could benefit therefrom. These undeniable advantages of the polynominal departmental slate are obtained at the cost of serious negative counterparts. The most obvious of these have come to light within the socialist group--loss of the benefit of the work of personal contact done by the outgoing officials, centralization of the handling of candidacies, which is relinquished by the local sections, and the risk that minority factions will be throttled. The party which has heretofore been the most concerned with decentralization and internal democracy is also that with the least stability in its methods of external representation. One would be justified in fearing that the party system as a whole may take an additional step up the ladder of bureaucratization, in the Weberian sense of the term, in that the increase in the number of positions offered by the apparatus will be accompanied by a gradual diversion of the party goals toward priority for the reproduction of that apparatus.<sup>9</sup> The most nearly perfect form of party bureaucracy, that of the PCF, is made up precisely of a melange of relentless majority balloting--compulsory democratic centralism--for governing the internal life of the party and the adamant defense of a proportional system to guarantee its external representation. The possibility of combatting the weight of individuals of note by means of the system of voting for multiple names on a slate would seem as mythical as imagining that a single network of notables, that of the departmental federations, could concentrate a maximum of power. At present it controls the electoral offer in a space shared by the legislative and the regional elections, which is in addition the chief level to benefit from administrative decentralization. The president of the county council finds himself provided thereby with an exceptional opportunity for patronage.

The change in the territorial dimensions of the voting method allows undeniable progress to be made against the inequalities in geopolitical representation. The failure to redistrict since 1958, despite the shifts in the population, characterized by the rural exodus but even more so by the decline in the centers of urban concentration (the overrepresentation of Paris being much more scandalous than that of Lozere), had resulted in substantial distortions in the ratio between the number of elected officials and the number of voters. This situation could have been corrected under satisfactory conditions by the establishment of a legal procedure for reviewing districting, implemented under jurisdictional control. But another series of considerations worked in favor of departmental voting, that pertaining to the function of the deputy as such. District voting was accused of favoring, to the point of abuse, the role of the deputy as a local representative, as an agent interceding for the relief of the grievances of the local voters and the groups in his district,<sup>10</sup> to the detriment, in fact, of his legislative work and parliamentary activities. Would the removal of the elected official from the voters suffice to eliminate the image of the "social welfare deputy?" One can seriously doubt that it would. There will be no rehabilitation of the

national role of the deputy unless there is a drastic limitation of the plurality of office<sup>11</sup> and strengthening of the parliamentary institution itself in its control functions. Now electoral reform is not moving in the right direction. The plurality of office is but the concrete evidence of a political ossification characterized by the oligarchic tendency of the parties and the concentration of politicians as a group, both phenomena being strengthened by the introduction of proportional representation. As to the efficiency of parliamentary control, this will depend on the prior limitation of plurality, because it presumes that the deputies are not subject to the whims of the administration, as petitioners acting on behalf of the various local levels.

#### Continued Exclusion for Marginal Groups

The heart of the electoral reform consists of course of the search for a closer relationship between the votes and the seats won by the various political groups. It is a question of putting an end to the dynamics amplifying the majority voting trends, which enabled the right wing to win 73 percent of the seats with 44 percent of the votes in 1968, and the PS to win 58 percent of the seats with less than 38 percent of the votes in 1981. The electoral system chosen for 1986 nonetheless continues to be characterized by a substantial number of anamorphic effects. First of all, the departmental framework chosen involves a small number of seats, four at least, in a number of districts. Here geographic proportionality comes into contradiction with political proportionality, because there cannot be equitable distribution here with such a small number. The overrepresentation of the most powerful party is also favored by the absence of vote splitting, the distribution of the balance to the strongest average and by the 5 percent threshold, the discriminatory efficiency of which will come into play in the large departments, in particular Nord and Paris.<sup>12</sup> As a result, with the single exception of the National Front, it is clear that the small groups (ecologists, PSU [Unified Socialist Party], extreme left) will be excluded, with just one or two exceptions, from national representation. The marginal votes will no longer even have the counterparts they might have obtained in the event of withdrawals, following the elimination of the second round. This elimination, on the other hand, reverses the deal for the large parties: their representation is no longer subordinate to the play of alliances, since they are the almost exclusive beneficiaries of the distribution of seats in all of the departments. The argument of representative justice is thus revealed in a singular light, because one of two things must be true. Either this motivation is real, and in this case the means for achieving the goal are lacking, or else it is but a promotional argument concealing a less attractive reality.

This second hypothesis should be studied in comparison with the flexibility the large parties expect the new voting method to provide. The bipolarizing logic of majority voting with two rounds has in fact exerted an increasingly limiting effect, matched by the rise in the level of votes required to continue in the second round--5 percent of the votes cast in 1958, 10 percent of the registered voters in 1967, and 12.5 percent of the registered voters in 1975. Since "compulsory duels" have become the norm, the extent of the negotiations between the two rounds has shrunk drastically. But

bipolarization has above all led each large political family to embark upon agonizing strategic revisions. The Gaullists have had to abandon the hegemonic pretensions dating from the period of the founding of the Fifth Republic and adapt to the party mold. The centrist group has been forced to the point of breakup and abandonment of its desire to play the hinge party role. The communists have lost leadership of the left wing and accepted the principle of alternation in power. The socialist sector has only been able to assume its role in government leadership by conforming to an institutional framework contrary to its traditional philosophy. All of these adaptations have been forced by the limitations inherent in the presidential electoral apparatus and that of the legislature. Making the latter more flexible entails the serious consequential risk that it will be accompanied by another ebb tide. Now the party laments about the intolerable nature of bipolarization have only had a feeble echo from the electoral body.

#### Consensus on Bipolarization

The consensus on the institutions has strengthened along with bipolarization. The highest rates of participation are obtained when the voting is most bipolarized, since electoral mobilization occurs when the issue is designating government leaders rather than representatives. If the voters go along with bipolarization, it is because it provides them with a special means of determining who will govern, not only in the right wing-left wing confrontation, but within each coalition--in the arbitration between Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Jacques Chaban-Delmas in 1974, for example, or in the definition of the balance of power between François Mitterrand and Georges Marchais in 1981. This prevalence of the task of governing over that of representing is entirely clear in the case of the left-wing experience, with the observation that the substantial loss of representation by the president of the republic and the Socialist Party at the polls was not accompanied by any challenge to their capacity to serve until the end of their respective terms of office. The challenge to bipolarization posed by the electoral reform raises the issue of how to maintain this decision-making power for the electorate.

There remains the situational aspect, allowing François Mitterrand to remain in the Elysee Palace despite a left-wing defeat in the legislative elections. For him, it has the weight of probability. The drastic decision to abandon a mixed voting system and adopt proportional departmental representation is consistent with the desire to precipitate the redeployment of political forces. However this calculation seems very chancy, since it underestimates the slow operation of the adaptation mechanisms, which could be seen for example in 1958, when the conduct of the parties on the first round was the same as it would have been if the voting had remained proportional. In addition, the proximity of the 1988 presidential election has had an excessive effect on the strategy of the parties, particularly the CDS component of the UDF, the indispensable link with an effort toward opening in the center. The lockout imposed by Raymond Barre is the more formidable in that in the strategy of appeal to the charismatic leader, the introduction of proportional representation allows him to make greater capital of the disrepute of the party policy.<sup>14</sup> But the greatest uncertainty lies into the incipient crisis in the Socialist Party which, beginning with a question about the implications

of a return to proportional representation and based on the double question of the institutions and the choice of alliances, raises the issue of its very identity.

### The Risk of Instability

On the institutional level, the introduction of proportional representation inevitably raises the question of the stability of the regime. In terms of a scenario for 1986, one can envision a certain fragmentation of the political forces in the National Assembly (entry of the National Front, partial or total dissociation of the UDF) which would allow the president of the republic to establish temporary majorities. Instability would to some extent be contained, but by an increased imbalance in the branches to the benefit of the head of the executive branch. One can also imagine that the majority dynamics might extend to benefit the UDF-RPR alliance, in which case only an agreement to share jurisdiction could prevent a crisis for the regime, with the chief of state thereafter being deprived of decisive recourse before the electoral body through dissolution. A comparative study reveals the fact that instability is not inevitably a factor in proportional representation,<sup>15</sup> provided that majority corrective measures are available (as in the FRG), or that a dominant party is enduringly present (as in Sweden),<sup>16</sup> or that there is a political culture characterized by an aptitude for negotiation. The institutional safeguards are limited in efficiency. Neither the allocation of major prerogatives to the chief of state nor his election by universal balloting constitutes in itself sufficient protection against ministerial instability.<sup>17</sup> Finland, which has the greatest similarities with the current French system, has had governments since 1919 with an average duration of no more than a year.

### The Impossible Presidential System

On the basis of consideration of the voting method, certain PS leaders have embarked on an institutional folly, rejecting the regime of the Fifth Republic,<sup>18</sup> or, on the pretext of adaptation, proposing a real Sixth Republic. A persistent rumor gives credit to the idea of prolonging the introduction of proportional representation by setting up a "veritable" presidential regime.<sup>19</sup> This is a proposal which once again illustrates Olivier Duhamel's thesis concerning the traditional inconsistency of the left wing on constitutional matters. This juridical-political monster has the unique characteristic of postulating a permanent adequation between the presidential and the parliamentary powers, while simultaneously destroying the means which could provide it. The provisions set forth in 1958 to remedy the lack of a parliamentary majority would disappear at the very moment at which that majority became more problematical as a result of the electoral law. In the event of a conflict, the mutual irrevocability of these powers (neither dissolution nor ministerial responsibility) would create a situation which could not be resolved except by means of a coup d'etat. Need we recall that these were precisely the circumstances which allowed the overthrow of the Second Republic in 1851, and the advent of Pinochet in 1973? Or again, that the American presidential system, for its part, is strictly a majority system?

## The Role of the Socialist Party

This kind of proposition is indicative of what is often the status of the discussion on institutional problems. It is a realm in which the professionals in politics have a high level of mastery, not so much due to their varying competence as to the maneuvering room they have for raising an issue for public debate. The situation is different with regard to economic, social and international problems, which are basically imposed upon them by their environment. Institutional issues rarely arouse the masses, but they lend themselves very well to tactical maneuvers on the political market. The discussion of the presidential system can serve as a prolegomenon to a synthesis motion in a socialist congress, just as on the right, the coexistence argument decides the control of patronage achieved between Raymond Barre and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

In the case of the PS, something more profound comes into this discussion involving its identity. The presidentialization of the party<sup>20</sup> has been simultaneously a means of acceptance of the Fifth Republic, a master weapon in the conquest of power and the tool of its subordination, once power was won. This party's chances of remaining in the majority after 1986 are dwindling, and quite apart from whether François Mitterrand remains in the Elysée Palace, the entire issue of its relationship to the institutions is raised. Further doubt develops as to its desire to give priority to the exercise of power over a retreat to the opposition role of protest. Taking refuge in constitutional debate is also a manner of avoiding the issue of the proportional system as such, which will relax the institutional constraints to the benefit of the interparty balance of forces. In this last connection, the reality is at the least discouraging, since the PS has no hope of regaining the political space majority voting opened up for it. The communist issue is circumvented, but under the worst conditions. The PCF, freed of the dynamics of the effective vote, is regaining full mastery over a unified electorate which is now captive. When Lionel Jospin said: "I think it is illusory in the long run and perhaps dangerous in the short run to attempt to tie up the PCF in the wrappings of a voting method,"<sup>21</sup> he was making a double assertion, first regarding the impossibility of union and second, the impossibility of abandoning the unified communist electorate in a blind alley. As Paul Thibaud noted,<sup>22</sup> each voting method corresponds to a way of getting out of the union of the left. The proportional system does this by dividing up territory, and majority voting by consecrating the socialist hegemony on the left. The former also entails rejection of the goal of rebuilding the left wing.

### A Closed Political Class

With regard to the party system, proportional representation leads to a strengthening of powers and simultaneously removes responsibility from the leaders, no longer under the control of universal suffrage. It encourages the parties to develop their singularity in the eyes of the electorate, not out of any concern for better adaptation to social diversity, but so that their own social considerations will prevail on the political market. In a situation of keen competition involving parties close to each other, a characteristic image must be established prior to the election, but even more important, there must be no definition of the ways and means which would allow a majority compromise

afterward. The marriage of doctrinal intransigence and the opportunism of practice becomes in fact a structure, a prerequisite to accession to power.<sup>23</sup> The increasing illegibility of projects involving the nation aggravates the chronic fragility of the public space in a country in which the political culture remains imbued with administrative secrecy. In order to understand the impact of electoral reform, one must in fact take into account preexisting characteristics, such as the pronounced dissociation of the social and the political aspects, the closed nature of the political class because of the linkage between political professionalism and the omnipresence of high public office in the leadership roles,<sup>24</sup> and again, the mediocrity of party images and membership in the eyes of the public.<sup>25</sup> Now, none of these factors can be improved by making the parties autonomous in terms of the voters. The reverse is more likely. One might respond that the current situation is a result of the old majority dynamics, but its inherent feature is precisely that it introduces the practices of semidirect democracy, which, at least in part, compartmentalize representative mediation.

In the final analysis, it is indeed in the realm of establishing political choices, in other words governability, that the evaluation of the voting method should be situated. Certain advocates of proportional representation have expressed the view, moreover, that this is the realm in which it could be most effective. Accepting that the bipolar majority system would remain in operation for electoral practices (cf the 1985 cantonal elections), it was their belief that it failed to function on the governmental level, first in 1976 with the Giscard d'Estaing-Chirac break, and then in 1984 with the departure of the PCF. Under these circumstances, the proportional system, by returning flexibility to the political game, favored governmental adaptation to ideological developments affecting alternatively the left wing and the right. In order to assess how this analysis applies, one must recall in synthesis the characteristics of the two main methods of settling conflicts.

--The majority model was defined by the clear establishment of the boundary between the majority and the minority, the absence of participation by the opposition in legislative activity, the concentration of the power of decision in the executive branch, the legitimizing of these decisions as the essential role for the parliament, and the discipline of elected officials.

--On the contrary, the proportional model involved an uncertain differentiation between the majority and the opposition, participation by the latter in legislative activity, more diffused power, involving an important negotiating role for the parliamentary commissions, and autonomy for the elected officials.

#### A Perhaps Bitter Lesson

Any transition from the first model to the second presumes a certain institutional rebalancing, but there is a democratic cost which is the higher the stronger the proportionalist dynamics is, in terms of loss of control of the voters because of the autonomy acquired by the politicians and the dilution of political responsibility. This cost may be tolerable if it is the price to be paid to maintain the integrity of a national community. This is the case when the political divisions are the expression of a cultural

segmentation of society, when for religious, linguistic or ethnic reasons, differentiated subcultures become institutionalized,<sup>26</sup> as they have in Holland or Belgium. This is not the case for France, for which the choice of a method of managing conflict arises within a national identity which hardly poses any problem, except for the sequels of decolonization. What is at issue then is the type of politics to which the method of settling conflicts adopted, and its adaptation to the needs, leads. The development of the political structure toward a dominant proportional system favors distributive politics, taking the place of regulatory politics.<sup>27</sup> While the latter contributes to the drafting of general rules, arbitrating among the interests pursued by large groups in situations of conflict, distributive politics is characterized by the tendency to break down the decision-making process into a complex of microsectorial, independent issues involving little conflict. Such a system is consistent with unstable political majorities, to the extent that it functions on the basis of an exchange of influence principle, governed by secret negotiations between a part of the majority and a part of the opposition. The field of compromise is limited, however, to the specific interests of the party clienteles, and could not extend to the major concerns of society.<sup>28</sup> Applied to France, the logic of distributive politics would thus allow it to manage minor conflicts, but it would be ill-adapted to an efficient battle on the part of the public authorities against unemployment. It would force France to abandon any pretensions in the realm of foreign, and in particular European, policy, and, in the end, to abandon the development of a defense policy based on nuclear armament.<sup>29</sup> Each of these choices is, naturally, capable of becoming the subject of a debate throughout the entire democratic system, but a policy cannot be pursued with just any method of governability. Beyond the electoral reform of 1986, which may perhaps be only an epiphenomenon of short duration, it is there that the main lesson lies. One can take the risk of destroying the stability of an institutional whole through a new electoral dynamics, on condition that one can obtain thereby a great increase in legitimacy for the improvement of democratic representation, or a great increase in efficiency in the capacity for governmental adaptation. Unless one can make a choice between these two goals, the lesson could be a bitter one.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. See P. Avril, "Commentary on the Origins of Representation," Congress of the French Political Science Association, January 1984.
2. See L. Moulin, "The Religious Origins of Modern Electoral and Deliberative Techniques," *REVUE INTERNATIONALE D'HISTOIRE POLITIQUE ET CONSTITUTIONNELLE*, January 1953.
3. F. Bon, in undertaking this exercise in "proportionalist retrosimulation" (*POUVOIR*, No 32, 1985), takes great care to specify that, if the application of a proportional discount to the votes recorded during an election involving proportional balloting can enlighten us about the characteristics of the various modes of balloting, it cannot be used in a historical reconstitution. Any alteration in the electoral rules involves in fact a development in the conduct of the political protagonists which it is

impossible to take into account in a calculation undertaken "all other things being equal."

4. See O. Duhamel, "The Left Wing and the Fifth Republic," PUF, 1980, pp 536 et seq.
5. The social program utilized a mixed formula with the Weill-Raynal system as its inspiration, combining voting for a single name within each district with proportional correction on the regional and national levels.
6. On the hit parade of ideas contributed, the "laws" attributed to M. Duverger (majority voting with one round "yields" a biparty system, the same system with two rounds leads to bipolarization, and proportional representation to a splintered multiparty system) always rank high, despite their silly determinism, caricaturing the thinking of the author of the "political parties."
7. Out of fear of this instability, M. Debre came out for majority slate voting in 1958, and out of defiance of the parties, de Gaulle imposed a return to the "republican tradition" of district voting.
8. In 1982, the average percentage of female parliamentarians in nine European proportionalist countries was 15.2 percent, with major national variations (30 percent in Sweden as compared to less than 10 percent in Italy), but with a threshold always higher than the average rate in the countries with majority voting, such as France and Great Britain, established at 4.5 percent (J. Mossuz-Lavau, M. Sineau, "Women as Political Personnel in Europe," Council of Europe, 1984). This rate varied in France between 7 percent in 1946 and 1.3 percent 1958, reaching 5.3 percent in 1981. In view of the number of outgoing socialists, a low rate of "incoming women" might be expected in 1986, even with proportional representation.
9. According to P. Bordieu, as the process of institutionalization advances and the mobilization apparatus developes, the weight of the imperatives having to do with the reproduction of the apparatus and the posts it provides, binding the incumbents by means of all kinds of material or symbolic interests, increases constantly, both in reality and in people's minds as compared to those who would impose the achievement of the stated goals of the apparatus. And one can understand that the parties may thus be led to sacrifice their programs in order to remain in power or simply to continue to exist ("Political Representation," ACTES DE LA RECHERCHE EN SCIENCES SOCIALES, No 36-37, February-March 1981, pp 20-22).
10. This phenomenon is evident in an analysis of the content of deputies' oral and written questions. See J.-C. Masclet, "A Deputy for What Purpose?", PUF, 1982.
11. Despite the statements of principle and the study reports, reform is constantly being postponed. This situation is, however, excessively unfair, because it gives rise to distortions in access to political resources for those with multiple posts and the other elected officials, who are by

far the most numerous. This imbalance has not been reduced by the alternation in power and the advent of new socialist elected officials, since plurality of office increased among deputies from 79.2 percent in 1978 to 82.1 percent in 1982. While it decreased after the 1983 municipal elections for the communists (61.4 percent) and the socialists (67.5 per-cent), this was due to the electoral setbacks rather than any kind of self-limitation (see J. Becquart-Leclercq, "Plurality of Office and Political Representation," Congress of the French Political Science Association, January 1984).

12. In his scale of constraints, meaning the regrouped combinations which impose various voting methods on the protagonists in political life, Jean-Luc Parodi ("The Fifth Republic and the Test of Proportional Representation," *REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE*, Vol 33, No 6, December 1983) places departmental proportional representation close to the least constraining majority voting methods.
13. See J. Tournon, "Election of Representatives, Election of Government Leaders," Congress of the French Political Science Association, January 1984.
14. The central ambiguity in the philosophy of the Barre supporters lies in this conjunction of the political liberalism demanded and a strategy of charismatic assembly pursued in negation of the legitimacy of pluralism and the regulation of the system by alternation in power. This double debate allows a "broad sweep" from the liberal-libertarian intellectual strata on the rise to the traditional middle classes on the decline. Where the former hear an appeal for modernization, the latter see the old Poujade antiparlamentarianism formula.
15. On the basis of a study covering 13 countries with proportional representation, it was found that between 1945 and 1976, the proportion of legislatures involving only one government came to 50 percent (J.-L. Parodi, "The Proportionalization of the Institutional System," *POUVOIRS*, No 32).
16. In order to achieve such a status, the PS would have to come close not to 30 percent, but 40 percent. This is an unlikely achievement if we take into account the fact that the PS can rally more voters in its support on the first round of a majority ballot than by proportional representation, as is shown by a comparison of the European elections in 1984 and the cantonal elections in 1985.
17. See M. Duverger, "Check to the King," Albin Michel, 1978, and Center for Comparative Analysis for Political Systems, "The Semipresidential Regimes," January 1983.
18. "The socialists do not have to make themselves the defenders of the 1958 institutions. They do not forget that they gave rise to a legalized 'quasi coup d'etat,' or in any case, extreme pressure exerted on the legitimate regime to yield" (L. Jospin, *LE MONDE*, 10 April 1985).

19. The campaign waged by the modernist left, in particular the Jean Moulin Club, in favor of the presidential system at the beginning of the Fifth Republic had a very different meaning (see O. Duhamel, "The Left and the Fifth Republic," pp 197 et seq.). This was a stage along the path toward acceptance of the institutions of the Fifth Republic, reflecting above all the choice of the majority system. The revision proposals entailed a procedure of dissolution-resignation foreign to a "veritable" presidential system.
20. See G. Grunberg, "The PS as a President-Making Machine," INTERVENTION, No 5-6, 1983.
21. LE MONDE, 10 April 1985.
22. LE MONDE, 3 April 1985.
23. A dominant majority system obviously does not eliminate the demagogic aspect of electoral promises, but unlike the proportional system, it offers a premium, often decisive, to the parties benefitting from the effects of a prior announcement concerning coalitions and program compromises.
24. The facts have been very little altered on this point by political alternation in power. On the basis of a recent study on the role and definition of high-level public office ("Forward, Children of the Phratry," LE MONDE, 28-29 April 1985), M. Dagnaud and D. Mehl conclude: "The bastions of the leading class have sometimes been shaken but they have never been breached by the socialist regime. New men have been established in power, but the socioprofessional profile of the political-administrative elite has not been 'upset' as a result."
25. Reform comes within a context of crisis within the political class which strikes at the elected officials more harshly than at the technocrats. To a question as to whether ministers should be chosen from among expert technicians or among elected officials, 60 percent of those surveyed favored the first response, and only 26 percent the second (SOFRES, LE MONDE, 6 September 1984).
26. A. Lijphart uses the term "consociative democracy" to describe this situation, when the whole of the elite, organized in a cartel, takes charge of the government to ensure the stable functioning of a democracy with a fragmented political culture (A. Lijphart, "Consociative Democracy," in "International Comparison in Political Sociology," by M. Dogan and D. Pelassy, Litec, 1980, p 211).
27. This typology was developed by Th. J. Lowi and was set forth in the work "Parliamentary Conduct" by J.-Y. Cherot, Economica, 1984.
28. The advocates of "conceptual majorities" should give more thought to the Italian experience. The multiplicity of votes there won a broad majority, with all the parties being associated in the work of legislation, but the regime is paralyzed on basic political issues.

29. It will be noted that to date, the three Western nuclear powers--the United States, Great Britain and France--have been governed by strictly majority systems.

Political, Administrative Elites

Paris INTERVENTION in French Apr-May-Jun 85 pp 54-55

[Article by Monique Dagnaud and Dominique Mehl: "The Leading Class in the Socialist Era"]

[Text] When the left wing wins an election, the establishment trembles. Rumor suggested bloody decapitations and hinted at an unprecedented turnover among those in power. Today, a balance sheet can be struck. The ministerial teams have been reorganized, many of the administrative offices have been reactivated, and the top levels of public and nationalized enterprises have been remodeled. Does France, as a result, have a different head? Has the socialist government substantially altered the profile of the leading elite? Our studies, among others, make it possible to trace the following development.<sup>1</sup>

The left wing has modified the social mechanisms operating in the selection of the elite very little. There were those who thought they were justified in announcing the advent of a republic of professors. However, their role remains limited to the socialist group in the National Assembly, a body whose importance has been singularly reduced within the context of the institutions of the Fifth Republic. They continue to be practically barred from the major administrative offices and the top level of the national enterprises. They have found their way a little more extensively than under right-wing governments into the ministerial cabinets, but they hold only 13 percent of the positions there. And most often, this enthronement in the seats of political decision-making does not guarantee them brilliant careers in the future. The administrative elite, the distribution of which is organized on the basis of the hierarchy of the public bodies, remain in the seats of power. Of course, one can see a certain evolution. In the ministerial offices, the weight of the public bodies<sup>2</sup> has been somewhat weakened to the benefit of administrative bodies enjoying less prestige--those of the civil administrators, in a first phase (Mauroy government), and those with various engineering and inspection duties in a more recent era (Fabius government). The finance inspectorate has been stripped of several important offices on the Rue de Rivoli, and the diplomatic corps has been supplanted on the top level in certain embassies and administrative offices, to the benefit of atypical individuals who did not pursue this "career." Ten or so of the socialist faithful have, thanks to foreign tours of duty, infiltrated the Council of State. Whether in order to place some of its proteges, or to "set an example," the left wing has thus effected some openings. But it must be noted that they remain limited.

The farther one moves from the purely political sphere, and the closer one comes to the top levels of the leading public or nationalized structures, the more the continuity in the profiles of the leaders is evident, and the clearer the priority given educational pedigrees, the public body system and

professional recognition becomes. The farther the socialist advance in their experiment in managing affairs, the more expertise governs appointments. Finally, with the combination of social legacy and educational success, it does not appear that the left-wing government has promoted any more of the "sons of the people" to the spheres of power than did the preceding government. The classic leading class has been able to maintain its position in the face of the "pink wave" relatively well. It has done this by using its educational trumps, whose aura has never been dimmed in the eyes of the socialists. This has been done by continuing allegiance to, or at least acceptance of, republican legitimacy. The universe of socialist militants and a part of the party apparatus (made up of teachers and middle-level cadres) find themselves kept at a distance by the social, vocational and educational careers of the elite in place on the top state and nationalized enterprise levels. This distance is reflected in the values and the positions set forth on both sides. Even if it is less clear in the most recent appointments, politicization nonetheless characterizes the men promoted in the wake of the leftist success. Membership in the PS and certificates of militancy have been the "master cards" for gaining access to ministerial offices much more frequently than under other governments. These qualifications also, but with less application, provide access to the major administrative bodies. On the other hand, they fade in importance for access to the highest levels of the nationalized enterprises. It is not that the new administrators put in place by the left have not frequented political circles (the majority have spent some time in ministerial offices, particularly the Elysee or Matignon Palace or the Ministry of Industry), but they generally did so under the most varied party skies. As a result, having roots in the socialist intellectual movement is the characteristic above all of the new incumbents in high-ranking state posts.

In the general staffs of the ministries, a considerable proportion of Socialist Party regulars and a handful of professional trade unionists or paid association employees can be noted (15 percent of the total during the Mauroy period, and 12 percent today). Militant activists entrusted with responsibilities in the socialist sections and sometimes holding local elective posts make up a major part of these staffs (about a third). However, the typical adviser is not a frenetic veteran of poster-placing activities or neighborhood meetings, but rather a specialist drawn from the administrative pool who, in the course of the 1970s, was a member of PS commissions. Put in another way, he is a desk worker whose militant activity is characterized by expertise. All in all, the leading class in power today is not entirely the same as before, nor is it entirely different. The method of selection remains the same in many respects. In some cases, a substantially less elitist approach to the paths of access to power has emerged. One qualification has gained in value--the membership card. These appointees often boast a cultural identity which differentiates them from the former leaders, although the culture of high-level public office is a bond which links the old and the new leaders. In the main, the new leaders are the product of a new generation, one which gained access to politics through the war in Algeria and the events of May 1968, who bathed in the atmosphere of cultural renewal in the years between 1970 and 1980, and who gained professional qualifications in this period while remaining bound to the partisan universe of the left wing.

#### FOOTNOTES

\* CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research], Center for the Study of Social Movements.

1. This article is a summary of a report prepared by the authors for LE MONDE under the title "Forward, Children of the Phratry" (see LE MONDE DU DIMANCHE, 28-29 April 1985).
2. Finance Inspectorate, Council of State, Audit Office, Department of Mines, Department of Civil Engineering.

#### Multiple Elective Positions

Paris INTERVENTION in French Apr-May-Jun 85 pp 56-60

[Article by Francois Dupuy and Jean-Claude Thoenig: "Plurality of Office--Privilege or Necessity?"]

[Text] The French administrative apparatus is not the merciless monolith so often denounced. Surprising in its inventiveness, "it is composed of little pieces, a complex of agents and undertakings deriving their homogeneity from their renewed adaptation to the demands and the needs of the citizens and their elected officials."

Francois Dupuy and Jean-Claude Thoenig, both researchers at the CNRS and experts on administrative studies, have just published a survey on this subject, "The Administration in Bits and Pieces," published by Fayard, from which we have extracted the analysis of the role played by the individuals elected to "plurality of office" in the administration and local political life. Far from being a privileged caste, as is most often believed, they are also, because they hold multiple posts, essential intermediaries between the central authority and the citizens.

A politician may hold one, two or three elective offices at a time--town councillor, county councillor, national or European parliamentarian. We are excluding here other offices which do not, or not as yet, involve election by universal suffrage, but which are often attached to those already mentioned--regional councillor, city councillor, member of the boards of directors of mixed economic companies or intermunicipal unions, etc. The most important office on each level is that most sought: mayor in the municipality, president of the county council in the department, president of the city in the urban concentration, parliamentarian or prime minister. The club of the "super-multiple-officeholders" is a selective one, but what a list of names there are, both in the opposition and in the majority, in the North as in the South: Pierre Mauroy, Jacques Chirac, Gaston Defferre, Jean Lecanuet, Olivier Guichard, etc. At the same time, this club is regularly expanded thanks to the advantages of universal suffrage. A veritable premium is accorded to plurality of office: a candidate who already holds an elective post is about three times as likely to be elected to another as his competitors who hold no office, whatever their party or ideological affiliation.

The majority of the great democratic countries (United States of America, United Kingdom) prohibit or seriously limit plurality of office in principle. In France, it gives rise to political debate at regular intervals. The arguments against plurality of office are confused. Some have an obvious moral aspect. Down with privilege! Why should so few men occupy so many posts, earning so much compensation so relatively exempt from taxation, above all at a time when the division of labor is an issue? Moreover, a closed class of professional politicians who monopolize elective posts is created, thus going against the requirement of participation in a modern democracy. Now the question raised for debate never leads to anything. Neither Valéry Giscard d'Estaing nor François Mitterrand was able, during his presidency, despite their promises, to limit the practice of plurality of office. To alter this phenomenon is to strike at the heart of national and local public life, by definitively splitting the political scene and the nature of public affairs (national on the one hand and local on the other), which would strengthen the role of the parties, and by redistributing power between the political and the administrative realms, to the benefit of the latter. In this connection, one fact merits serious attention. Politicians hold multiple office, civil servants do not. One can be a senator and mayor, or a minister and county council president. It is prohibited to be a prefect and a subdivisionary or a central administration director and a departmental director. Now this prohibition on multiple office within the administrative sector confirms the superiority of politicians over bureaucrats.

A multiple officeholder at work is a spectacle which deserves attention. He serves as mayor in his commune, president of the county council and a parliamentarian in Paris. He has the right of access everywhere, from the office of the minister to that of the chief official of the canton. While the civil servants muddle through the formal channels of communication, he is mobile and personally omnipresent. This is a formidable advantage in pursuing his business, but also in his dealings with civil servants. This is true to the extent that the multiple officeholder becomes an echo chamber for communication with the administration. He can make his departmental director understand that having paid a visit to the office in Paris, he believes it advisable for the director to make the decisions on certain cases that would suit the elected official. The greatest advantage of plurality of office lies in facilitating communications within the administration itself. The elected official can go to the minister's office to plead a case which the departmental director cannot or does not dare send along through the normal channels of hierarchic transmission. In his way, the elected official simplifies the action taken.

The multiple officeholder presents matters as he sees them, with his ideas. From this to exerting influence is but one step, easily taken. The multiple officeholder says what he wants or what he does not want in any given case. At the very least, he may say nothing but the government employees will guess what he is prepared to accept and what he would reject. And as his is a constant presence, in any case more intense and forceful than the hierarchic pressure or the exchange with colleagues in other departments, it is his viewpoint, his rationale which the civil servants gradually adopt, without even realizing it. There are no formal meetings in his office, no explicit

plans, no compromising pressures. The integration develops from day to day, unspoken, and as the problems arise or the opportunities present themselves.

Certain multiple officeholders go farther. From correcters of wrongs, they become veritable administrative entrepreneurs. They seek to develop their territory, they hope to achieve things requiring the cooperation of several ministries or which go against custom. And then it is they who place pressure on the entire system. Paying visits to Paris and making telephone calls to the prefect, they obtain funds, mobilize departments and launch campaigns. Through intermediary offices, they place their mark on their regions: an urban development plan here, an industrial complex there. The prefect is their prefect, no longer a majestic father figure, but an attentive colleague.

The work of administrative integration as performed by the multiple officeholder involves a great art. It takes talent, in addition to the legitimacy of universal suffrage, to carry it off. Playing the potentate, thundering threats, slipping into authoritarianism, directly involving departments in petty political maneuvers sometimes bordering on scandal--these are not the indicated practices. The territorial officials of the state have their dignity as well, and the public is watching. On the other hand, the multiple officeholder knows how to put in a word where needed, to play on weak points, to sort out information knowledgeably and to exploit division when needed, exaggerating the consequences of rigidity in Machiavellian fashion, in order subsequently to play a unifying role, that of the project sponsor or acceptable coordinator.

If political influence is a constant factor, it is not intolerable. For each government employee taken separately, it is reflected in suggestions, information or the lack of reaction. At the extreme, the most powerful multiple officeholder is one who does not need to speak: silence serves his purpose. On the overall level of all the employees and all of the offices in the canton or the department, these suggestions, this information, this lack of reaction gives rise to an integrated structure. Each operates in his own corner, but the whole, finally, evidences a certain cohesion. Everything works as if the administration were operating on the basis of the multiple officeholder as the pivot of its action, its point of reference. No question of low-cost housing here, because the electoral clientele supporting the elected official might reject it, while elsewhere a road will be improved because it will be evident that a system in such condition, with a risk of accident it entails, will displease the public and thus the multiple officeholder. In short, it suffices for him to exist for the course of administrative action to be altered.

Resisting the influence of the multiple officeholder is a very risky attitude for a civil servant, since that officeholder can get around the obstacle and can also go direct to a superior hierarchical level. It is in general the civil servant who loses out or yields, either to safeguard his career or following a transfer. In his everyday life, he is subject to a subtle and surreptitious political influence, but neither threats nor intimidation. The tradition of protocol is such that before appointing a territorial official, his hierarchic superior alerts or even sounds out the multiple officeholder concerning the possible choice. It is the prefect who will welcome the

politician at the station each time he returns from Paris. In the final analysis, this serves as a sort of guarantee of good administration, and everyone benefits thereby. The departments do not pull in opposite directions. They gain in autonomy with regard to their hierarchy. The success of the multiple officeholder benefits the government employees. Such an officeholder keeps his prefect 10 or even 12 years, while the average turnover in each post is every 2 to 3 years. When the multiple officeholder becomes a cabinet member, he often takes his prefect with him to Paris, making him the head of his office staff or compensating him by giving him serious responsibilities at the head of a nationalized enterprise. The civil servant, for his part, does not like changing his political interlocutor very much. Each local situation, each multiple officeholder has certain peculiarities. The civil servant probably does not have a similar relationship with the local political circles in Lot or Moselle. Establishing a relationship with a new elected official would take time. And if there is no cumulative officeholder, the civil servant will often conclude that the department is a desert and that the activity of his own office there is hindered, with the ministry neglecting its duties.

Politicians who have a strong influence on administrative offices and civil servants involved in the play of influence--there is no spectre of party use of the state and corruption due to illicit traffic in special favors. Without denying the existence of "gray areas" on the boundary of the licit and the illicit here, sociologists note that the coexistence of multiple officeholders and civil servants is a phenomenon with an entirely special form and function, that of a network serving to integrate disparate complexes. The links and the exchanges of influence between civil servants and cumulative office holders, while they can be important for the individual interests of the partners involved, represent a public fact which serves the collective function of rebalancing the power between the sphere of representation and that of the bureaucracy.

Not enough consideration is given to the phenomenon of the multiple officeholder. He is the pivot of public administration. In the vast majority of departments and regions, one or in a few cases two major leaders dominate the political and administrative scene. Deputy-mayor, senator-president of the county council--one always comes back to them. They are believed to be incorruptible. Neither an exception to the democratic rule nor an accident thanks to exceptional personality, the multiple officeholder constitutes what the sociologists call a structure. His role exceeds his own person, since through plurality of office, the entire local political world finds consistency above and beyond the administrative sphere, and thus in the final analysis counts more heavily and has the last word. The administration of public affairs is affected and conditioned by the presence, the interests or the standards of an individual, a group, an environment. The multiple officeholder is the agent who integrates the administration. But he is also and at the same time an agent of integration for the local political world.

First of all, the multiple officeholder is someone who has weight because of his personal presence. He is seen in numerous places. He meets with mayors from different sectors. Officials come to him who perhaps do not meet among themselves, representing competitive associations, trade unions, owners'

organizations, etc. Little of what happens in the collective escapes him. And if there is something truly important of which he is unaware, then this would be a sign of his failure.

How does he function in his collective? He is not a party "boss" who rewards only his friends and punishes his enemies. On the contrary, he allocates his attention in rather open fashion. He speaks to all forces together. He is not the disciplined executor of a political party policy. It is instead more often he who directs the local branch of his party, when such exists. Except in the Communist Party, the elected official is largely autonomous. He does very little through a party machine or through third persons who would do his work for him. He is present in the field, in the press, at the banquets and ceremonies. He spares himself no trouble and encourages direct meetings. He likes interpersonal relations and renders service. His party label is paralleled by a legitimacy acquired through the services rendered to the people. His capacity for administrative integration is his basic weapon against his political adversaries.

He places his administrative relations in the service of those to whom he believes he should render service. Does a subordinate have a tax problem or does he find his telephone bill too high? The multiple officeholder will advise him, or even undertake to settle the matter himself. The advantage is clear. The citizen, even if he lives in one of the most distant areas and is totally unfamiliar with administrative secrets, has in the multiple officeholder a short circuit for access to and obtaining action on the highest level of the administration. For the cumulative officeholder, the service rendered is a part of his electoral strategy. In exchange for his favors as a courtier and spokesman, he can hope to win one or more votes. In a way, because of the difficulty of access to it, the administration provides the political notable with a reward.

On the other hand, administrative action serves to screen the intervention of the multiple officeholder in local affairs. Contrary to what happens in other countries such as Belgium or Holland, where, through the parties, it is the elected political officials on the higher territorial level who participate directly in the affairs of the elected officials on the lower level, the relation in France between the multiple officeholder and the rest of the local political world is indirect. For example, the mayors are not at all pleased if the county councillor takes over too much of their role in municipal affairs. They can much more readily accept the advice of civil servants. However, the multiple officeholder has an advantage. He can work with local elected officials, his colleagues, indirectly, through intermediary government employees. The multiple officeholder inspires and coordinates the activities of the administrative departments, each of which, in its sector of authority and in its territory, influences and inspires the activities of the municipalities. If the local political game allows coordination of the various administrative activities, this administrative integration, in return, makes it possible to exert an influence on that same political life.

But the advantage enjoyed by the multiple officeholder is not solely that he can combine administrative action and the political world, while the administration itself remains relatively too chaotic and splintered and thus

lacking homogeneity to provide him with a grip on the local political scene. In addition to his political action, the multiple officeholder in fact provides a model of personal success and public devotion which other elected officials and politicians seek to imitate. The high-ranking notable is the visible tip of the iceberg. On various levels and in various sectors, each with its own methods, a mechanism which emphasizes this notable and personal aspect of power is developing steadily.

If there is a polarization of power, it is found in politics, not in the administration. A small number of local officials (mayors, multiple officeholders, etc.), each on his own level, organizing networks of influence and controlling undertakings in opposition to the splintering of departments. In their sectors, they hope, they will achieve obvious superiority in terms of speed, mobilization and coordination. One should not conclude from this that the electoral world is an excellent oiled machine, wherein the poles are coordinated perfectly. There are conflicts, instances of paralysis and splintering, but less, much less than in the administration. Plurality of office, as a tool, is capable of providing a new deal.

#### Effect of Industrial Modernization

Paris INTERVENTION in French Apr-May-Jun 85 pp 65-72

[Article by Patrick Viveret: "Modernizing Without Depoliticizing"]

[Text] In the political discourse of the left wing, as on the right, the theme of modernization recurs constantly. A new "industrial imperative" is henceforth the project of the government and the ideology of the Socialist Party. However, this modernization of politics will remain a formal matter if it does no more than overlay unchanged political structures with hymns of praise to the new technology.

Modernize or perish: this is the choice which enables Laurent Fabius to represent himself as the spokesman for a much broader consensus than that of the political forces represented in the government. This is, moreover, the only strong political message the president of the republic and his prime minister are still sending to the public. As was noted in fact by Serge July just following the Francois Mitterrand interview "plugged into" French Television Channel 1 by Yves Mourousi, "in both cases (editor's note--for the president as well as his prime minister), we are seeing the same thing--systematic depoliticization of government action." It is all as if, the editor of LIBERATION went on to say, "alternation in power had already occurred and France was now being governed by a ministry of technicians whose popularity with the public is emphasized. And this is why the most political of our presidents has as his main policy refraining from politics" (LIBERATION, 29 April).

Must the "politics of communication" necessarily kill politics as such? Is this the tribute the government of Laurent Fabius must pay to modernization in order to establish the credibility of his discourse about the third industrial revolution? I would like to defend another hypothesis here: the present technological change, if we assess its nature properly, very far from removing

us from politics, will on the contrary lead us to greater reflection on its specific nature and importance. We are not experiencing in fact a "third industrial revolution" to which it is necessary to "adapt" the social relations and methods of government at all costs, but the first information revolution, which requires that in politics, as in economics, the key value be the modernization of information. If this hypothesis is correct, as I will attempt to demonstrate, it will entail two consequences which are far removed from the current "modernist" discussions.

--First, the invention of changed social relations and a new political technology is essential, since the human resource represents the principal asset of our societies.

--Secondly, the main danger we run is not that of "failure to adapt" to the movement of technology and the economy, but of a dramatic gap between the scope of the successes achieved in the communications sector and the mediocrity of the advance seen in the management of human passions. Now the handling of this disparity is essentially the business of politics. For, as McLuhan noted, "the separation brought about by the printing industry between the mind and the heart is the trauma from which Europe has suffered from the time of Machiavelli to the present."

#### A Cultural Turning Point

The arrival of Laurent Fabius at the Matignon Palace will doubtless, in retrospect, be seen as a turning point in the 7-year term of Francois Mitterand. But it will not have been one of an economic nature: that had already been effected by Pierre Mauroy, with the June 1982 austerity plan. It will be seen as a cultural turning point. With Laurent Fabius, the socialist left wing, far from identifying itself with any great political message, is working, one might say, paraphrasing Saint Simon and Marx, at "moving from the governing of men to the administration of things." "Everything is politics" has been succeeded, as Serge July noted, by "everything is daily business." "Politics bores you," the prime minister seems to be saying to his fellow citizens. "How well I understand you! But I am here precisely to free you from it."

The "winning France," that invited to participate in Francois Mitterand's spectacle, is now regarded as the project. From Bernard Tapie to Gilbert Trigano, and including Patrick Dupont, Stephane Collaro, Jacques Calvet and Barbara Hendryckx, we are far indeed from the "socialist project" and its advocacy of a break with capitalism. Or rather, all that remains of the project of which the first version was written at the time by Jean-Pierre Chevenement is what one might have feared: its conservative portion.

This choice does indeed have advantages. In a country wearied by politicization as extreme as it is mediocre, this strategic retreat by the government has a double advantage. It leaves the opposition, which seems simultaneously petty in politics and irresponsible, vulnerable. It allows the hope that this society, allowed more breathing room, will be grateful to the socialists for this new freedom, and that it will be somewhat indulgent toward these policies which have become so relatively tolerable.

However, if the partial retreat of the state may be an excellent thing, depoliticization for its part could prove dangerous. For the dictates of economic modernization, separate from those of political modernization, lead to an increasing schizophrenia separating government action and party life. Thus despite the importance of the economic, institutional and cultural changes which the government has imposed on the Socialist Party since 1982, the organization headed by Lionel Jospin has always seemed to be awaiting the "end of the parenthesis" and has never seriously theorized on the pragmatic changes about which the government leaders have learned from the exercise of power.

### Is a Dogmatic Relapse Possible?

More serious still, the actors in this practical modernization of the left wing themselves sometimes give the impression that they reserve the right to a retreat in dogmatic ideology in the event that this seems useful to them.

Thus we have seen Pierre Mauroy, who had the political courage to avoid destroying the bridges with Europe when he launched the austerity policy, pursuing a debate on the union of the left, its tradition and its future program, which we had thought was drafted prior to his term of government office.<sup>1</sup> Francois Mitterrand himself punctuates his "revisionist" statements from time to time with pious references to the "break with capitalism," leading one to wonder sometimes if their ultimate purpose is not to nurture one of those confused distinctions between the conquest and the exercise of power, the maximum and the minimum program, of which the French socialists are so fond.<sup>2</sup>

The modernization of our society is not a question simply of social relations "catching up" with the advance of the economy and technology, any more than it requires the limitation of the political field. Overemphasis on the theme of modernization in governmental debate, in addition to allowing the left wing, as a counterbalance, to find "food for the soul" in its old ideologies, might also derive from an error in the analysis of the change we are experiencing. In fact, by developing the argument of necessary "adaptation" to "the third industrial revolution," the government suggests that, as in the case of the two preceding industrial revolutions, those brought about by the steam engine and the introduction of electricity, the current change requires once again that man adapt to the demands of the machine. Now such discussion is inevitably of a fatalistic nature, and does nothing to alleviate the anguish of the members of the social strata who see their jobs called upon to adapt or disappear. There is thus a risk, and this is perhaps the most serious thing, of sterilizing the resources for social innovation which French society has accumulated since 1968.

As in all the developed countries, the melange of technological modernism and ideological conservatism is gaining acceptance in France today, and no one has understood this better than Jean-Pierre Chevenement. However, in my opinion, this is an error. For real modernism now demands more effort in the realm of social relations and methods of government than in that of technological research as such.

## The First Information Revolution

We are only just beginning to realize that we are not experiencing a crisis, but a formidable change comparable to that experienced by Europe in the Gutenberg era. But we still remain marked by a system of representation which makes us think of this change in terms of a new industrial revolution.

Now the main characteristic of industrial revolutions has been to shape man to the machine and to organize social relations to this end. Chaplin's "Modern Times," the automation of human labor, has remained the key image for this kind of Taylor-type development. Let us note that this analysis is widely shared in the West, by business owners as well as the trade unions. The former see therein an opportunity and justification for challenging the social gains of the workers movement. The latter seek to extend the deadlines, which they secretly know are inevitable, by waging defensive battles based on corporatism and an appeal for protectionism. The British miners' strike clearly illustrated this phenomenon. It was never a question on either side of establishing how one could mobilize the irreplaceable capital represented by the workers knowledge and intelligence in another way. Margaret Thatcher and Arthur Scargill had at least one very important thing in common throughout this battle: they waged it with the weapons and the ideology of half a century ago.

This view of the new industrial revolution, shared in varying degrees by the majority of the governments and the political and social forces in the United States and Europe, is nonetheless erroneous, and this error leads to tragic consequences. It is a historical irony that at a time when the conservative cultural wave was sweeping over the old and new worlds and the fine old authoritarian values were sweeping away the self-management themes of the 1970s, an ancient Japanese gentleman, the president of Matsushita Electric, delivered this little instructive speech to an elite group of American and European managers: "We will win and the industrial West will lose. You cannot do very much more, because you carry your defeat within yourselves. Your organizations are based on Taylor's theory, but the worst thing is that your thinking is too." And this old gentleman added, thus revealing the only real secret of the Japanese success in these recent years: "We are post-Taylor in method. We know that business has become so complicated and so difficult and the survival of a firm so problematical, in an increasingly dangerous, unexpected and competitive environment, that an enterprise must mobilize all the intelligence of every individual every day in order to have a chance of survival."<sup>3</sup>

## Taylor's Theories Survive

The resistance to this approach in the world of business is considerable. In Japan itself, the mobilization of intelligence is carefully channeled within the large enterprises and cannot fail, through the "quality circles," to result in the improvement of products. Social relations, for their part, remain extraordinarily rigid, and the educational system, the extreme importance of which Konosuke Matsushita quite rightly emphasized, remains characterized by such a spirit of competition as to cause massive anguish among the majority of students.

If there is a weakness in Japan, it is there that it must be sought, for it is not with impunity that one can awaken the intelligence and imaginative capacity of men.

The wage earner to whom it is suggested that he exercise his critical spirit and capacity of imagination in the realm of improving the internal design of a Toyota will have ever greater difficulty if he is asked to remain "stupid and disciplined" with regard to everything pertaining to social relations in the enterprise and, beyond that, in his social and political life. If the new raw material of the information revolution is indeed grey matter, the oxygen of intelligence is freedom. One does not think, one does not create within a rigid and inevitably imprisoning system, because intelligence operates through trial and error. Eliminating the right to err is to strike at the heart of human intelligence.

Thus the great error of all of those discussing modernization and seeking once again "to adapt" man to the new machines is that this time, since the human resource is the principle asset, the priority need is to analyze and overcome the social, psychological and political blocks to the mobilization of intelligence.

The technological revolution as such henceforth has its own internal energy, and each discovery in one realm leads to new ones in others. It is certainly of capital importance to maintain the financial and intellectual efforts in the realm of research and the manufacture of new products, but now and henceforth, in the data sector in particular, the main hindrance to development is no longer technical, but human.

All of our developed societies have in fact been corrupted to the bone by the Taylor and Ford type of thinking. It is not only business which is organized on a pyramidal model such as to reserve intelligence and information for the top levels and limit them to the minimum at the base. The workers trade unions and the political parties are also products from the same mold. It is no accident that the military model has fascinated all the great revolutionaries, that our language, still today, is essentially the language of military tradition (the key word in this vocabulary, "militant," has its origin in the Latin word "miles," meaning soldier). For the military hierarchy is the extreme expression of the industrial model for production and command. It is, to use Edgar Morin's expression, "a system of deep complexity." And it is indeed the dominant characteristic of the political parties and the majority of the trade union organizations still today.

This kind of criticism must obviously be handled with caution. As they are today, the political parties are the main guarantors of democracy, and it is not without reason that all totalitarian regimes target the elimination or recruiting of them as their main goal. Also, trade unionism is not mainly responsible for its method of organization. It was in order to respond as efficiently as possible to the inhuman order imposed by businessmen influenced by Taylor's thinking that the workers movement deemed it necessary to adopt its adversary's pattern. But one can not utilize this democratic vigilance to justify the conservatism of the social and political forces.

It is precisely because they are their replaceable organs of democratic life that it is not possible to allow the political parties to remain societies as closed as they are mediocre.

#### The Development of Candidates for Office

For even if the development and selection of candidates for office are limited to the minimum role on which all are agreed, the methods of that selection and the weakness in this development raise questions.

In fact, it would appear as if the qualities demanded of a candidate to win election, and first of all to be nominated, were practically the opposites of those he should have once in office. Have we ever seen, within a political party, a candidate selected on the basis of his real capacity to carry out the responsibilities he seeks, in terms of professional, social and human competence? One need not look elsewhere for the reasons for the development of the technocracy, upper or middle level, in all of the democratic societies. Technocratic power is in fact only so excessive because politics is often clearly incapable of dealing concretely with the consequences of the program it is supposed to implement. Since, within the parties, the "feasibility" of projects has not been discussed to the extent that the competence of the candidates has, there does in fact come a time when they are in office when it is necessary either to betray what has been promised or to risk catastrophe. The skill of the technocrats must now enable them to provide politicians with the means of pursuing a different policy, without giving the impression of being entirely faithless to their electoral promises.

In a world in which the complexity and seriousness of the problems facing government leaders, from the administration of a large city to that of a modern state, are tremendous, it is as urgent to contemplate a reform of political society as it is reform of the schools or of business. We are horrified to find that 20 percent of the children in the sixth form are illiterate, and quite rightly an effort is being made to combat this phenomenon. But at the fact that a chief of state as powerful as Ronald Reagan confuses Peru with Bolivia, at the total incompetence of a minister in his field, or the failure of a deputy to understand what a business enterprise is, we merely smile. Worse, those who are cleverest of all are pleased, because in the weakness of politics, they see the most certain means of preserving their power.

In fact, there can be no real economic modernization without a change in social relations and in political society. To an even greater extent than a business, a trade union or a political party should be an intensive area of training, mobilization of intelligence and creativity. And in order for this to be the case, it must cease to function on the Taylor model and must change so that the formidable potential quantity of information and creativity dormant within its personnel can be mobilized and processed.

## Opposing Conservatism

It is notable that the themes discussed in the 1970s, focused on the need for social innovation, renewal of political practices and more broadly, the most self-administrative organization of government possible, have been entirely buried, although the information revolution gives them much greater strength today than yesterday, as well as a number of points of application.

It is however a paradox that it is the Japanese businessmen who are pursuing post-Taylorian discussion at a time when the French left wing is fascinated by the return to order and cultural conservatism. It is worrisome that the extreme point of modernization within the Socialist Party seems to come down to taking over the gains of the social democrats and the mixed economy. Indeed, one can resign oneself to seeing the political parties, like the churches, lag a half a century behind the development of society. But to do so is totally inadequate when the transformation of social relations and the methods of government has become the basic condition for the mobilizing of human resources. On the contrary, we need political sectors which will explore, experiment, and even insofar as possible, move ahead of the change in society.

"There has been much talk in these recent years of the division of labor, measured in hours. The division of government is more essential." These lines are taken from the 1985 "Report on the Status of Technology" put out by the Future Research and Evaluation Center. Its authors wrote, as early as 1978, in the conclusions pertaining to a survey of technological changes in progress commissioned by the EEC, that "only the mobilization of European creativity and culture can guarantee our future."<sup>5</sup>

This is indeed the issue in the realm of political modernization as well.

### Toward a New Collective Mobilization of Intelligence

To an even greater extent than the world of business, political society and the state resist this change. The fact is that the link between the government system and control of information is still clearer here. Naturally, no apparatus would formally oppose the concept of circulating information in a political party and mobilizing the competence and intelligence of all its members. But just as the introduction of new technology in an enterprise where the social relations remain unchanged will lead to unemployment and frustration, the data-processing experiments one sees popping up here and there in the parties are treated as a fad, and most often serve only to increase the control capacity of the political leadership. (See section under last subheading below.)

Real political modernization involves neither dissolution into a simple politics of communication nor the application of some new technological tools to unchanged structures and conduct. It requires a reworking of the functions and tools of a modern democracy in the light of two criteria.

a) Because they must govern ever more complex societies, the political systems must be as "informed" and "intelligent" as possible, and to achieve

this, they must abandon pyramidal structures in favor of organization in networks essentially making use of decentralization and interaction. (See the boxed sections on the Ides network experiment and on the problem of decision-making.)

b) Training is a categorical imperative if what is wanted is to prepare citizens who will be capable, in all the responsible posts they seek to win, of putting enough competence and experience to use to avoid being at the mercy of the technician's knowledge and the technocrat's power. It was again Konosuke Matsushita who said to his European and American interlocutors: "It is to this end (editor's note--the mobilization of intelligence in business enterprise) that our large companies give all of their personnel 3 or 4 times as much training as you do yours, and above all it is why they require that the national educational system upstream provide them with ever increasing numbers of graduates, of enlightened and cultured generalists, who are the indispensable compost for an industry which must be nurtured by continuing intelligence."

Isn't such a training effort the more indispensable still if we realize that the future leaders will have to assume responsibilities in which not only the jobs of their wage earners or the economic future of the enterprise will be at stake, but also the very life of their fellow citizens and the future of numerous generations, in terms of the choices they make in the realm of defense, security, justice, technological choices, etc.?

There is certainly no question of forgetting, through a lapse of technological optimism, or, as was more nearly the case in the 1970s, into doomsaying, that a large proportion of the basic questions of politics will neither be settled nor basically aggravated by the technological transformation we are experiencing. The extension of democratic practices does in fact raise a series of problems relating to the essence of politics, unconnected with the economic and technological changes but pertaining to the nature of the human species when it is socialized and takes up problems of government.

Therefore the decisive issue in dealing with internal and external violence in a collective, that of the relations of power and appointment, in short political passions and their relation to the other human passions, has not changed basically since Plato's "Republic" or Aristotle's "Ethic." The fact remains that an impasse on these specific problems of our era would be as tragic as was the failure of the republican parties to take the social issue into account a century ago.

Better still, one could say that a veritable modernization of politics, far from plunging us into modernism or depoliticization, might lead us back to its real specific nature. For the basic problem in our era lies precisely in the fact that we have not experienced the equivalent of this "intelligence revolution," the consequences of which we have attempted to discern, on the level of managing human passions.

As Arthur Koestler said: "We can compare the diagrams<sup>6</sup> illustrating the explosive growth of the population, of knowledge, of energy and communications, with another chart which would show the advance of social

morality, ethical beliefs, spiritual awareness and related values. This curve would then have an entirely different appearance. We would see it rise slowly throughout all of prehistory, and then oscillate first upward and then downward in the course of what we call civilized history. And, shortly after the beginning of the brusque rise in exponential curves, we would see this "moral curve" dip very clearly and fall, under the weight of two world wars, the genocide perpetrated by numerous dictators, and the new methods of terror and indoctrination capable of enslaving entire continents. The contrast between these two curves...represents the consequences of human schizophrenia."

This disparity between the advance in intelligence, the power of technology and the stagnation, indeed regression, in the management of human passions is the priority and vital concern of politics. It demands of the men in politics exceptional wisdom, experience and training. For them, true modernism also demands a return to the great tradition of political philosophy. The "information revolution," while it greatly facilitates the management of things, does not suffice for dealing with that old and fascinating problem, the government of men.

#### Bourg-en-Bresse--The Two Worlds

The Socialist Party congress in Bourg-en-Bresse provided an excellent example of an open approach to the new information technologies. A veritable riot of audiovisual equipment, and in particular a "minitel" network, was set up in the great hall adjacent to the congress premises.

Unfortunately, there was no relation between the new communications and labor resources thus made available to the delegates and the organization of the debates themselves.

The participants in the congress could indeed see the speakers on screens of all sizes and in full color, and they could consult the computer terminals for lists of all the restaurants in the city. But when they entered the "holy of holies," the hall in which the star performer spoke, there was no change, basically, from the circumstances at a congress of the SFIO, or any other party, which might have been held 50 years ago.

In fact, the communications structure remained entirely traditional. A few officials spoke to thousands of passive listeners, who went out to the bar as soon as the "second team" came on the scene. The information structure remains poor, centralized and ill-adapted to the tasks.

No one, apparently, dreamed of using the technology enthroned in the enjoining room to develop interactive communications between the work of the renewed commissions and the groups of members in the various corners of France, using teleconferencing (or video) systems. However, all of this would have been entirely possible, technically speaking.

Perhaps in Toulouse....

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "On the Left," Paris, 1985.
2. Leon Blum theorized about the distinction between the exercise of power, acceptable with the "bourgeois" parties, and the conquest of it which alone would make it possible truly to implement the socialist program.
3. Quoted in SCIENCES ET TECHNIQUES, special spring issue.
4. Thus, now that microcomputers which it is possible to learn to operate in a few hours, and which need no prior data-processing knowledge, are available, the main problem becomes that of the cultural block or lack of imagination on the part of the majority of people, who do not see what use they could make of such equipment.
5. Issue of SCIENCES ET TECHNIQUES previously quoted, and also text under last subhead above.
6. A. Koestler, "The Horse and the Locomotive," Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1968. (The first diagram of which the author speaks would show the exponential curve of the human progress made in knowledge, energy and the capacity to transform nature.)

5157

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

DISSIDENT VIEWS TILT TO USSR IN EUREKA, NICARAGUA POLICIES

Paris RENCONTRES COMMUNISTES HEBDO in French 20 Jun 85 p 2

[Article by Eddy Kenig]

[Text] Signs of a warming up of relations with the East are not lacking these days: the gas agreement with the USSR, Laurent Fabius's trip to the GDR and Gorbachev's projected visit to Paris. Interpreting in his own way the resumption of contact at a higher level "with Russia," Couve de Murville, speaking at the National Assembly, attributed it to the departure of the communist ministers. If one believes this, then it was their presence that forced the government to an excess of leaning toward the Atlantic alliance--which will no longer be necessary.

One cannot totally exclude the fact that during the formation of the first government to include communist participation, it appeared timely to emphasize by several actions, France's fidelity to its alliances. However, this factor turned out to be only very marginal, and it is hardly serious to attribute to it today the change in the temperature of our relations with the USSR.

It appeared essentially to be the direct result of a correlation of forces on the national level.

While the strategic balance appeared to him to be broken in Europe, to the advantage of the USSR, by the placement of the SS 20's, a direct threat to our security, French policy could not directly confront the Soviet strategy. It therefore aligned itself on the side of the USA in the matter of the Pershing missiles. Although, on closer examination, the refusal to consider the French nuclear arsenal in calculating the balance in Europe was not particularly "Atlantic."

Today, while the reestablishment of the balance on our continent has begun, French policy is temporarily free of this problem. Moreover, it is the so-called American "Strategic Defense Initiative" project which has come to be the center of concern. French reticence with regard to the SDI arises from the ignorance in which the Americans leave their allies as to those who have and those who are about to have, and also from the risk of an armaments race in space, putting directly in question the validity of the balance of terror which is the basis for our strategy of dissuasion. France's refusal to

participate, this being the case, in the American program, the fact of making a rival European peace proposal called "Eureka," is arousing a growing interest on the part of the Soviets, who are emerging from the recent period of withdrawal. It is enough to open the way to useful contacts. Besides, contrary to the resulting appearance of early reactions to the SDI, the French position is not at all isolated in Europe, with the exception--one of consequence, however--of the government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The acknowledgment of these recent developments makes it clear enough that it is decidedly not possible to insert French foreign policy into the scheme of "Atlanticism." Historically this implies a subordination to the objectives and methods of the USA. We are far from that. What presently prevails is rather the persistent search for and implementation of an independent policy for France in terms of its own interests within the framework of the alliances it has. The example of support for Nicaragua after the boycott decreed by the Reagan administration is a result of the same spirit.

By receiving at the Elysee Palace the president of that small country threatened by US imperialism, the president of the republic carried out a political act which created, of itself and by the support it has found in several countries of America, an obstacle to interventionism. Certain critics felt that more should have been done. The Right accuses the government of aligning itself with Moscow. Perhaps it should be pointed out that a political act for which France has the effective means doubtless has more clout than any extremist gestures. The fact remains that, based on its own concerns and in spite of the reservations it might have about the Sandinists' domestic policy, France has taken a clearly anti-imperialist position in the matter.

Other examples could be found of the same thing, as in cases where France has taken an action parallel to that of the United States. It is precisely the right of an independent foreign policy not to please the same people all the time.

8735

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POLITICAL

NORWAY

COMMUNIST CHIEF HANS KLEVEN ON FOREIGN POLICY, ECONOMY

PM271421 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 12 Aug 85 p 3

[Unattributed report on Norwegian Communist Party Chairman Hans I. Kleven's answers to readers' letters: "It Is Not the Soviet Union Which Threatens Norway"]

[Text] "It is not the Soviet Union which threatens Norway. Today, as 25 years ago, the threat comes from a completely different quarter. Today Norway is in a military alliance with the United States which is striving for military supremacy in order to be able to dictate its terms to the Soviet Union and other countries," Norwegian Communist Party [NKP] Chairman Hans I. Kleven said in his reply to a question from AFTENPOSTEN reader Erling Nustad.

Nustad, who comes from Tretten, put the following question to Kleven: "If Norway was subjected to a military attack by the Soviet Union what stance could one expect the NKP to take? Would NKP members fight together with other Norwegians against the Russians?"

The remainder of Kleven's answer to Nustad's question is as follows:

"The NKP stands for the right of national self-determination. We would, on a national basis, fight against any intruder. This has always been a clear line in our party's policy; the Communists showed this not least during World War II.

"Norway has never been attacked militarily or threatened militarily by the Soviet Union. The only time we had a visit from Soviet Troops was in 1944. They came as liberators then and drove the Germans out of Finnmark. And what people were saying at the time was 'We thank you!'

"Reagan preaches 'crusades' against the 'evil' in the world, that is, communism. Nuclear strategy is supposed to solve world problems for him. Norway is an important pawn in this game.

"Norwegian security policy must take as its point of departure that we tear the country free of its relationship of dependence on the United States and pursue an independent foreign and security policy, based on detente and mutual disarmament."

Hilde Jakobsen, Trondheim: "What do the Communists mean by socialist democracy? What are the possibilities in Norway?"

Kleven: "The socialist social system, in which society owns the most important means of production and all important state bodies are guided by the popular majority, is the Communists' objective.

"On the way to this future goal we are in favor of expanding and renewing democracy. This must happen in the economic field first and foremost, which is the most important area, the mainstay of social life. When a tiny majority of large shareholders and stock exchange speculators have the final say over the country's most important industrial and financial resources, over jobs and investments, there is no connection at all with popular democracy. This economic power must be broken. We support the nationalization of major industry and the major banks, and want the most important sections of the economy to be brought under society's guidance and control. Through the trade union movement and democratically elected bodies and workers themselves must have the last word--both at the individual work place and in society as a whole."

Haraold Halvorsen, Klofta: What should the Norwegian authorities do to get the Soviet Union and other countries in Eastern Europe to respect the Helsinki Final Act on human rights?" If these efforts do not produce results what consequences should this have for future relations?

Kleven: "All countries which have signed the Helsinki Final Act should first and foremost see to it that they implement the undertaking they have made in their own countries and in their international dealings. This should be done before people involve themselves in campaigns on human rights inspired and run by the Reagan administration. This also applies to Norway.

"The Helsinki Final Act is a very important document in the postwar period. It is an international peace document, promoting detente and cooperation in Europe. Unfortunately the act's intentions have been little observed. The document has not been given much publicity in Norway either, by the authorities.

"The NKP's principle view with regard to human rights in the broadest sense in our own country we have outlined as follows in our manifesto: 'On the road to and under socialism the workers' movement will at all times ensure freedom of organization, association, and of the press to criticize the state's and the authorities' actions to all those who accept the right of the popular majority to determine the country's political development. The workers' movement will protect justice and will carry on the bourgeois legal tradition freed from bourgeois class-based legislation.'"

CSO: 3639/155

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

POLL RESULTS ON ELECTORATE'S PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE

June: Lemos Ferreira Loss

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 2 Aug 85 p 11

[Article by Gouveia de Albuquerque]

[Text] If General Lemos Ferreira were to join the race for president, along with Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo, Mario Soares and Freitas do Amaral, he would get only 3.3 percent of the votes. This was the finding of a poll made in June by NORMA [Portuguese affiliate of Gallup International] to which TEMPO had access. It was a survey commissioned by Freitas do Amaral and its findings led to the former centrist leader's decision to announce his candidacy for the coming presidential elections.

Four possible lists of candidates were given to the almost 1,000 persons polled in this survey, all of them including the names of Pintasilgo, Freitas and Soares, who, of course, are the "strong" candidates that have publicly announced their decision to submit to the voice of the electorate in the presidential elections.

In the first possible list of candidates, the race among the three leaders provided the following result in this poll: Freitas do Amaral in first place, with 36 percent of the votes; Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo a short distance behind, with 34.5 percent; and, in third and last place, Mario Soares, who managed to get only 19 percent of the preferences.

A second possible list added the name of former prime minister and former leader of the social democrats, Pinto Balsemao, who obtained only 3.3 percent of the votes, unmistakably "stolen" from Freitas do Amaral, as can be seen by the results. In this scenario, Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo was the winner, with 35.2 percent of the votes (0.7 percent more than in the previous list); Freitas do Amaral was in second place, with 33.7 percent (2.3 percent less); Mario Soares fell to 17.6 percent; and, as we have mentioned, Pinto Balsemao would come in last, with 3.3 percent of the votes.

The entry of Pinto Balsemao in the presidential race suggests that his small electorate would come from those who in the previous scenario voted for Freitas and Soares. This last candidate, moreover, would also lose some votes to Lurdes Pintasilgo.

In the third possible list considered in this poll, Pinto Balsemao's name was replaced by that of the new social democratic leader, Cavaco Silva (who was already exercising leadership on the date of the poll). The outcome was as follows: Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo in front, with 34.3 percent; Freitas do Amaral in second, with 26.8 percent; Mario Soares with 17 percent; and, lastly, Cavaco Silva with 9.9 percent.

Analyzing these data in comparison with those obtained in the preceding scenarios, there is a noticeable loss by all three frontrunners to Cavaco Silva. But the loss of votes is much greater in the case of Freitas do Amaral, from which it is reasonable to assume that most of Cavaco Silva's votes came from Freitas do Amaral. However, the new social democratic leader has scant support, much less than the support base of the party he heads. In other words, most PSD [Social Democratic Party] members would rather vote for Freitas do Amaral than for the head of their own party.

Another point to note is that Cavaco Silva would also be "stealing" votes from Soares and Pintasilgo, as all of their percentages fall in relation to the previous scenarios.

Lastly, the poll presented a fourth and final possibility, in which the three frontrunners were joined by the name of the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff, General Lemos Ferreira. It will be recalled that this individual has thus far neither confirmed nor denied the possibility of his being a candidate in the coming elections.

In this scenario, the poll had the following outcome: Lurdes Pintasilgo in first place with 35.8 percent of the votes; Freitas do Amaral with 31.2 percent; Soares with 17.7 percent; and, last, Lemos Ferreira with 3.3 percent of the preferences.

Once again, in this scenario it is Freitas do Amaral who is deprived of votes, which are transferred to Lemos Ferreira, while Lurdes Pintasilgo and Mario Soares lose nothing with the appearance of this candidacy.

In conclusion, it is mentioned that in all four scenarios the percentage of undecided voters is similar (and considerable): between 10.2 and 12 percent. This means that there are still many voters who have not chosen their candidate from among the names that were presented to them in this poll.

Abstentions are also high and constant. In the four scenarios of this poll they range between 13 and 13.7 percent.

Comparing the findings of a poll taken in June of last year and those of the current poll in regard to the possibility of only the three frontrunners being in the race, it happens that Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo has fallen from 37.9 to 34.5 percent (that is, from first place in 1984 to second place in 1985); the score of Freitas do Amaral rose during these 12 months from 27.5 percent to 36 percent; and Mario Soares remained perfectly stationary: 19.3 and 19 percent.

## Results Based Upon Four Hypothetical Lists of Candidates

<u>Preference</u>	<u>First List</u>	<u>Second List</u>	<u>Third List</u>	<u>Fourth List</u>
Abstaining	13.0%	13.7%	13.5%	13.4%
Pintasilgo	34.5%	35.2%	34.3%	35.8%
Soares	19.0%	17.6%	17.0%	17.7%
Freitas do Amaral	36.0%	33.7%	26.8%	31.2%
Balsemao		3.3%		
Cavaco Silva			9.9%	
Lemos Ferreira				3.3%
Undecided	10.5%	10.2%	12.0%	12.0%

## Evaluation of Candidates

Those interviewed in this NORMA poll were also asked to say what they considered the most positive and the most negative aspects of each of the three leading candidates.

Thus, in regard to Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo, 27 percent of those interviewed said that they were unaware of any positive aspects. Eleven percent said that her most positive aspect was her "good presence," followed by (in decreasing order) the fact of her being "a friend of the poor" (6 percent), "intelligent" and "serious" (both qualities with 5 percent).

As for the negative aspects of this candidate, 15 percent said that she didn't have any, while 4 percent said she lacks "political competence."

In regard to the prime minister, the poll showed the following results: no positive aspects, 22 percent; is "good politician," 10 percent; is "competent," 6 percent. As for the negative aspects of Mario Soares: "not true to his word" (24 percent), is "incompetent" and "indecisive" (both with 6 percent).

Lastly, the appraisal of Freitas do Amaral was as follows: "no positive aspects" and "is honest" (both with 10 percent); "is intelligent and cultured" (8 percent); "competent" (6 percent). Among the negative aspects were: "no negative aspects" (16 percent); "is of the Right" (6 percent); "doesn't know how to be a politician" (3 percent).

## President Should Be Watchdog and Critic of Government

Another question brought up by the poll was that of whether the president of the republic should support the government or should act as a watchdog and critic of it. The majority of replies--64 percent--were of the opinion that the president should monitor and criticize the executive branch, compared with 18 percent who felt he should support it.

From the point of view of party preference, it was mainly among APU [United People's Alliance] members that the watchdog and critical action of the president

found backing. Conversely, the position of support is advocated more strongly by PDS voters.

Those interviewed were also asked to express themselves about the current crisis of Portuguese society, in terms of actual awareness of its existence, its most serious aspects, its causes and the possibilities of recovery.

In a first approach, almost all of them--97 percent--were of the opinion that the nation is really in a period of crisis.

The aspects of this crisis considered the most serious were, in decreasing order: inflation/cost of living (37 percent); unemployment (29 percent); the economy/finances (13 percent); lack of money (5 percent); political dissension (5 percent); lack of discipline (5 percent); hunger (4 percent); and housing (3 percent).

#### Government Action Held Responsible

As the most important cause of the crisis of Portuguese society, the poll identified, in decreasing order: the performance of the governments in the first place (49 percent); strikes (29 percent); the political parties (21 percent); the international economic crisis (19 percent); the 25 April Revolution (15 percent); the nationalizations (12 percent); the regime of Salazar and Marcelo Caetano (11 percent); the boycott of the large companies (6 percent); the performances of the president of the republic and the Assembly of the Republic (each with 4 percent); the performance of the Council of the Revolution (3 percent); the military and the labor unions (each with 1 percent).

Those who mentioned the political parties as causing the crisis were asked to indicate which of them they held responsible. The majority of the replies (66 percent) were definite: all the parties are responsible.

Those polled were also asked to indicate precisely which governments were responsible for the crisis. The replies, in decreasing order, were: in first place, the current PS [Socialist Party]/PSD coalition and the Vasco Goncalves governments (both with 22 percent), followed by the first PS government (12 percent), "all the governments" (11 percent), the Pinto Balsemao government (6 percent), and the PS/CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] and Sa Carneiro governments (each with 4 percent).

#### Confidence in Nation

The majority of those interviewed were of the opinion that the nation will be able to overcome the crisis: 63 percent, as compared with 22 percent who feel otherwise.

Having been asked to recommend the best solution for the crisis, 70 percent of those interviewed said they did not know of any. "Replacement of the current government" was suggested by 19 percent as the best solution, followed by "prohibition of strikes" and "by working" (both with 7 percent), "greater production" (6 percent), "creation of jobs" (5 percent), "denationalization of business" (4 percent), "greater powers for the president of the republic" (3 percent) and "support for nationalized businesses" (2 percent).

Regarding the manner of governing needed to overcome the crisis, the overwhelming majority of those interviewed (66 percent) felt that the executive power should "govern with authority, in democracy." On the other hand, 19 percent believe that the executive power should "govern seeking consensus on all matters." Lastly, 4 percent think it preferable that it "do away with democracy."

In terms of party affiliation, it was the PS voters who most strongly felt that to overcome the crisis the government should exert more authority. Looking for consensus on all matters was chiefly recommended by the APU voters. Doing away with democracy was advocated by voters of all political parties, with the CDS predominating.

The poll also asked for opinions about private enterprise and open competition. The results obtained were: in favor, 61 percent; opposed, 11 percent; no opinion, 24 percent.

#### Methodological Notes

Universe: Individuals over 18 years of age, residing in metropolitan Portugal, in localities with 10 or more households.

Sample: Stratified random sampling method, with a variable fraction sampling and multistage selection.

Number of interviews: 975.

Data gathering: direct and personal interview, based on a semi-structured questionnaire.

Execution: Conducted by NORMA between 29 May and 11 June 1985.

July: Freitas Victory

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 15 Aug 85 p 9

[Article by Gouveia de Albuquerque]

[Text] If the presidential elections were taking place now, with only Freitas do Amaral, Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo and Mario Soares entered in the race for Belem [the presidential palace], the first of these would be the victor, with the current prime minister in last place. In effect, this is the finding of a poll commissioned by the PSD [Social Democratic Party] and executed by NORMA, to which TEMPO had access.

The poll also proposed a second scenario for the presidential elections, adding the names of Cavaco Silva and Lemos Ferreira to the three mentioned above. Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo would be the candidate elected in this scenario, followed by Freitas do Amaral, Mario Soares and, not far behind, Cavaco Silva. Lemos Ferreira would come in last, with less than 2 percent of the votes.

NORMA took this poll last month, July, interviewing over 1,000 persons. Through the great number of questions and scenarios in this poll, the principal objectives of the PSD in commissioning it were: to get an idea of the current spectrum of political parties; to learn to what extent the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] constitutes a real danger for the social democrats; to ascertain whether a

pre-election PSD/CDS coalition would be advantageous for both parties; and, lastly, to learn the latest voting trends in regard to the presidential elections.

Inasmuch as a law remains in force in Portugal that prevents publication of polls about the competing political parties from the time the election date is set until [the election] is held, we are unable to report the voting intention of the electorate relative to the event of next 6 October. For this reason, our report of this poll is impaired by the mutilations we had to make.

But, adhering to a principle long advocated by this newspaper, we once again protest against this unfair and anachronistic regulation, without parallel in the most civilized democracies, where reporting of polls is generally prohibited only during the last three days preceding an election. Among us, regrettably, this period of prohibition covers 3 months...

#### Freitas Is Favorite

Analyzing the results of this poll in regard to the presidential elections, at the outset it is confirmed that, regardless of who the candidates are, about 11 percent of those interviewed said they would not vote. Most of these replies came in the northern part of the country, from residents in rural areas, of the female sex, belonging to the lower-middle class socially and between 21 and 34 years of age. These abstainers correspond to almost 800,000 voters and are habitually apolitical and impervious to electoral campaigns.

As we mentioned above, this NORMA poll suggested two scenarios for the presidential race, the first including the three candidates considered most likely to occupy Belem and who have already announced their respective candidacies. In this scenario, Freitas do Amaral wins the elections with 32.5 percent of the votes, a percentage that requires a second round to be held between the two candidates with the most votes.

Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo is in second place with 30.5 percent and, in last place, Mario Soares obtains only 15.7 percent (about half as much as each of his opponents). It is reported that 18.2 percent of those interviewed said they did not yet know for which candidate they would vote. This percentage is equivalent to more than 1 million voters who will not decide for whom to vote until after the election campaign.

By region, it is found that 54 percent of Freitas do Amaral's electorate lives in the North, 32 percent in the Center and only 13 percent in the South. For Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo, these percentages are 41, 36 and 22 percent, respectively. The prime minister's regional universe is practically the same as that of Freitas do Amaral.

As for the socioeconomic class of the respective voters, the largest percentage of those voting for Freitas do Amaral belong to the upper-middle class, while those voting for the other two candidates are mainly from the lower-middle class. As for age, the greatest percentage of the Freitas do Amaral voters are between 45 and 54; those of Mario Soares are between 35 and 44; and, lastly, the largest percentage for Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo is between 18 and 20 years of age.

Attention is called to the fact that the majority of the latter candidate's voters are extremely young--they were between 12 and 14 years of age when Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo was prime minister. Moreover, the fact of her being a woman does not benefit her: just as is the case with the other candidates, most of her electorate is of the male sex.

Lastly, it is pointed out that both Lisbon and Porto gave their preference to the former CDS leader.

#### Lemos Ferreira Last

The poll included another scenario, in which Cavaco Silva and Lemos Ferreira are also candidates for the presidential elections. The results were: in first place, Maria de Lurdes Pintasilgo, with 25.1 percent of the votes (despite having 5.4 percent less than in the previous scenario), followed by Freitas do Amaral with 21.1 percent, Mario Soares with 11.5 percent (4.2 percent less than previously), Cavaco Silva with 9.4 percent and, lastly, General Lemos Ferreira, with a mere 1.9 percent (equivalent to a little more than 100,000 voters).

In this second hypothesis there would also be a need for a runoff election. Analysis immediately reveals that the three candidates all have lower percentages than in the previous scenario. Freitas do Amaral is the candidate most heavily penalized by inclusion of Cavaco Silva and Lemos Ferreira. He loses 11.4 percent, about equal to the combined votes of Cavaco Silva and Lemos Ferreira--11.3 percent. Although the sharp fall of Freitas do Amaral can be explained, as these votes clearly went over to the latter two (unofficial) candidates, the same thing happens to Lurdes Pintasilgo and Mario Soares, whose vote losses in this scenario of more candidates are to the categories of those who replied that they are not voting "for any of the above"--7.7 percent--and those who "don't know yet" for whom they will vote--19.1 percent.

One conclusion to be drawn from analysis of this scenario is that the PSD leader would obtain a percentage much lower than that reached by his party in 1983, which would indicate votes by social democrats loyal to Freitas do Amaral even if the head of their own party were running in the elections.

The vote for Mario Soares is also much less than that obtained in the latest elections by the party he leads.

#### Government Was "So-So"

Another question put to those interviewed was to learn about their positions regarding the performance of the government during the last 6 months. The largest number of those questioned said that the government "was neither good nor bad" (30.7 percent). Next, with 26.8 percent, was the reply that the government's performance was "poor." Thirteen percent said that the government was "very poor" and 11.3 percent, that it was "very, very poor." On the opposite side, 4.7 percent of those asked said that the government was "good" and 0.4 percent, that it was "very good." Not a one of the 1,000 persons questioned said it was "very, very good."

## Presidential Elections [Percentage of Votes in Hypothetical Situations]

<u>Hypothesis</u>	<u>F. Amaral</u>	<u>M.L.Pintasilgo</u>	<u>M. Soares</u>	<u>C. Silva</u>	<u>L. Ferreira</u>
Scenario 1	32.5	30.5	15.7	---	---
Scenario 2	21.1	25.1	11.5	9.4	1.9

As can be seen, the conclusions are not very flattering for the current government, at least on the basis of its performance this year.

Curiously, 89 percent of those interviewed who said "very good" are women. And, what is even more unique, all the women who gave that response belong to the lowest social class.

### Performance of Mario Soares

Very similar percentages were obtained in the question put to those interviewed in regard to classifying the way in which Mario Soares performed the functions of prime minister in this government. The results were as follows: "very, very good," 0.3 percent; "very good," 0.7 percent; "good," 8.3 percent; "neither good nor bad," 31.5 percent; "poor," 23.7 percent; "very poor," 11.7 percent; and "very, very poor," 9.4 percent. In other words, only about 10 percent really liked the prime minister's performance, while over 40 percent thought it was deplorable and 30 percent thought that it was neither good nor bad.

### PS in Government

Those interviewed were also asked to express an opinion about the performance of the Socialist Party in the government, and the results were not much different from those obtained in the previous question.

What stands out is that not one of those interviewed classified the performance of the PS as "very, very good." The rest of the results were: "very good," 0.6 percent; "good," 6.8 percent; "neither good nor bad," 31.1 percent; "poor," 25.2 percent; "very poor," 10.9 percent; and "very, very poor," 7.9 percent.

The similarity of the classifications for Mario Soares and the PS constitutes one more proof that for the average citizen the two are intimately connected; that is, to speak of Mario Soares is to speak of the PS and vice-versa. In other words, those who blamed the PS for the unsuccessful government are the same ones that blamed the prime minister for the same thing.

### PSD Performance Not Good in Government

If the performance of the PS in the government drew no praise, the same fate lay in store for the PSD. In fact, upon being asked their opinion about the performance of the social democrats in the present government, those interviewed expressed the following positions: "very good," 0.9 percent; "good," 5.7 percent; "neither good nor bad," 31.9 percent; "poor," 25.3 percent; "very poor," 11.2 percent; and "very,

very poor," 5.4 percent. No one asserted that the PSD was "very, very good," as was also the case when the previous question was put in regard to the PS.

Except for insignificant alterations, the classification of the performance of both parties was identical; that is, those interviewed gave equal blame to the central-bloc parties that made up the government, despite the clear supremacy of the PS, which had the privilege of naming the prime minister and the majority of the cabinet ministers. In this poll, those interviewed made no such distinction, which should be cause for the parties to give serious thought to any possible coalitions in the future.

#### Inflation Biggest Problem

Another objective of this poll commissioned by the PSD was to learn what problems the Portuguese people are most concerned about these days.

The inquiry produced the following results: at the head of the list of major concerns is inflation and the cost of living, with 66 percent of the replies. In second place, with a little more than half as many (37.1 percent), was unemployment, followed, in descending order of importance, by the financial problem (26.5 percent), health (26.3 percent), their children's future (24.7 percent), lack of housing (23 percent), hunger, crime, the nation's future, the drug problem, the possibility of war, the children's education, corruption, political instability, difficulty in obtaining a first job, and the tax burden.

The poll indicated that the problem of inflation and the high cost of living is felt more seriously by residents of the North region, of the feminine sex, of the lower social classes and the oldest. Unemployment also affects the residents of the North region, but of the male sex, of the lower-middle class and with ages between 21 and 34.

The data from this part of the poll will permit the social democrats to prepare a strategy for an election campaign, as they have the findings that are, really, the mirror of the nation.

#### Methodological Notes

Universe: population over 18 years of age, residing in metropolitan Portugal in localities of 10 or more households.

Sample: 1,003 persons interviewed, selected randomly.

Field Work: From 4 July to 11 July.

Data processing: Used a system of weighting factors to make the sample representative.

Conducted by: NORMA, Inc.

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

#### PARTICIPATION IN EUREKA BEING NEGOTIATED WITH FRENCH FIRM

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 20 Jul 85 p 20

[Text] Representatives of the French Lectra Systemes firm, which is involved in advanced technology, will visit Lisbon next week for preliminary talks with Portuguese public and private bodies with a view to implementing the first technological project involving Portugal to be included in the development of the European Eureka program.

Arrangements were made for this visit by the French delegation in connection with the meeting held in Paris in recent days by the foreign trade ministers of 17 European countries interested in the program initiated by French President Mitterrand, of which the Portuguese government was one of the first supporters.

The delegation will engage in talks with the EFACEC enterprise, the National Industrial Technological and Engineering Laboratory (LNETI), the Beira Interior University Institute and the Electronic Development Investments Enterprise (EIDE), in order to evaluate a project in the laser and computer-aided design sectors, using optronic tools, with applications concentrated mainly in the textile sector.

A Portuguese scientist who participated in the Paris meeting, Prof Carvalho Rodrigues, told EXPRESSO that a number of projects already in existence and involving Portuguese enterprises might readily be taken up again on the European level within the framework of the Eureka program. These include, for example, Unirob and Ellena, already in existence.

He stressed that new projects for this purpose will be developed above all by the industrial enterprises themselves, which will also provide substantial financial contributions. He said that in this sector, Portugal has been one of the pioneer countries, due to its choice of development contracts with investments in which the percentages provided by the industries and coming from public funds are equivalent (approximately 50 percent each).

"The small and average industrial enterprises will be the center for the development of some of the projects," Carvalho Rodrigues said. He went on to note that there is interest in such areas as artificial intelligence, microelectronics, robotics and oceanographic resources.

Concerning the latter, an idea put forth at the Paris meetings in which considerable interest was shown had to do with a proposal by Jaime Gama, who described the potential existing in Portugal for such an effort, in terms of maritime area, infrastructures and capacity for basing research in this field on its territory.

The Portuguese government has not as yet defined the amount of its financial contribution to the Eureka program, but this apparent delay, similar moreover to that for other European countries, has to do with the investment policy being pursued by Lisbon.

This and other decisions concerning Eureka will be made at the next meeting of the 17 countries involved, which has already been scheduled for 15 November in the FRG.

5157

CS0: 3542/226

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

## MEANS OF IMPROVING POOR AGRICULTURAL SITUATION DISCUSSED

### Unexploited Land

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 16 Jul 85 p 24

[Text] More than one-eighth (12.8 percent) of the continental territory of Portugal is not under cultivation, the majority of this total of 1.14 million hectares being land which is unsuitable for farming, a book by Caldeira Cary, an IFADAP technician, reports.

The book "Framework and Outline of Agricultural Investment on the Portuguese Continent," written by Francisco Caldeira Cary and published by the Development Bank, says that 47.6 percent of the land (4.2 million hectares) is used for dry farming, 18.7 percent (1.16 million hectares) is in forests, and agroforestry is pursued on 12.4 percent of the territory (1.1 million hectares).

Irrigated farming is pursued on 7.0 percent of the continental territory of Portugal (600,000 hectares), while social areas occupy 150,000 hectares, representing 1.7 percent of the total.

Caldeira Cary says that the most widespread cultivation systems are basically of a single-crop type, almost always utilizing technology ill-adapted to the balancing of the systems.

He believes that the primary sector in Portugal, i.e., the farm sector, is in a period of profound stagnation. This is confirmed by all of the analytical studies made in the past 20 to 30 years, and is reflected in the reduced value of farm products, the limited diversification and the low overall plot productivity in the sector.

### Imports

Caldeira Cary stresses that as a direct consequence of this situation, the domestically produced farm product supply is low and the country imports the greater part of what it consumes.

He notes that the farm sector constitutes a major bottleneck limiting overall economic development, such that it is "imperative" that national policy "establish strategies which will ensure the speedy development of agriculture."

The farm development strategies, Caldeira Cary adds in his work, presume the existence of a consistent farm policy making it possible to undertake structural changes in the sector, adjustments in the production apparatus and the modernization of technology through short-, medium- and long-term measures. He stresses that the lag in Portuguese agriculture is reflected in relative terms in the tremendous gap between the productivity indices in Portugal and those in countries with which our economy must be compared.

The productivity per hectare in Portugal in the period between 1969 and 1978 was slightly over a third of the average for the EEC for wheat, somewhat less than a quarter for oats, barley and rye, 2.5 times less for sunflower seeds and about a quarter for corn.

Portugal has productivity per hectare (4,280 kilograms) exceeding the average for the EEC (3,850) only for rice, while productivity for potatoes is less than a half of the average for the EEC, and that for milk per cow in Portugal is 60 percent below the EEC figures.

#### Proper Crop Priority

Caldeira Cary stresses that the change needed in Portuguese agriculture entails making investments, a risk which must be "analyzed and weighed," because the modernization of the production and technological apparatus leads to complex indebtedness situations which must be studied by forecasting techniques in planning and assessing projects.

He notes that in the farm production sector, "the evidence of inadequate use of the natural resources of the territory and the limited productivity in agriculture are obvious, and a cause-and-effect relationship between these two vectors can readily be established."

He says that Portugal has 0.33 hectares of arable land per inhabitant, indicating a more favorable situation than those in France (0.32), Norway (0.19), Italy (0.17), the FRG (0.12), Belgium (0.08), Great Britain (0.08) and Holland (0.006).

Caldeira Cary notes among the factors for improving Portuguese farm productivity proper crop priority and making the rational utilization of resources and greater crop intensity possible through the utilization of land for the farm products best adapted to the soil.

He further notes the need for technological improvement and the use of crop nutrients in Portuguese agriculture.

Portuguese use of fertilizers in farming falls far below the average use of crop nutrients for the EEC.

#### Limited Hydroagricultural Development

In 1975-1977, the use of crop nutrients in Portugal (expressed in kilograms of active substance per hectare) was less than half, for nitrogen and phosphate products, and less than a sixth for potassium products.

It is also noted that the consumption of selected seeds is practically limited to the cultivation of wheat, with no use of this technique in such sectors of basic importance to the development of agriculture as corn, forage crops and secondary grains.

Another technological factor limiting productivity to a low level, Caldeira Cary stresses, is the limited development of hydroagricultural methods and the underuse of the existing irrigated areas.

The more than 770,000 farm operations in existence have an average area of 6.1 hectares, with 39 percent of them being made up of six or more plots.

A structural analysis shows that in the North, 78.3 percent of the farm operations have less than 4 hectares, while in the South, just 1 percent of them (with an area equal to or in excess of 500 hectares) accounts for about a half of the arable area in the zone.

With regard to the age groups of farm operators, it has been established that almost half (45 percent) are over 55.

As to level of schooling, 43 percent of the farm operators are illiterate and only 2 percent have completed secondary or higher-level courses.

The high age and low educational levels thus appear to be obstacles to innovation and technological development in Portuguese agriculture.

#### Young Farmers' Movement

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 18 Jul 85 p 24

[Article by Jose Gutierrez: "Gap Between Promises and Support Protested"]

[Excerpts] The problems in Portuguese agriculture, as could not fail to be the case, are beginning to affect those in the youngest population groups, who are moreover the sole heirs of the process of economic recovery and integration in the EEC. The young farmers are voicing apprehension about their future, and above all they are questioning the fate of the land--a basic real asset they want to develop. The state has not provided facilities or credit for true agricultural reform, the young Portuguese farmers, now organized in an association waging the battle for their rights, complain.

The failure to define a national farm policy is the most serious problem the young Portuguese farmers see. Their main concern is to be able to work the land for themselves.

As is obvious, the failure of the country to define a farm policy carries with it the risk of a lack of status for the young farmer, or rather, its representative body, the Association of Young Farmers of Portugal (AJAP), a barrier which, like the lack of supplementary legislation, they have not yet succeeded in surmounting.

## Government Provides No Links

The young farmers say they do not want to get involved in politics, or in partisan "shotgun counts," and they complain of a government (now in office) which "links no one with anything or anyone else."

To this first position, adopted at the first national meeting held in Aveiro in July of 1983, the exigent strength of the major conclusions of the second meeting held in Monfortinho in April of this year must be added.

More nearly questions than demands, they require an answer from the officials responsible for the farm sector in the country, and Minister Alvaro Barreto promised a response in Santarem, when the National Agricultural Fair was held there.

After stating that a domestic farm policy "is something more than government programs or even sectorial farm policies," they stressed that "we, the Association of Young Farmers of Portugal, since we have taken up the responsibility which falls to us, must urgently demand of the government a domestic farm policy."

As to the credit policy, "unfortunately, strange as it may seem, there are no incentives for young farmers to invest, but rather a chaotic picture for the people as a whole, with a serious impact on the youngest just beginning life."

Vocational training, or more accurately the lack of it, is another of the main concerns of the AJAP, which assigns priority responsibility for the situation to the Ministry of Agriculture.

"Whatever the case, although temporary situations can be foreseen, the young people should be considered first of all, because they are the guarantors of the long-term pursuit of the activities which are developing," the AJAP insists.

It is also mentioned that the majority of the young farmers want to have access to the land which belonged to their parents, and to do this they need to have special credit lines available, so that the land will not be divided up more than it already is.

But how will the new and young farmers, who have a new way of thinking, survive in a country in which, although integration in the EEC is almost complete, measures agrarian reform by the change in ownership of the land, while forgetting that this reform should have begun with a soil map and should be continued in terms of crop conversion?

5157

CSO: 3542/226

MILITARY

AUSTRIA

# EXPERT DEFENDS COUNTRY'S RIGHT TO GUIDED WEAPONS

Vienna KURIER in German 14 Aug 85 p 5

[Guest Commentary by H. Vetschera: "We Are Allowed To Have Missiles!"]

[Text] The author is associated with the Institute for Fundamental Strategic Research. His contribution was taken from a study commissioned by the Institute for Fundamental Political Research.

The arms limitations contained in the state treaty do not have, in the narrower sense, the enduring negative consequences in terms of Austria's military defense that have at times been attributed to them:

- The proscription on nuclear weaponry and other weapons of mass destruction, has been superceded in the meantime, in part by other agreements on arms control; and in general, such weapon systems do not fit into the currently held Austrian defense strategy.
- Restrictions on naval equipment are irrelevant for Austria as a landlocked state.
- The limitations on long-range weapons, including both "self-driven or guided projectiles" and artillery with a range of over 30 km, is completely compatible with the defense needs of a small neutral state, and only marginally reduces the scope of Austria's military options.

It was most likely not until the early 1960's that the view, which is today widespread, of "missile prohibition" appears to have become prevalent, a fact which can be deduced by comparing the texts of various military journals.

This opened the door to an uncritical reinterpretation of arms limitation to signify a general "missile prohibition." Yet it must be recalled that this reinterpretation occurred exclusively within Austria itself. The actual practice of those states which were signatory to the state treaty, on the other hand, supports the conclusion that there, the original scope of arms limitation continued to be understood as before.

This means that, based on military requirements, there is no need to alter the arms limitations contained in the state treaty, since this would only signify a minimal improvement, at best, in military options.

But, on the other hand, neither does it mean an abuse of Austrian foreign policy as an instrument of security policy if Austria makes full use of the framework outlined in the arms limitation agreement in terms of its military planning and procurement. And in this framework, the eventual procurement of short-range defensive guided weapons has its place, as well. These weapon systems, which are intended as a defense against attacks from the air and by tanks as well as an arming of the Austrian air force, do not exceed the limits outlined in the state treaty. Their procurement, therefore, would not only not represent a contradiction of the state treaty, it could also contribute to enhancing the credibility of the principle of permanent neutrality. As far foreign policy is concerned, the following considerations would result:

- Neither the acquisition nor the possession of such guided weapons would represent an infraction of the state treaty.
- Therefore, no foreign power, and no power signatory to the state treaty, would be justified in accusing Austria of illegal actions because of the acquisition or possession of such guided weapons.
- On the other hand, such an accusation would represent a departure from previous state practice on the part of the signatory power in question, which would constitute an arbitrary change on the part of this state of the legal terms spelled out in the state treaty. This would indicate that the signatory power in question regarded in negative terms Austria's efforts at self-preservation and maintenance of its permanent neutrality.
- Therefore, as long as the procurement of defensive guided weapons is not linked on Austria's part with the idea of an alteration or reinterpretation of the state treaty, it should pose no problems in terms of foreign policy.

Furthermore, the reactions of the powers signatory to the state treaty would allow conclusions to be drawn concerning their position vis-a-vis Austria: if they assume a positive or neutral position in the question of the procurement of guided weapons, this would imply a willingness to respect Austria's independence and territorial integrity, even in future conflicts. After all, Austria's enhanced ability to defend itself would mean that they would be provided with a more peaceful and more secure flank. But, on the other hand, if they assume a negative position, this would support the conclusion that at least the mental reservation exists that, in the case of a conflict, Austria's neutrality and territorial integrity may be disregarded, and that Austria could be used for military operations.

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CSO: 3620/483

MILITARY

DENMARK

RESEARCHER: DEFENSE DEBATE NEEDS NEW THINKING

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Aug 85 p 12

[Op Ed Article by Mogens Godballe, political scientist and peace researcher at Copenhagen University's Institute for Social Science and Administration: "Defense Minister Putting a Lid on Defense Debate"]

[Text] In an article in BERLINGSKE TIDENDE on 12 August 1985 Defense Minister Hans Engell presented the views of his conservative Defense Ministry colleagues in the United States and Great Britain on Danish defense policy.

The defense minister's conclusion was that although he personally would like more money for Danish defense the situation is not that bad. Our share of the total combat effectiveness in NATO's army and air force units is larger than that of several of the countries we normally compare ourselves with.

The problem with this kind of conciliatory nonpolitical article based on the least common denominator is that it helps to postpone a much-needed public debate on the future of Danish defense in light of new strategic, political and technological conditions.

The defense minister is evidently trying to hold onto what might be called the postwar professional defense establishment in Denmark, which had its political expression in the compromise between the nonsocialist parties and the Social Democrats. But certain basic conditions for this are eroding. Let us look at a few of them.

1. The nuclear age's stockpiling of destructive materiel and linking it with military planning gives a new limited scope for using military means to solve conflicts.

Security problems can no longer be viewed in a narrow military strategy universe where threats are met with counterthreats and the important thing is to wipe out the enemy.

Military means cannot be used rationally unless the benefits are larger than the costs.

Therefore all use of nuclear weapons will lead to self-destruction and an illusory faith that real dangers can be combated with the use of such weapons. For instance what good would it do to provide Denmark with reinforcements in a war if it leads to destruction of the human, environmental and production base we have today?

In the modern age the task of military means is limited to providing a credible defensive deterrent capacity in the event that some member of the international power structure entertains the idea of occupying our country. And to creating the political prerequisites for stability, detente, trust and arms reduction.

This is the only way that military means can make a substantial contribution to political solutions of conflicts in peacetime without military saberrattling, the creation of tension and distrust or the stockpiling of more and more destructive weapons.

2. The future development of military technology and the technological inflation of new materiel.

Is it possible to conceive of a three-service Danish defense system 20 years from now based on cost-effective calculations? Will we be able to afford such a system even if we want it?

It will be typical of future military technology development that surveillance capacity will improve greatly, combating the enemy will not depend on distance to such a large extent and precision and rapidity in delivering firepower will increase.

To an increasing extent this development will affect the tasks, structure, tactics and equipment of the different branches of the service. The contribution of some branches to the total combat effort will decline while that of others will increase.

Typically the importance of the army will grow, since land areas will be suitable for effective and survivable surveillance and for combating naval, ground force and air landings.

It is still difficult to make accurate predictions of the importance of future military technological developments as far as structure, equipment and tactics are concerned.

As a result of the latest defense agreement from June 1984 a study and analysis group was set up to look into these matters. It is here that the minister has an obligation to make sure that esprit de corps, service rivalry and inertia do not dominate this effort in relation to objective and untraditional considerations.

Another problem is that a senseless adherence to a Danish superpower defense in miniature could weaken the democratic basis for security policy.

If a three-service defense system is maintained indefinitely it will lead to a gutting of the structure of the services and a subsequent decline in their combat effectiveness. An annual technological inflation of close to 10 percent means that combat effectiveness would be based on a steadily decreasing number of weapons platforms which would increase vulnerability and encourage a destabilizing early use of military means in a crisis.

Either the reinforcement policy can be given a higher priority, which would inevitably lead to a loss of much of Denmark's political freedom of action in peacetime and during crises, or the defense budget can be increased substantially.

This involves a risk that public confidence in defense might decline at a time of large cuts in services available to the general public.

3. And finally the domestic political conditions for defense policy are entirely new.

Today the defense minister acts as administrator for a security policy majority in Folketing consisting of the Social Democrats, the Radical Liberals, the Socialist People's Party and the Left-Socialist Party, who have ordered the government in repeated resolutions to work for Danish freedom from nuclear weapons in peacetime, wartime and periods of crisis. In reality this means that the biggest party involved in the defense compromise--the Social Democratic Party--is on a collision course with the most important cornerstone in recent defense compromises--the reinforcement policy.

A break with conventional thinking is necessary if Danish freedom from nuclear weapons under all circumstances is to be reconciled with the summoning of American and British reinforcements. A transitional arrangement might involve renegotiating the reinforcement agreements and tightening up our practices with regard to allied ships calling at Danish ports in peacetime with nuclear weapons on board.

By openly acknowledging the new terms for Danish security policy and entering into a constructive dialogue on the formation of a future Danish security policy the defense minister could initiate an open and exciting public debate.

And after all that is what we all want to defend.

6578

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

# ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES EXPAND ROLE OF ARMY SIGNAL CORPS

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Jun 85 pp 84-90

[Article by Eberhard Skibbe: "Army Signal Service"]

[Text] Ever since there have been armies and wars have been fought one of the most important prerequisites for military success has been the ability to inform the fighting force immediately and unmistakably of the intentions of the leaders on all levels. It ranks with armament and training. This is true even today, especially in view of the large-scale and highly mobile operations on a possible battlefield in Central Europe. The article discusses the role of the signal service as a leadership tool in the Army, and the influence of modern technology on the equipment, organization, and tactical behavior of the signal troops.

It is well known that the information flow in military signal traffic is not merely characterized by the fact that the leadership transmits its aims in the shape of orders and directives from its level of competence to the next lower one. The traffic also must include continuous information flow from bottom to top, it needs comprehensive information which will result in the clearest possible picture of friendly and enemy situation and developments.

Besides this mutual "vertical" signal traffic, information flow in a "horizontal" direction between equal levels of leadership and to logistics and intelligence services must be assured. It contributes markedly to mutual coordination of all important operations and, for example, helps to avoid problems that all too often occur along the borders of combat sectors. Thus there is a need for a comprehensive net whose density increases as the main battle area becomes closer, and one that is indispensable for making military decisions and translating these into operational actions.

The activity of signal troops had, from their inception, been limited to establishing, operating, and maintaining such leadership networks, but for some time now there have been changes that have resulted in new and additional tasks. Thus, an additional area of responsibility has been added to the signal force, that of electronic warfare [EW]. This includes from its inception the surveillance of enemy signals, especially wireless traffic, and encompasses now the

interception of all enemy electronic activities which can lead to input for friendly operational leadership.

The activities included are detection, location, and evaluation of electromagnetic signals. (SIGINT - Signal Intelligence).

Besides these purely passive tasks of signal-electronic intelligence (Fm/Elo Aufkl), called electronic support measures (EloUM), the signal troops of the Army's electronic warfare (FmTr EloKa H) are charged with executing electronic countermeasures (EloGMO [ECM]). The objective of these largely electronically active measures is to disturb and/or make useless the enemy's use of electronic means for command and weapon use through targeted jamming and deception.

The basis of these measures and of the use of the required technical resources consists of the tactical-technical and scientifically evaluated realizations made in peacetime through a continuous evaluation of the electronic activities on the opposite side which are then confirmed by other sources.

The importance of this service has increased as more electronic resources have been applied East and West, not only in the signal service but also in weapon technology (such as radar, laser, telemetrics).

Since the Army Signal Corps has the task to secure classical information transmission (voice, teletype) and to acquire and evaluate data collected by intelligence, it is obvious that the Signal Corps will be concerned with the information and data transmission in the future army command system, already in the preparatory stages.

#### Tasks of the Sectors of the Signal Service

Army signals are concerned not only with the field army; it is also charged with meeting the needs of the territorial army as far as signals are concerned, establishing suitable networks, and securing signal operations even in the case of war under combat conditions.

Thus, signal troops establish signal networks for the territorial and military district commands and tie them to the automated corps networks (AutoKo networks) of the field force. These services are based primarily on postal lines, on the basic Bundeswehr networks, and in the case of important command communications on additional Bundeswehr-owned wire and radio communications and superimposed radio networks. For network expansion or addition in the case of failures, mobile signal troops are available, put into action by the signal commanders of the territorial commands when the need arises.

The Territorial Army's signal troops have as one of their most important missions the establishment and operation of the signal networks of the Supreme Bundeswehr Command. The communication lines are primarily operated within the network of the German Postal Service, the Bundeswehr basic network, and field wire and radio lines. A superimposed radio network is planned only for especially important command communications.

The nodes of this network are located in the area of the federal defense ministry's headquarters, connected to each other by cable.

In conclusion it can be said that the signal troops of the territorial army support its missions of

- securing operational freedom of NATO,
- functioning as intermediaries between military and civilian administration,
- protecting the infrastructure and objects in the rear,
- defending the country with Home Guard brigades.

In military signals, just as in the public information transmission network of the German Postal Service, there are currently massive changes. This development began with the high standard of digital technology. Along with microelectronics, it opens completely new possibilities in the military sector. These include not only better transmission quality and speed, but digital technology also benefits automation of the transmission service and circuit switching. Digital data transmission also simplifies effective encoding (especially cost effectively in voice transmission) and thus contributes greatly to increased signal security. These new technologies are applied in the above-mentioned AutoKo network of the field army. The signal instruments of the new generation have already been designed for the change from analog to digital technologies.

Of course, the advantages brought about by miniaturization of electronics are included. Smaller, more manageable instruments, using less current than was the case in the tube era, increase mobility of the force. Reduced failure rates and better maintenance conditions increase operability.

AutoKo is the comprehensive communication network of the field army that connects corps, division, and brigades levels through a grid. It consists of a digital meshed radio network, automatic switchboards and terminals, as well as of such conventional customer terminals as the telephone, teletype, facsimile. It has been introduced in its first level in all the three corps of the German Bundeswehr since 1975.

In addition to the already mentioned automatic connection for customers and the independent search for a connection in case parts of the network are interrupted or overloaded, the new system has additional capabilities, for example, direct dialing from customer to customer regardless where they may be located. That means that the call signals need not be tied to a certain instrument but may be tied to the person of the customer. He can then make sure that he can be reached by the closest terminal. In spite of automatic dialing, precedence levels are possible.

Over the second stage of development (AutoKo II) the long distance radios FM 12/800, some of which have been used for more than 20 years, will be replaced by modern and more capable FM 1000 instruments. In addition, the FM 15000

radio-instrument kit will be introduced. This serves to connect switchboards and terminals to the FM 1000 long distance network, eliminating the time consuming and often impeded laying of additional cables. It also increases quite considerably the mobility and scope of the signal service and thus also means an addition to the combat power of the armed forces.

Naturally new signal systems with such large-scale improvements in capability always require changes in the organization of the forces installing and operating them. Automated switching frees operating personnel; local radio networks reduce the need for cable laying troops, and--let this be mentioned here--the processes in the command systems will quite considerably reduce the voluminous cable traffic in the reporting system. This is necessary since on the other hand additional personnel must be detailed to operate these command systems.

No matter how capable--and, after the introduction of radio connections instead of field cables--less sensitive to combat operations the AutoKo network may be after these two stages, in movement signal traffic can only be carried out over the radio. For this reason the radio services are an equally important communication resource that serves not only to overlay other communication systems but is the basic command system at levels below brigade.

According to the broadcast conditions the following frequencies are used: HF (1.5 to 20 MHz), VHF (20 to 80 MHz), and UHF (225 to 400 MHz). The latter are primarily reserved for ground to air communications with aircraft, while vehicles and ground forces communicate with their headquarters and with each other over VHF. HF is used wherever the quasi-optical broadcasting conditions make VHF and UHF broadcasting impossible. For short distances the ground wave (low flying aircraft), and for long distance the space wave, are used.

It is clear that everybody using these media must be aware of their physical characteristics and their limitations. The equipment will largely meet the tactical needs, but behavior on the battlefield must not overlook signal tactical principles.

In the radio signal service the army signal troops can soon make acquaintance with new technology, mostly characterized by greatly improved frequency economy thanks to automated channel selection (AKW) and by improved electronic counter-measures (EloSM). Moreover, the third stage of the AutoKo (III) includes a wireless dialing system, UHF.

#### Electronic Warfare (EloKa) [EW]

Since ancient times it has been the custom in war to fight the enemy especially hard at the point of his greatest realized or suspected strength. If--as shown in the beginning--a smoothly functioning command system is one of the most important prerequisites for success in military action, then it is a logical conclusion that these command systems of the enemy are to be engaged and friendly ones are to be protected. Thus goes today's definition of the warfare with electronic "weapons," something that takes place without sound and whose principles have already been briefly outlined.

Both the territorial and the field army have installations, detachments and units for electronic warfare. With their intelligence work in peacetime, carried out around the clock, the signal troops make an important contribution not only to the situation evaluation, but also realizations about the command systems on the opposite sides, their characteristics, uses, deployment, and capabilities. All of this contributes not only to the evaluation of the electronic threat. It also means that data from these sources does not always lead to electronic countermeasures, but may indeed be the cause for using "hard" weapons.

The electronic warfare units in no way lead an isolated life. In the field army tasks of electronic intelligence and of electronic countermeasures are issued by corps or division headquarters. Somebody directing operations in a command post must himself determine the focus of intelligence, he must decide whether it is more advantageous to intercept enemy signal traffic or to prevent it by jamming, or whether there is a chance to deceive the enemy. Also, the battlefield commander must order the use of dampers when he wants to avoid the detection of certain operations by enemy radar. He also must decide if weapons are to be brought to bear on radio stations and radar devices detected by the EloKa units, and in which order of priority this has to take place in view of the importance of the threat.

This all indicates that the commanding generals and their subordinate commanders must be as aware of the capability of EloKa, their strengths and limitations, as of any other weapon systems used in combat.

EloKa can carry out its mission effectively only with especially qualified personnel. In addition to the technical understanding of signal intelligence, this includes knowing the language of the opponent, knowing encoding and other transmission processes, ability to identify radar instruments on the basis of signal parameters, and ability to rid reports to the higher headquarters of redundant components so as to stem the flood of information from intelligence.

These abilities cannot be acquired over a short term. In addition to extremely thorough training years of experience in practical intelligence work are needed. Also, those serving in this area must, as an individual, be especially reliable, EloKa soldiers of any rank have strict obligations for maintaining secrecy, exceeding the usual degree, since revealing an information source will all too often mean that it will go dry. An opponent will also be very interested to learn with what means, procedures, and success chances he has to reckon in the field of ECM. Every indiscretion will serve his countermeasures. This is also one reason why knowledgeable authors must be always reticent in describing this service.

#### Data Transmission

In view of the high mobility of friendly forces, rapidly changing conditions with the need to establish areas of concentration on short notice while maintaining supply and maintenance and to maintain a high degree of survivability makes a use of electronic data processing in the command process

unavoidable. Prerequisites for an effective support of headquarters work with modern electronic means include:

--An undelayed information flow for situation assessment.

--Rapid flow of commands to subordinated units.

--Relieving headquarters staff of time or labor intensive routine tasks.

To that end the "Army Command Information System for Compute Based Operational Command in Headquarters" (HEROS) is in development. It integrates all basic and special command sectors of the army. Plans call for:

Mobile subsystems for corps, division and brigade headquarters (HEROS 2/1) and for the Home Guard command (HEROS 4).

Fixed subsystems for the Army Staff headquarters (HEROS 3), for the headquarters of the territorial army, traffic control (HEROS 5), for tasks in crisis, tensions, and mobilization (HEROS 6), and for additional peacetime tasks (HEROS 7). Without dwelling further on the details of the required data interfaces internal and external to the headquarters, the complexity and distribution of this command information system alone indicate what tasks that the Army Signal Corps will face in the future. It should be mentioned that the AutoKo network has already been designed to manage this data flow within its area of use, and that the additional communication networks are also suitable for broadband transmission, especially since the public network of the Post Office is increasingly modified to permit digital broadband signals. Extensive uniform standards, such as EUROCOM and CCIT, as well as close cooperation with the Post Office, contribute to assuring the compatibility of the networks.

#### Perspectives

All these observations point out that the Army along with other branches of the Bundeswehr is making every effort to assure effective defense in the signals area through the use of modern technologies. An inescapable consequence of this development is a restructuring in the organization of the signal troops and addition of training programs at the Army Signal School. Preparations for this are said to have been largely concluded.

9240

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MILITARY

ITALY

#### SNIA-BPD DEVELOPS WEAPON MANAGEMENT UNIT

Rome INTERARMA NEWS in Italian 10 Jul 85 p 401

[Article: The SNIA-BPD Air-to-Surface Systems]

[Text] The expertise gained by SNIA-BPD in missiles and unguided rockets has allowed diversification into products for land and aerial use with the aim of offering complete systems which are versatile and capable of being integrated in all theaters of operations. For air-to-surface use 50mm, 70mm, 81mm, and 122mm caliber systems have been developed and are available with a great diversity of conventional warheads for maximum efficiency against various targets. The systems also include launchers for airplanes and helicopters which are optimized in their implementation according to the characteristics of the airborne vehicle. The necessity to adapt air-to-surface systems to the requirements of a more sophisticated theater of operations necessitating the use of more precise armament systems and ammunition with greater terminal effects brought about the development of warheads and ammunition. In this technology SNIA-BPD is at the forefront having already in production large and small caliber ammunition for use as artillery shells and for rocket systems for field use. This has furthered the development of rocket systems for aviation, mounted warheads, small caliber antipersonnel ammunition, and anti-material ammunition of 70mm, 81mm, and 122mm caliber; warheads and antitank mines magnetically activated, with microwave sensor and a self-destruct programmable mechanism. Additionally, in advanced stage of experimentation are other types of warheads and prefragmentation phosphorous flechettes with proximity fuses. Implementation: to permit cost-effective optimal operation, SNIA-BPD has achieved a unified approach for implementing the armament which is: flexible in its components to permit rational installation on board airplanes and helicopters; modular, to afford easy interface with other systems and sensors already present in the configuration of the air vehicle; reliable, thanks to the high technology of its components. The more significant operation characteristics are: calibration of the fuse as function of the target distance, the value of which can be inserted automatically through a laser/radar system or

manually; choice of warhead; selection of fireburst in terms of rate and quantity; continuous control of available ammunition; calculation of rocket ballistics as function of flight characteristics and environment; automatic check of the operative condition of the system, and search with visual display of any eventual malfunction.

13120

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MILITARY

ITALY

BRIEFS

NEW NORTH-WEST REGION COMMANDER--General of the Army Domenico Corcione (55), a native of Turin, is the new commander of the North-West Military Region with jurisdiction over Piedmont, Aosta Valley, Liguria, and part of Lombardy as far as Brescia and Mantua. He succeeds General of the Army Ferruccio Schiavi who left Turin after almost 2 years' stay. Present at the ceremony for the exchange of orders, which took place at the Monte Grappa barracks, was Chief of General Staff Army General Umberto Cappuzzo. General Corcione was born in Turin and lived there up to his admittance to the Academy (1950). He is, therefore, an officer of the postwar generation; moreover, he is the first commander of the North-West Military Region that did not participate in the Second World War. Appointed second lieutenant in the Engineers Corps in 1952, he attended the Applications School, the War School, and obtained a degree in civil engineering. Additionally, he commanded the Second Regiment bridgebuilders, the Legnano mechanized brigade, and the Centauro armored division. He served at various times with the Army General Staff where he held the positions of chief of Plans Section of the Office of Operations, chief of Office of Infrastructures, and chief of the IV Detachment. During this last assignment he received a commendation of which he is particularly proud for having organized and directed the entire logistic support for the Italian contingent in Lebanon. After the ceremony, General Corcione paid a visit to the more important detachments, among them the Third Army Corps. [Text] [Rome INTERARMA NEWS in Italian 10 Jul 85 p 395] 13120

'TICINO 85' EXERCISES HELD--These were the exercises (26-27 June) which started on the banks of the river near Varallo Pombia (Somma Lombardo) and ended at the Candelo Masazza shooting range. The exercise of the 3rd Army Corps saw the participation of the "Legnano" mechanized brigade and 131st "Ticino" battalion of the "Centauro" division commanded by General Francesco Bettin of the 3rd Army Corps, the 3rd "Lavio" battalion and the 53rd "cassiopea" battalion of the 3rd Army Corps: a total of 80 officers, 82 noncommissioned officers, 1120 troops, 37 "Leopard," 92 M-13, 135 vehicles of various types, 4 helicopters, and boats of every kind. The purpose of "Ticino 85" was to train in the various phases necessary to conceive, organize, and conduct the operations for securing a watercourse; to train the mechanized units on how to establish a bridgehead and how to use river crossing equipment. Thus the securing

of the river by dispatching reconnaissance (silent) to identify points of attack, the attack by riflemen on boats (protected by artillery and helicopters). During a real war these operations would take place at night and at dawn; then breakthrough by ferrying across the heavy vehicles while the engineers construct a Kruppmann bridge type 50 (115 meters long) on which the Leopard tanks, howitzers, M-13 (with the antitank TOW), and cannons pass a helicopter also lands on the bridge. [Text] [Rome INTERARMA NEWS in Italian 10 Jul 85 p 397] 13120

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MILITARY

NORWAY

# ARMY BUYING 2,000 SWEDISH-MADE BV206 CROSS-COUNTRY VEHICLES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Aug 85 p 8

[Article by Liv Hegna]

[Text] The army will buy 2,000 new cross-country vehicles from Hagglund & Sons, Inc. The contract was signed on Friday. The total purchase price is 1.5 billion kroner. The vehicles will be delivered in the period 1987-1991. Major General Karsten Kristiansen of the Army Supply Command said at a press conference that this BV206, as it is called, is unique on a world scale because of its excellent terrain-maneuvering capability.

"The BV206 will give the army considerably better mobility in the field, especially under winter conditions," he said.

The Swedish firm has agreed to make reciprocal purchases of Norwegian industrial goods worth a total of 600 million kroner. An agreement has already been made with Viking/Mjondalen concerning delivery of industrial rubber for the tracks on the vehicles. This contract alone is worth 100 million kroner. The firm will soon decide what other deliveries will be included as part of the package. Some of the likely candidates are Kongsberg Weapons Factory, Raufoss and Dyno Industries.

The new BV206 vehicles will go to army infantry battalions, with around 50 being assigned to each top-priority battalion. The vehicles will also be used by communications units and air defense units. According to Major General Kristiansen the BV206 will replace helicopters in transporting air defense materiel to hilltops in order to broaden the skyline. This tactical gain could be decisive in North Norway in particular.

"Hagglund & Sons, Inc. is also conducting tests to see whether the BV206 is suitable as a missile-launching platform. If these tests are successful the army might also be interested in buying the vehicles for that purpose too," said Kristiansen.

6578

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

GENERAL URGES MEASURES TO COUNTER SURPRISE ATTACK AT WAR START

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 19 Jul 85 p 3

[Op Ed Article by Maj Gen Bengt Wallroth, Head of The International Unit In The Department of Defense: "Prospect Of Timely Mobilization Must Be Assured"]

[Text] Numerical strength is often the basis for comparing the degree of strength in discussing national security matters--especially between the super-powers. Tentative conclusions are drawn by comparing both sides in regard to numbers of soldiers, tanks, guns, armored cars, fighter aircraft and different kinds of ships.

This type of comparison is too superficial when it deals with estimates of military strength. A number of different factors have to be taken into consideration--beyond mathematical calculations--in order to get a reasonably accurate picture.

Finding a model that reflects an entirely accurate base of comparative strength is impossible. Not only is it difficult to grasp the effect of individual factors--it is, above all, difficult to combine the various aspects from which meaningful conclusions can be drawn. The difficulties are compounded by secrecy in regard to performance characteristics of weapons and weapons systems as well as by factors of other operational and strategic relationships--often concealed by the various factors in the political arena.

I will not attempt--first of all--to compare military strength between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (WP). I will limit my discussion to pointing out some factors which are important in the calculation of power relationships in Europe. There are several other significant components that could be added--I do not claim that this is the complete picture.

This is only intended as a contribution to the discussion of power relationships--an important question--because it calls for measures which deal with proposals of promoting confidence and security within the framework of the ongoing conference in Stockholm.

My considerations also reflect some thought about the military situation in Central Europe and the conditions for military action with, primarily, conventional weapons from both military alliances.

## Army Combat Forces

It is customary to report the more important weapons or weapons systems on both sides in regard to army combat forces. A common omission is to fail to give an account of the total resources available.

Often only the NATO or WP forces are mentioned while omitting the national forces. This applies particularly to important weapons and weapons systems included in local armed forces (local defense forces)--despite the fact that they are very significant in defense combat.

Estimating the offensive potential of army combat forces calls for accountability in regard to operational units, divisions and--in some cases--regiments or brigades. In this respect the WP has a considerable advantage in Central Europe when it comes to directly available units, as well as units that can be mobilized. Still, the number of divisions must be viewed in the framework of their endurance, firepower and mobility.

For example, a "NATO-division" has more soldiers than a "WP-division" while their firepower and mobility are similar. It is reasonable to conclude that a NATO-division will have greater endurance than a WP-division.

The performance characteristics of the various weapons systems will also impact considerably on the strength of the army units. The effect and quality of ammunitions are particularly significant. Homing grenades, for instance, give a considerably higher capacity to artillery- and trench mortar systems.

Another important factor in offensive potential is the availability of bridge construction and shipping materials. There are a number of rivers in Europe which an attacker will have to cross.

I believe that analysis shows the WP-units to have superiority in this type of equipment.

## Air Support

Another important factor to consider in Central Europe is the support that fighter and bomber aircraft provide to the army combat forces. A number of different aspects have to be considered in estimating this matter as well. It is not only a question of the number of planes--even though this in itself already requires that different accounting principles be used. It is customary in the West bloc to only account for aircraft that is based in Europe during peacetime--or specifically intended to be there. Air forces with alternate missions--e.g. based on aircraft carriers--are less likely to be included.

Consideration must also be given to the different range, carrying capacity and military equipment of the different aircraft--in addition to their numbers.

The access to air bases in relation to available planes is an additional, important question. Here the WP has the advantage over NATO--which could have great importance.

In addition to the above it should also be stated that the operational possibilities for the air forces depend on the adversary's air defense resources in the form of fighter planes and anti-aircraft defense of different kinds, as well as on one's own possibilities for surveillance, command and protection--e.g. by using electronic jamming equipment.

The capacity in the field of the last-mentioned equipment is probably one of the best kept military secrets--but the indications are that the NATO-countries have the advantage here.

Estimating the conditions for--above all--surprise attacks, the availability of operational units is an important factor in this connection. The immediate availability of army combat units depends on the number of units and their strength.

Here it can be said that the WP has considerable superiority. Whether or not this superiority is sufficient is doubtful. Most likely it would call for mobilized units (units in categories II and III--and in the long run mobilized divisions) to be brought in quite promptly in order to succeed.

This brings up the question of the WP's efficiency--in the first instance that of the USSR--mobilization and deployment system. The main part of the Soviet army units have to be filled up in person and this also applies to equipment--before they are operational.

The fact is that today--percentage-wise--there are fewer Soviet units numerically complete in peacetime than there were 15 years ago. This fact decreases the possibility for success in connection with a surprise attack. Even the transportation and deployment of units mobilized in the USSR would be likely to run into certain difficulties--especially if NATO air forces could attack deployment routes and intersections.

NATO is clearly behind in the ability of calling up army combat troops on an immediate basis and it also has less units available for mobilization. An additional problem is encountered in deployment conditions. NATO has only a few units deployed next to--or near the German-German border. At the same time that, perhaps, millions of people have to be transported to the west of the border, the NATO-units would have to be moved in the opposite direction.

In addition, many of the NATO-units intended for Central Europe will have to be brought across the Atlantic--with all the problems specific to that situation.

Clearly, NATO today lacks the prerequisites for undertaking successful surprise attacks with army combat units against the WP's territory. Even weeks--and maybe months--after the outbreak of war, the WP would be likely to maintain--or increase--its numerical superiority.

## Surprise And Power Concentration

It is generally assumed that Soviet strategy is based on security and superiority considerations. Normally, it is said that offensive success only can be guaranteed if there is threefold superiority.

This is something that the WP does not have--at least not in the initial phase--in Central Europe. The possibility for surprise and superiority of local forces--by a mustering of strength--must, however, be part of the picture. A concentration of troops--coupled with surprise--could make it possible to strengthen an already existing superiority while at the same time making it more difficult for the adversary to achieve an effective defense.

There are many examples in military history of operations demonstrating the success of a combination based on a display of strength and surprise: Finnish units fighting against France 1940 and the Operation Barbarossa against the Soviet Union--just to name a few.

Surprise can be achieved on the strategic level as well as the tactical level. Strategic surprise can be achieved by--for instance--an increase in military preparedness, mobilization and deployment of units in a concealed manner--or with an element of surprise--making it possible for the opponent to have time to react. Here it can be stated that the conditions for carrying out such measures--secretly--in Western nations are extremely limited because of the watch of the mass media over measures taken by the authorities, among other things. This is more easily done in the WP-states and their more closed societies.

On the other hand, NATO--and primarily the United States--with their sophisticated surveillance systems have a certain guarantee that measures taken to achieve strategic surprise will be detected--reasonably far in advance.

Tactical surprise can be achieved by keeping the opponent uncertain about the time and place of an attack. Technical developments, especially in regard to the range and carrying capacity of planes--as well as the increased precision of specific weapons--have improved the possibilities in this respect--compared with what it used to be. This is true for both NATO and WP, but--as pointed out above--NATO is unlikely to meet the conditions favoring an attack of WP's territory thus the element of tactical surprise is more likely to be on the side of the WP.

## Support

There is no way to succeed in military operations without good support. The main point is to supply ammunition and--for today's units--fuel for combat units, in addition to providing soldiers with food and medical care. NATO and WP have different logistics systems. NATO-units are based on a collection procedure whereas WP-units depend on having supplies delivered.

This fact alone calls for analysis and reflection. It can be assumed that the greatest problem for logistics is for the side involved in attack operations

on foreign soil. The defender has the advantage of putting up supplies in suitable locations where they can be later picked up as needed.

Thus even the conditions for a smoothly functioning support system is a factor to be considered when estimating the degree of strength.

Even just the military factors mentioned above (there are more!) are difficult to judge. It is even more difficult--but still necessary--to add some other significant factors to the picture.

Which political system produces the most efficient military units and the most capable leaders?

Is there greater strength in NATO than in WP--or is it the other way around?

Does the decision process within NATO take more time than in the WP? Many maintain this to be the case.

#### Conclusion Difficult

It is complicated to judge the respective strength between the great power blocks. Numbers are not enough. A multitude of factors have to be weighed. It is especially important to study the dynamics of the operational balance of strength, i.e. how factors of strength are influenced in various operational situations.

There is presently such an extensive study under way in response to a government request. The analysis is being carried out by specialists--primarily from the Defense Staff and by the Research Institute of the Swedish National Defense--and assisted by representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.

The project is called "Europe Project" and the results will be available some time in 1986. Hopefully, it will provide a good base for continued discussions in regard to how the relative strength levels affect Swedish defense actions and national security in different ways.

I myself like to be careful when it comes to drawing conclusions in regard to the consequences of the relative strength relationships as seen on a more superficial level. Nevertheless, I shall make the following comments.

Most analysts feel that NATO would not be successful in a conventional attack on WP. Thus the focus of the discussion becomes whether or not WP's conventional superiority in Central Europe is such that it would assure success in possible attack operations against NATO-states.

Many judge the level of strength in Central Europe to be relatively even so that the WP could not be sure about successfully attacking the opposing military alliance.

## Sweden's Position

If that indeed is the case, it should not lead to the conclusion that this--in itself--dramatically reduces the risks of war for Sweden and the Nordic countries in a situation, sufficiently tense to trigger a war by error or miscalculation.

It might be more reasonable to assume that the party with conventional superiority in Central Europe--while maintaining the same degree of strength against the main opponent--still could deploy considerable resources for offensive operations against the flanks.

For Sweden this means that we have to maintain satisfactory quality and quantity in the military establishment. In addition, we must do all we can to ensure that we can raise military preparedness--maybe mobilize--in time.

If we are successful in those respects--the defense establishment will have good possibilities to succeed in its task to maintain the peace.

9349

CSO: 3650/305

MILITARY

SWEDEN

#### ARMED FORCES FACING CHOICE OF READINESS OR MATERIEL CUTS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 23 Jul 85 p 8

[Article by Erik Lidén: "More Men Or More Modern Equipment: Future Of Defense Cause For Conflict In Military Establishment"]

[Text] Qualified units of the Swedish national defense have been cut in half since 1955. The number of draftees and home-guards mobilized at the outbreak of war has not changed greatly during these 30 years--about 850,000 men and women.

In preparation for the 1987 defense resolution the relationship between quantity and quality of military units has been the subject for detailed discussions by the mass media. Army representatives at a high level--like the former Army Commander-in-Chief Nils Skold, Commander-in-Chief Candidate Bengt Gustafsson and Commanding General Carl Bjoreman--emphatically state that each draftee must be trained and given a war posting in order to produce a tough defense across the board. Training will have to substitute for important renewal of war materiel.

#### Prevention Of Blood Bath

Two retired colonels, Bjorn Zickerman and Hodder Stjernsward, have protested against sending young Swedish draftees into a bloodbath--meeting a superior enemy. They were joined by the defense investigator, former member of the Riksdag, Hans Lindblad (Liberal Party) and all three stressed the need for quality in the military establishment.

Sweden's defense efficiency can never be measured during peacetime. It is difficult to estimate data on strength, but it is entirely clear that in most areas defense today has been cut in half since 1955--with particular risk to the navy and the air force.

Defense costs have risen from 2 billion kronor a year in 1955, to more than 22 billion kronor today--at a little slower pace than inflation. Technical development and other price increases, as well as heavy increase in the cost of peacetime training has decreased the opportunities to buy modern equipment in sufficiently large numbers to retain the numerical strength of qualified units.

## Army Copes Best

During the 30 years that SVENSKA DAGBLADET has examined this matter the army has managed the best so far but will have problems in the 1990's--barring swift decisions in regard to further closing down of regiments. How many draftees will undergo training will be a question for discussion in the 1987 and 1992 defense resolutions as well as the degree of mechanization and armor protection there will be in the future army. It is economically impossible to satisfy both the need of complete protection and modern armored brigades.

The quality of modern army brigades must be compared to the development in the world around us and then--says Commander-in-Chief Lennart Ljung--the gap between our defense force and the force an attacker could mount against Sweden would widen successively. This is obvious in all three branches of the defense establishment. The Soviet Union, for example, invests heavily in mechanization, assembly line combat vehicles, guns and amphibious vehicles.

## 450 Fighter Planes Gone

The number of special landing crafts at sea is rising at the same time as modern container ships easily can be adapted to war use. The number of Swedish fighter aircraft will be reduced from 850 to 400--while the world around us invests in aircrafts. Landing possibilities by air both from airplanes and helicopters improve already in peacetime, which in turn increase the risk for a surprise attack against--for instance--Sweden.

Swedish military readiness in peacetime is insufficient with air wings closed down for vacation, training interruptions and holiday leave for draftees, limited number of ships in operation, etc. These problems will all be addressed by the Defense Committee in session.

## Unprepared Soldiers

The Army states that peacetime readiness must not interfere with the defense opportunities at war and that draftees who have not completed their training only can solve limited tasks in a war situation. However, the Commander-in-Chief--already controls a number of emergency battalions and companies today which can be rapidly deployed with the help of the air force 8 Hercules planes.

The development of the Swedish war organization since 1955 and up to 1995 (estimated) is indicated by the graphic illustration and the table below.




Most obvious is the reduction in the air force from 50 divisions to 22.5 during this period. The reduction of larger ships and submarines in the navy is also striking, at the same time as the number of lighter surface vessels do not show an appreciable increase. The investment in air-to-surface missiles has, however, increased the range--but the same development is found in the world around us. High altitude anti-aircraft defense is limited. Only the army's Hawk battalions can today go beyond 3-4 km from the ground. Hawk

can only be fully utilized when it is attached to the air force tactical fight command--its own radar only has a range of 8 km in space.

The air force has sold the Bloodhound missiles back to Great Britain. The army's regular anti-aircraft defense will now first have the so-called proximity fuse ammunition which explodes without the plane having been directly hit. Distances of 5-10 meters are reasonable.

Other shortcomings are access to helicopters for rapid transport, arming of fighter aircraft, anti-tank equipment, modern mines, tele and tactical fight command materiel, etc.

Many billions are needed to provide Swedish defense with the resources needed as outlined by the threatening picture of future combat environment by the commander-in-chief in his plans. Next time this question comes up will be this fall when the commander-in-chief 85 will describe the situation for the 1987 defense decision--most likely a troublesome reading assignment for all politicians.



The illustration above shows the development from 1955 until 1985 and the presently projected development until 1995. An army brigade includes about 5000 men, usually 3 armored battalions, 1 artillery battalion, 1 battalion of engineers and 1 maintenance battalion. In addition, there are companies assigned to reconnaissance, staff, armored/anti-tank/ and anti-aircraft duty.

One air force division usually consists of 8 airplanes.

Key:

- |                          |                           |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| (1) Army                 | (6) Marines               |
| (2) Brigades             | (7) Ships                 |
| (3) Battalions/Companies | (8) Flotilla/Battalions   |
| (4) 8 older ones         | (9) Air Force             |
| (5) 6 older ones         | (10) Divisions/Battalions |

Table of the development in military organization

	<u>1955</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1989</u>	<u>1995</u>
Modern infantry brigades	26	20	20	11	10	10
Older brigades	-	-	-	8	7	6
Armored brigades	7	6	5	4	4	4
Norrland brigades	4	4	4	5	5	5
Mechanized brigades	-	-	-	1	1	1
Detached battalions	100	100	100	100	115	115
Bicycle rifle battalions	100	100	100	90	85	85
Local defense companies	500	500	500	500	500	500
Armored vessels	2	-	-	-	-	-
Cruisers	3	1	-	-	-	-
Destroyers/frigates	25	17	8	-	-	-
Torpedo/missile/patrol boats	40	34	34	34	34	34
Submarines	21	21	17	12	12	12
Flotillas for mine clearing	16	14	14	11	8	8
Coast artillery battalions	43	41	34	30	30	30
Fighter aircraft divisions	28	28	17	12	11	11
Attack divisions	12	12	5.5	5.5	5.5	2.5
JAS 39-Gripen divisions	-	-	-	-	-	3
Reconnaissance div'sions	10	10	8	6	6	6
Light attack	-	-	4	4	3	?
Tactical control/base battalions	50	50	45	45	45	45

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

## NEW PORTABLE ONSHORE APPARATUS CAN LOCATE SUBMARINES

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 22 Jul 85 p 7

[Article by Lars Porne: "New Device Discovers Both Wrecks And Submarines"]

[Text] One can stand on the dock and look down into the dark, completely impenetrable water and ponder over what might be concealed below the surface. Then a device is lowered and--suddenly--a world, unknown to us, appears below.

The device is a narrow beam sonar and with it the military can see foreign submarines--if there were to be some near-by--the police can locate stolen cars and other objects, the marine archeologists can find old wrecks.

"We have made some tests with the narrow beam sonar," says staff editor Wyn Enqvist at the naval staff's information department to SVENSKA DAGBLADET. But that is all he can say about it.

### A Kind Of Underwater Radar

This sonar is a kind of underwater radar which emits a narrow beam of very high frequency waves. The hydrophones the navy used in the submarine chase had a beam width of 30 degrees while the narrow beam sonar only has one and it rotates across the entire horizon and gives a picture on a screen of what there is underneath the surface of the water. The picture can be recorded on an ordinary video recorder if one wishes to analyze it in peace and quiet.

The navy calls the device UDI, after the Scottish company which makes it.

"This sonar is used on the offshore platforms for all kinds of things--among other things it guards against possible sabotage," says Lars Moberg, president of Scandinavian Dynamics Company who is launching the device for civilian use.

It gives a very clear picture of all objects in the water and therefore is far superior to a regular hydrophone when chasing submarines at close distances. The range is, however, only about 1,000 meters and its greatest practical use is in distances between 500 and 600 meters.

"The beam width is only one degree," says Lars Moberg, but when it is 1,000 meters away it gets to be 17 m wide."

#### Sees 150 Meters

The sonar is a so-called hydro-acoustic system. The version we are studying is in the under-water-world in Stockholm which can see about 150 meters.

We let it down from the dock at the Hammarby port and hope to find some interesting things, but we only see the smooth bottom with a little wavy pattern. With a bit of training one learns to read the picture on the screen.


It is a bit more fun on Skeppsholmen on the bridge that crosses over to Kastellholmen. There we can see the small harbor's mooring rocks, chains and a few objects we are not sure about.

"The sonar is an excellent aid for guiding divers," says Lars Moberg. It drastically reduces the search-time for the divers and one can save on the many useless dives if one is looking for something. One can lower the sonar from a rowboat and quickly search a large area to find out if it is worthwhile to send down divers.

The device can also be programmed so that it registers changes underwater.

The simplest civilian version used by SVENSKA DAGBLADET to look at Stockholm underwater is not very large and the whole device--including a small power plant and a roll of cable--can easily be stored in the luggage compartment of a normal car.

It is quite likely that foreign submarines that come into our harbors to snoop around in our archipelago have similar systems on board, says a spokesman for the navy.



Lars Moberg with the whole sonar apparatus. The black jar is the sonar proper and on the picture screen one can see everything located on the bottom and in the water.

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

# ADMIRAL URGES GOVERNMENT PROCURE MORE COASTAL CORVETTES

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 21 Jul 85 p 7

[Article by Rear Admiral and former Chief of the Navy's Procurement Department Gunnar Grandin: "Order The Ships!"]

[Text] On 30 June SVENSKA DAGBLADET printed an interview with the Soviet defector and former high diplomat Akadiy Shevchenko. The interview also dealt with the submarine incursions. In the same paper there was also an article by Erik Lidén that four coastal corvettes that were to have been ordered on 1 July this year were postponed and will come up again for a decision in November of this year. It can be of interest to compare the content of these two articles.

Shevchenko says about the same thing about the reasons for the submarine incursions as many civilian and military experts in Sweden have on their own concluded in this matter. What is going on--according to him--is in part, reconnaissance of locations for submarines with nuclear missiles and, in part, a general intelligence gathering effort as a base for possible attack on our country.

To the above can also be added the recent information about the great deal of interest exhibited by Soviet libraries for description of Swedish ports and waters.

It may seem as if Shevchenko did not present anything new. It is, however, valuable to get confirmation of what one believes and--for those who deny that there even were any submarines here except for U-137--this ought to be something to think about.

## Display More Firmness

Shevchenko recommends that we get tougher. The Soviet Union would understand that and pull back. What the Soviet defector is saying is what many inside and outside Sweden have said before. There can be no doubt about the need for not compromising our stand when it concerns our own waters. Those who come here illegally have to blame themselves.

I also believe the government has clearly stated this position. But now the question is: How do we act when we want to be firmer?

Discussions have gradually centered on whether it would not have been more correct to detain and interrogate the crew of U-137 and carefully have gone through the entire ship in order to find out what they were up to. But that is not what happened. It is not very likely that there will be a repeat of the U-137 incident. Presently we are determined to force every submarine we might possibly encounter to surface--with all the means available to us. As far as I know, the directives for this procedure are clear and sufficiently "hard."

It is easy to say that one ought to act more firmly. Generally, it is just not feasible. There has to be some foundation and some tools to carry through. Otherwise it all comes to nothing--just like in Martin Ljung's sketch where he meets the tigers, unarmed, and says: "I got so mad!" In this context that means that we must have the resources to engage in chasing the submarines. If we do not have them, it does not matter how mad we get.

The Submarine Defense Commission came out with clear, qualitative recommendations for measures to correct the submarine incursions. But the pace has been slow in regard to satisfying the demands for quantity.

In addition to inlet defense and permanent guard facilities, we need corvettes with towed hydrophones (variable depth sonar), primarily for pursuit in outer territorial waters, minelayer-destroyers with a special type of "seeing" hydrophones for inner waters and helicopters for rapid deployment and coordination with corvettes, minelayer-destroyers and patrol boats.

Where the U-137 ran aground we were in the process of producing two minelayer-destroyers and two coastal corvettes. Since then, four more minelayer-destroyers have been ordered. Plans--up to this time--called for ordering four additional coastal corvettes around 1 July of this year. It seems that these are the ones which will be postponed to November at the earliest because of financial reasons. An inquiry to the Defense Department's Materiel Administration confirmed that the expected authorization had not been granted to proceed in this matter.

If Shevchenko's admonition for a firmer stance is right--an opinion shared by many Soviet experts--then it seems that the government instead promptly should order these ships. Obviously, the right decision would have been to already do this in connection with the U-137 incident. An indication of that kind would truly have emphasized our intentions. The government's best--and maybe only--possibility is to take a "hard" stance and to see to it that resources are available.

The debate about foreign submarines often focuses on making them surface or sinking them. This would, of course, be spectacular.

I would, however, like to stress that our objective for submarine defense in peacetime is not this but to stop the violations instead. We can assume that the trespassing party is well aware of our resources and determines operations with that in mind. It is, therefore, likely that the violations would stop when the risks for losing a submarine would become too great. But as long as there is no risk involved they are likely to continue.

The interview with Shevchenko seems to confirm this. That is why it is so important to promptly implement measures for effective pursuit of submarines that truly inspire respect. That would give us an entirely different knowledge about what is happening--and is not happening--in our waters presently. It would also provide a better base for the government's diplomatic measures. The protection of our outer territorial waters mandate a sufficient number of coastal corvettes. The ships, now of immediate interest, would--together with the minelayer-destroyers and the patrol boats--give us at least a couple of complete destroyer groups.

#### Bargaining

Nothing in Sweden has happened during the last couple of decades to draw international attention of such an extent as the submarine incursions. Both East and West pay meticulous attention to our measures in regard to submarine defense. Given this background, it is almost impossible to understand the haggling about when to order these ships.

Whenever a serious incident occurs the politicians, the press and the public let us hear an outcry: "What is the navy doing about this? Why do we not have the necessary resources available etc.?"

The truth of the matter is that we have lost our defense capacity against submarines after decades of almost systematic neglect. This was clearly documented by the Submarine Defense Commission. It will take time to rebuild it in regard to equipment, personnel and training. We have no equipment other than that we have access to from our long-range planning. There are no short-cuts and delivery dates for qualified materiel are usually several years off.

We are now in the process of slowly rebuilding our capacity in submarine chase resources--with the knife at our throat--one might say. The corvettes--long since planned for and incorporated in the economic plans for defense--apparently now are at risk to become subject to budgetary considerations.

#### Defend Or Not?

If it is true--as stated by Lidén--that it "is known that there are divided opinions, on the political level in regard to the need for coastal corvettes"--and that the ships now in the process of being delivered have to undergo thorough testing before new ones are ordered--then one really begins to wonder.

It is difficult to understand what type of political points of view could be cited for warranting a reconsideration of the decision on the coastal corvettes. The professional experts--the commander-in-chief and chief for naval operations--have made a decision on what is needed in order to control the submarine violations. The coastal corvettes have been included within the economic framework. We are not talking about large ships--they weigh a little more than 300 tons each. The political element in this question ought to be whether or not we are going to defend our waters.

The efforts to postpone the ordering of the corvettes has to be interpreted as a sign of little interest in this defense measure. There is every reason to ponder what Shevchenko and other experts have to say before making a decision--impacting on our credibility in such a negative manner--to postpone the ordering of these ships.

#### Only Solution

Since the incident at Harsfjard it has not been possible to determine the nationality of other trespassing submarines. If, however, other nations than the Soviet Union were to send their submarines here the demand for resources for pursuit of submarines surely would not decrease.

The only solution to this question--so essential to our neutrality--is to build up a submarine defense that ensures that:

- 1) Our neighbors are not tempted to come in our waters with their submarines.
- 2) If they do, we have the capability to expose and send them away.
- 3) We can verify that nothing illegal is occurring within our territorial waters.

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

F-16 TO BE REBUILT FOR 50 MILLION KRONOR--The air wing, F 16 in Uppsala will be rebuilt for about 50 million kronor. The largest part of the addition consists of new hangars and simulator buildings. Most of this has to be finished by January 1986 when two divisions of the Viggen planes will be placed with the wing. That means that the Draken planes will be gone for good from Uppsala. In the future F 10 Angelholm will be the only Swedish Draken air wing. F 16 in Uppsala will have 16 Viggen planes ready to start as of January next year. Each one of them costs 60-70 million kronor. In order to manage repairs and maintenance, considerably more planes are needed. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 21 Jul 85 p 7] 9349

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ECONOMIC

DENMARK

# MINISTER PRESENTS AUSTERE BUDGET BILL

## Nation Warned About Deficit

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Aug 85 p 10

[Article by Carl Otto Brix, Hans Jorgen Poulsen, Ole Dall, Thorkild Dahl, Henrik Skov and Karin Kaas]

[Text] Life Improving for Danish Citizens

The austere spending and income policy is a vital prerequisite for achieving balance in the Danish economy and when that happens we can start paying back our debts and thinking about the society that will emerge from all this, according to the finance minister.

After analyzing the 1600 pages and thousands of figures in the budget proposal, Finance Minister Palle Simonsen (Conservative) has no doubt that he can offer some encouragement to the Danish people:

"It will be easier to be a Dane in 1986.


"It is true that the tax burden will increase just a little," the finance minister said, "but that is simply because of the inclusion of the real interest tax which will not affect the average family directly. The tax for an average family will decline by 1 percent. At the same time prices will rise by only a few percentage points. And what that means for the average citizen and the average family is that for the first time since 1977 there will be a rise in what economists call disposable real income--what is left over after allowing for taxes and inflation. Danes will be better off even with the very low wage limits that were imposed as a result of the contract intervention in the spring."

But won't some of them have a hard time repaying the loans they were forced to take out to pay for the mandatory savings measure?

"Mandatory savings became an unpleasant necessity. The government felt it was natural to include this measure as part of the overall solution this spring. Otherwise we would have had to resort to different finance policy austerity measures."

Would he say that there would be no more economic austerity measures?


"The government has no plans in that direction. But on the other hand I would like to make it clear that the prerequisite is a change in the trend of the balance of payments deficit. We are convinced that it is turning around now, but the government is not satisfied with the figures for the first half of the year--a deficit of almost 13 billion kroner. It is quite obvious that a large-scale and gratifying investment is taking place which should lead to better export figures for the rest of the year and we are looking forward to that. We estimate that the deficit this year will be between 17 and 18 billion kroner. That is a correction of 2 to 3 billion kroner compared to our estimate at the beginning of the year. It is also worth noting that everybody is talking about our foreign deficit--the area where things did not go very well. The government has done a good job in all other areas."



Budget Deficit 1979-1985

Key:

1. Billions of kroner at current prices
2. Budget deficit including interest
3. Budget deficit excluding interest



Budgeted Personnel Use 1981-1989

Government politicians assert that a major cause of economic improvement is the reduction in the number of public employees. The curve shows the state trend in this area.

Key:


1. Employees in thousands

#### Eliminating Deficit Most Important

According to the Finance Ministry's own estimates unemployment will remain at a level of around 8-9 percent for the rest of the decade. Is that what is considered a good job?

"When the government took office the deficit was so large that the primary task had to be eliminating it. Next year the state budget deficit will be 10 billion kroner lower than it is this year or roughly 26.5 billion kroner. This has been achieved through cuts in public spending. The number of people employed in the public sector simply had to decline. One might say that this was the price we had to pay to reduce the deficit tempo.

"Now growth in the number of public employees has been reduced to around zero. It is the government's clear goal to increase the number of people employed in the private sector and this has been successful and will be even more so in the years ahead--on one condition: that the austere income policy continues. Only then can we achieve both goals--wiping out the deficit and reducing unemployment."



The government is very proud of Denmark's position in relation to the other countries belonging to the cooperative western organization, OECD. Denmark's deficit in the public sector in relation to gross national product (total production) is lower than the OECD average.

Key:

- |                      |            |
|----------------------|------------|
| 1. Percentage of GNP | 3. Denmark |
| 2. OECD countries    |            |

#### Other Countries and Denmark

Why is it the fault of other countries when the economy is not doing well, while the government takes credit for it when it is?

"That is an inaccurate way of stating the problem. We depend on conditions in other countries. For example we have been hurt by the high exchange rate of the dollar and the cold winter, which led to high energy costs. But naturally our own policy has an effect on the situation. For example it is important now to avoid new fiscal austerity measures that could have a

negative impact on employment. One might say that the budget proposal itself expresses an austere economic policy because it sticks to the same spending level as last year's budget, namely 185 billion kroner in terms of current prices. This limit will be adhered to in coming years so that the goal of balancing the domestic budget can be met in 1988 and that of balancing the foreign deficit can be met by 1990."

Can the budget proposal win majority support?

"The budget proposal expresses an austere spending policy but there is nothing dramatic about it. The proposals made by the Radical Liberals have been incorporated to a large extent so that only a few details remain to be discussed with them before they can promise their support."

No Point to SDP Cooperation

Will the Social Democrats be included in the negotiations?

"I have a hard time seeing any point to that when the Social Democrats voted against government savings cuts amounting to around 20 billion kroner."

When will the government be able to lean back and declare that the goal of restoring the Danish economy has been achieved?

"There is a long way to go and we must be very careful. We must first achieve balance between our income and our expenditures and then we can start paying off our debts."

What kind of society is the government aiming at?

"A society where there is room for initiative and enterprise. Not a society where everyone is 'the architect of his own fortune' but a society with a little more fresh air, where there is a little more desire to invest in an education or in a business. It will be a society that does not stifle us with equality but one in which there is respect for the individual as well as for the community."

A truly conservative society, in other words?

"The four government parties share the political responsibility and the political obligations."

Outlook for 1986

Total state spending will rise by 1.8 billion kroner next year but the budget deficit will decline substantially and disappear altogether by 1990. The foreign deficit is still oppressive and is estimated at 17-18 billion kroner for this year.

The fourth budget submitted by the four-party government anticipates an increase of 2.3 percent in private consumption next year. Taxable personal

income is expected to rise 4 percent in 1986 compared to 5.4 percent this year. It is estimated that net state spending in 1986 will total 188.1 billion kroner, 1.8 billion more than this year. The reserve for unforeseen expenses such as wage and price increases has been cut from 9 billion this year to 5 billion next year. According to the government this cut is possible because of the 2 percent ceiling in the latest wage contracts.

An increase in the value-added tax does not appear to be imminent but as a result of higher private consumption next year the value-added tax will bring an additional 2.1 billion kroner into the state coffers next year. This large part of the taxes on consumption will then bring in 50 billion kroner annually. Total indirect taxes will thus continue to bring in several billion kroner more to the state treasury than direct taxes on income and assets. The difference is 4 billion kroner.

#### Two Kinds of Tax Burden

According to the government's comments on the new budget bill, there is a prospect of a slight improvement for the first time in 10 years after a steady decline in disposable real wages for typical wage earners.

The tax burden on households is estimated at 43 percent, a good percentage point lower than last year. This includes income taxes, item taxes and membership contributions to unemployment funds. In the period 1982-86 the tax burden on households has varied between 42 and 44 percent.

However the clarifications of the budget also operate with a different and higher tax burden. Here the increased taxes on stock companies and the real interest tax on pension assets are included. This gives a tax burden of around 48 percent.

The size of the tax burden this year has also been influenced by extra-large payments of tax balances because payment dates have been moved up.

A key figure is the deficit in the DAU, operating, investment and loan, budget. This year the deficit will be 36 billion kroner and next year it will be down to 26.5 billion. In the budget the four-party government "inherited" from the Social Democratic minority government in the late summer of 1982 the DAU deficit was 74 billion kroner. The present government wants to eliminate this deficit altogether by 1990.

Next year's estimated deficit is based on net income of 161.6 billion kroner and net spending of 188.2 billion. In relation to gross national product this is 4 percent, compared to 11 percent in 1982.

#### Balance Still a Major Problem

While the government can rejoice over the steady decline in the budget deficit, dealing with the deficit in the foreign balance of payments is still a major problem.

Without a heavy deficit that is expected to reach 17-18 billion kroner this year there would be a surplus in state finances. It is estimated that the balance deficit for the first half of this year amounted to 12.7 billion. The government is still committed to wiping this deficit out by the end of 1988.

The basic condition for living up to these goals--as Finance Minister Palle Simonsen disclosed in his presentation--is holding wage and price increases in check so that production and employment can shoot up. It is estimated that exports will rise around 5 percent in 1986 compared to 7 percent this year.

The national debt will increase by 28 billion kroner in 1986 to a total of almost 500 billion at the end of the year. The interest on this debt is still a heavy burden even though it will decline slightly. In 1986 Denmark will pay 55.5 billion kroner in interest. That is 300 million kroner less than this year. A sharp drop in interest rates and limited net borrowing on the domestic market were cited as the reasons for this by the Finance Ministry.

The exchange rate of the dollar is also a factor. A change of 1 krone in the rate of the dollar leads to a change of 400 million kroner in state interest costs. When the new budget proposal was drafted in the spring the assumption was that the dollar would be worth 11 kroner. Today it is around 10 kroner.

#### Marked Shift in Tax Burden

Next year total state revenues will be 8.2 percent higher than they are this year. There has been a marked shift in the distribution of the tax burden. In 1981 90 percent of state revenues came from withholding taxes and contributions. That figure has now declined to 80 percent. That is because the new real interest tax and an increase in company taxes make up a larger share of state revenues. The real interest tax on pension assets will bring in 12 billion kroner next year compared to around 9 billion this year. And company taxes, which have been raised from 40 to 50 percent, will produce twice as much revenue, 14.5 billion kroner.

The estimated average municipal and church tax for 1986 is 28.1 percent. That is unchanged in relation to this year. Block grants from the state to counties and municipalities will be reduced by 2.9 billion kroner compared to cuts of 5.5 billion this year.

#### Unemployment Compensation to Decline by 2.4 Billion

It is estimated that unemployment will drop in 1986 by 8,000 people to 247,000. This will produce savings of 2.4 billion kroner, money that the state will not use for other purposes.

Some 18.4 billion kroner has been set aside in the new budget for unemployment compensation payments to unemployed workers. The number of unemployed

people is expected to drop from an estimated 255,000 this year to 247,000 in 1986. This would save 2.4 billion kroner in unemployment payments.

In the language of the budget unemployment compensation is a "market-sensitive" item. For this reason it is approached with great caution in the state budget for the coming year. What is saved as a result of a decline in unemployment and a subsequent drop in the number of people receiving unemployment compensation will be used to reduce the state deficit and for no other purpose.

The unemployment figure of 247,000 includes both fulltime and parttime recipients of unemployment compensation. If the total number of unemployed is translated into fulltime terms the figure would be 188,000. This includes 13,000 "whole-year people," who are expected to receive education grants after the job provision law has been revised.

At this time the maximum daily compensation rate is 335 kroner, corresponding to 104,000 kroner a year. The amount will be maintained unchanged until 1 October 1986. It is estimated that an average of 93.5 percent of those who are unemployed will receive the highest level of compensation. Thus a growing number of the unemployed will receive the maximum payment.

Efforts are also under way to adjust unemployment insurance, with particular emphasis on reducing incorrect payments from unemployment funds, simplifying insurance rules and making a new assessment of the rules for paying compensation.

Recipients of early retirement payments also come under unemployment funds. The arrangement has been in operation since 1979. The number of early retirement compensation recipients will rise by 8,000 this year to a total of 89,000 in 1986. The additional expense will rise by 700 million kroner in 1986 to a total of 8 billion kroner.

#### Radical Liberal Chairman Supports Government

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Aug 85 p 1

[Text] The Social Democrats will vote for the 1986 budget proposal, party chairman Anker Jorgensen told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. The government and the Radical Liberals have agreed to adhere to a strict spending policy in order to achieve balance in state finances by the end of the 1980's.

The average Dane will be a little better off in 1986, Finance Minister Palle Simonsen (Conservative) promised. The tax burden will decline by 1 percent for families and with lower price increases next year will produce a rise in individuals' disposable real income for the first time in many years.

"This means that an individual's wages will go further in spite of the very low wage increases that were part of this spring's intervention in wage negotiations," Finance Minister Palle Simonsen told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

The budget proposal has an unchanged spending limit of 185 billion kroner after a number of changes adding up to around 5 billion kroner were made within and between various ministries. Next year's deficit will be 10 billion kroner lower than this year's and Palle Simonsen said, "I am wearing both a belt and suspenders when I project a deficit of 26.5 billion kroner for next year.

"The plans to achieve balance by the end of the 1980's will probably be carried out," said the finance minister, but he emphasized that the improved prospects "should not tempt weak souls to think that everything has been taken care of. We are not through with our recovery efforts."

The total tax burden will rise next year when one adds in the increased taxes on stock companies and the real interest tax on pension assets, but there will be a decline for families.

The finance minister did not foresee a repetition of the drama of recent years with regard to passage of a budget. Palle Simonsen called it "unrealistic," however, to think that an agreement can be reached with the Social Democrats on the 1986 budget.

When the budget proposal was presented the Social Democrats supported the government's goal of bringing the deficit down to 26.5 billion kroner but at the same time they will try to change various reallocations of funds that have been included in the budget.

"It was due to special circumstances that we voted against the budget 2 years ago and did not vote on last year's budget. We will vote for the 1986 budget," Social Democratic chairman, former Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen, told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

This means that the budget will again pass by a broad majority in Folketing, with support from the government parties, the Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals.

Radical Liberal leader Niels Helveg Petersen said that it is vital "to keep spending levels for public outlays unchanged for the third year in a row.

"We simply must maintain this line on spending policy next year too," the leader of the Radical Liberal Party said.

Along with the optimistic remarks the finance minister also issued a warning.

"Unless there is a favorable development in the balance of payments situation, new finance policy austerity measures will be necessary, so it is important to stick to our guns," said Finance Minister Palle Simonsen, who

now estimates that the balance of payments deficit this year will be 17-18 billion kroner instead of the 15 billion the government predicted earlier.

"The balance of payments situation is not satisfactory, but we still expect to achieve balance in 1988," said Finance Minister Palle Simonsen.

#### Paper Approves of Budget

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Aug 85 p 12

[Editorial: "A Good Proposal"]

[Text] The 1986 budget proposal contains a lot of encouraging news. The new economic policy has led to a substantial improvement of the national economy. Production has risen sharply, employment is increasing rapidly, the decline in real wages has been checked, interest and inflation have been reduced and the trend in public spending is being brought under control. The improved national economy has put its stamp on the new budget proposal. State finances are moving quickly away from the brink of disaster, state bankruptcy and similar alarming scenarios that were part of the current discussion just 3 years ago.

In addition to reflecting the improved national economy the 1986 budget proposal also expresses the energy with which the government has approached the establishment of a more efficient management of state spending. The expanded framework principle works. The reform of the state budget system that has begun will mean additional improvements in future years. It is important in this context that the government's basic spending policy position is becoming accepted by the systems. Room for new measures must be created by means of increasing efficiency and not through increasing personnel and spending.

Against this background it is not surprising, although of course it is very satisfying, to see unchanged spending levels for another fiscal year. It is characteristic of the scope of this effort that it has been dubbed the tight spending policy. Just a few years ago a national budget without substantial spending increases would have been unthinkable. It is also encouraging that it has been possible within the same framework to include as many new initiatives as we see here.

Precisely because state finances have made this obvious improvement there may be some reason to warn against relapses. It was very difficult to change course. Now we must stick to it. It will be necessary to do this for a period of many years. Seen in historical perspective an enormous number of positive steps were taken to produce a favorable development in the Danish economy. But these steps have never been adhered to for very long. As soon as improvement was in sight, we slipped back into the old groove. Denmark's economic problems are long-term in nature. Therefore the present course must be continued for a long period of time.

And it should not be overlooked that in relation to economic developments, the heavy-spending part of the public sector is the municipalities. They are responsible for around two-thirds of the public consumption of resources. At this time the municipalities are planning their 1986 budgets but the results will not be apparent before sometime in October. However the government's message to the municipalities is quite clear. No spending increases in relation to the 1984 budget--or in other words, a budget development that is similar to the national budget trend.

It is a good result to bring the state's annual deficit down from 74 to 26 billion kroner. But there is still a deficit and that also means another increase in the already large national debt. By the end of this year the national debt will exceed 500 billion kroner. It will be even higher before the deficit situation has been brought under control. It will take a good many large surpluses in national finances to eliminate this debt and until that is accomplished the interest burden is inexorable.

There are a lot of good things in the budget proposal that has been presented, but there is still a long way to go and absolutely no room for easing up on either municipal or national spending policies.

#### SDP Compromise Seen Difficult

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 16 Aug 85 p 12

[Editorial: "Impossible Compromise"]

[Text] There are mistakes that an opposition group does not make more than once. No matter how much the Social Democrats would like to resist the government they will not vote against the new budget bill when it is submitted for passage before the beginning of next year. They did that in 1983 and they came to regret it. That was the first time since 1929 that the Social Democrats refused to approve a budget and it will probably be that long a time again before they repeat the action. An opposition cannot rally around lost battles.

Of course the Social Democrats do not consider the government proposal acceptable. Mogens Camre, SDP finance policy spokesman, has called for three important changes. He wants what he calls social restoration. He wants more efforts to improve the employment situation. And he wants a so-called dynamic business policy. The Social Democrats will undoubtedly spell out the details of all this at great length in the months ahead. We do not have to wait for any clarifications to see what it means as far as the budget is concerned. The Social Democratic policies would lead to a sharp increase in the state spending budget. Such major changes in the budget and such large reallocations of important areas would destroy the basis for the policy put forth by the government. The government will therefore be forced to reject a compromise with the Social Democrats.

The budget proposal will be taken up by the Finance Committee and within the committee the Social Democrats will take part in going over the budget and hopefully they will also participate in discussing its details. The practical work will be accomplished. But it will not be possible for the government parties to establish any real compromise with the Social Democrats when they make such big demands with regard to changing government policy. They may well express indignation that their views were not considered more carefully. Since the government changed hands 3 years ago it has been impossible to get the Social Democrats to support the main line the government established, a line that has been clearly defined in the various budgets in that period. They were able to agree on tax reform and there has been Social Democratic support for a good many other things. But when it comes to the economic recovery there is such a wide gap between the opposition and the government that it cannot be spanned.

When Anker Jorgensen decided in December 1983 that his group would vote against the budget bill, one of his arguments was that the government was "so totally negative" toward the Social Democrats. In the intervening 2 years it would have been more reasonable to claim that the Social Democrats are the ones who have been totally negative toward the government. Two years ago this led to an election and defeat for the Social Democrats. There will be no election this year, but the Social Democratic defeat is still a source of irritation.

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ECONOMIC

DENMARK

# COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS' NEW LEADERSHIP PROFILED

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 Aug 85 p 6

[Article by Lars Dyrskjot]

[Text] On 15 October Professor Christen Sorensen, Odense University, and Professor Peder J. Pedersen, Aarhus College of Business and Economics, will joint Professor Ebbe Yndgard of Aarhus University as leaders of the Council of Economic Advisers.

"Inspiration from the Council of Economic Advisers in the early 1970's lies behind the economic policy that is being pursued in Denmark today," the new chairman of the council's presidium, Professor Christen Sorensen of Odense University, told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

For years the economic advisers have urged politicians to pursue an income policy and outgoing council leader, Professor Karsten Laursen of Aarhus University, said: "Income policy is pivotal to economic policy--and it is the reason why the Danish economic trend has shifted around."

"The advantage has been that it has been possible to test economic policy on a variety of models before putting it into practice," said Christen Sorensen who was named by the government yesterday as the new chairman of the leadership of the Council of Economic Advisers where he will succeed Professor Karsten Laursen whose appointment expires on 15 October 1985.

At the same time the government named Professor Peder J. Pedersen of the Aarhus College of Business and Economics as a new member of the top leadership of the Council of Economic Advisers. He will replace Professor Niels Thygesen who submitted his resignation as a member of the top leadership.

Thus after 15 October the top leadership of the Council of Economic Advisers will consist of Professor Christen Sorensen, Odense University (chairman), Professor Ebbe Yndgard, Aarhus University, and Professor Peder J. Pedersen, Aarhus College of Business and Economics.

"The economic adviser institution has the advantage of bringing together a group of people who are relatively independent from outside pressure and allowing them to inspire each other. And then the economic advisers can

inject some vitamins into the debate. But it is important for me to stress at the same time that the economic advisers are far from having readymade solutions to the problems of economic policy in this country. Many other people can and should give their own views," said Christen Sorensen.

As new chairman of the economic council Christen Sorensen did not want to say anything just now about current economic policy. "There are two reasons for that," he said to BERLINGSKE TIDENDE. "For one thing the current group of experts will remain in office until 15 October and they should make any statements that are necessary until the end of their period in office. For another thing the three future members of the leadership should first have an opportunity to get together and exchange views before issuing any statements about the economy. The economic advisers should act as a unit when statements are issued."

However the present economic chairman, Karsten Laursen, has no doubt at all that the Danish economy is heading in the right direction. He said there is no need for more economic steps because higher taxes just increase costs for firms and he also predicted that Denmark's balance of payments deficit will have been wiped out in 1990.

Karsten Laursen thinks the balance of payments deficit this year will be around 20 billion kroner. But he considered further intervention both unnecessary and of dubious value because our competitiveness will improve.

"The economy has turned around and as soon as next year the big investments in the private sector will show up in terms of higher exports and there may be room for a further drop in interest rates," said Karsten Laursen who will join the J. L. Fund's board of directors.

"I am looking forward to the position which I have no doubt will be exciting and challenging. At the same time I feel that being a member of the chairmanship of the Council of Economic Advisers is like being a representative of the public. I have to take care of my job at Odense University too," said the new top economist who was born in 1945 and got a degree in political science in 1972. From that year until 1977 Christen Sorensen was employed by the secretariat of the Council of Economic Advisers, before becoming an assistant professor at Copenhagen University.

Since 1982 Christen Sorensen has been a professor at Odense University where he has worked primarily with economic models, tax policy, financing and international economics. Christen Sorensen has been a member of several tax committees, including Thorkil Kristensen's committee.

Peder J. Pedersen, who was born in 1941, got his degree in political science in 1970 and became a doctor of economics in 1984. Since 1983 he has been a professor at the Aarhus College of Business and Economics. Prior to that he was employed by the Copenhagen College of Business and Economics and Aarhus University. Peder J. Pedersen has concentrated among other things on economic policy, economic growth and labor market conditions and policy in particular.

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

'EXPLOSIVE GROWTH' IN INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENTS CONTINUES

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 14 Aug 85 Sec II p 2

[Article by Lars Dyrskjot]

[Text] In the first 6 months of this year there has been an explosive growth in the expansion of industrial production capacity. The Finance Institute for Trades and Industry alone had a 66 percent increase in applications which resulted in total investments of 3.1 billion kroner.

Danish industrial production is now expanding rapidly. In the first 6 months of this year alone trades and industry have decided to make investments worth over 3.1 billion kroner and almost 90 percent of this amount went toward expansion of production capacity. And according to the Finance Institute for Trades and Industry the big investment enthusiasm in the industrial sector is continuing.

"Expansion of firms' production capacity began last year and the trend has continued this year," said deputy director Niels Larsen of the Finance Institute for Trades and Industry, FIH.

Building investments are responsible for 40 percent of the investments FIH has financed. Half of the investments were in machinery but here too an expansion of production capacity is involved to a large extent. The remaining 10 percent was invested in nonmaterial things or in taking over existing facilities.

Crisis Years

"In the crisis years industrial investments went into rationalizations to a very large extent and these were not designed to increase a firm's production capacity but simply to improve profitability," said Niels Larsen.

In the first 6 months of this year the Finance Institute has had a 66 percent increase in loan applications, a total of 1439 applications for almost 2 billion kroner in all. ""There was a sharp rise in investment activity in May and June in particular when we had 550 loan applications. Thus income policy has led to increased investment desire," the deputy director maintained.

## New Borrowers

Around half the amount of total approved loans went to first-time FIH borrowers. In all 1.5 billion kroner in loans were approved in the first half of the year, corresponding to investments worth 3.1 billion kroner since FIH finances 45 percent of investments.

Undoubtedly the increased investment desire in the industrial sector was greatly encouraged by the sharp decline in interest rates from 13 percent for a regular FIH loan in January and February down to between 7.5 and 9.5 percent now, depending on the type of loan. "We are now offering trades and industry financing terms lower than we have had since the end of the 1960's," said deputy director Niels Larsen.

The first half of 1985 has been the busiest as well as the best period to date for the Finance Institute. Total net results were 130 million kroner compared to 55 million in the first half of last year. Regular operations rose from 68 to 86 million kroner and at the same time there were exchange rate profits of 44 million kroner compared to an exchange rate loss of 13 million kroner in 1984.

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ECONOMIC

NETHERLANDS

## LIBERAL PARTY CALLS FOR 3.5 BILLION GUILDER TAX CUT

The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 27 Aug 85 pp 3-4

[Text]

The Hague, August 26 - The Liberal party in a draft election manifesto published today calls for an annual 3.5-billion-guilder cut in the individual tax and social security burden in the four-year term of the next government.

The manifesto, to be formalised at a party congress in mid-January, says the overall public sector deficit is to be reduced to four to 4.5 per cent of the national income by 1990, from an estimated 7.5 to 7.9 next year.

The measures are to be financed by an extensive programme of public sector spending cuts, including an annual two per cent retrenchment of the workforce providing savings of 18 to 20 billion guilder in the four years, the manifesto says.

To promote sustained economic recovery the liberals advocate the creation of a stable business climate in combination with continued curbs on pay rises.

It further proposes that preference be given to expansion and replacement investments rather than consumer spending to combat unemployment.

### New Tax System

Based on an expected annual two per cent economic growth over the next four years tax and social premium cuts would maintain the spending power of public sector workers and those on social security, the Liberal party calculates.

The party wants the gap between the lowest income groups and the net income of those earning twice the average wage (some 76,000 guilders a year) to be increased, while differences in net income between the highest and lowest paid should not be allowed to shrink further.

In this regard the party proposes a major overhaul of the wage and income tax system according to the so-called 'contour programme' which details tariff cuts to be made in combination with fewer tax deductables.

Such a programme would involve cuts at the top end of the income tax scale from 72 to 60 per cent with proportional cuts for lower income groups.

### WIR Scheme

The manifesto emphasises the need to privatise or abandon collective tasks, including the gradual dissolution of WIR investment subsidies. It says this money could be used instead to create an accelerated depreciation facility, investment deductions and cuts in corporation tax and social premiums.

The party recommends special measures for new entrepreneurs, such as special tax and social premium arrangements to minimise financial risks in the preliminary stages of a new business.

Other programme points include the institution of a differential system of study finance, whereby training courses of marginal value to society will cost more, and scrapping of the existing government fine art support scheme (BKR).

The liberals reject plans to polder the Markerwaard, a 60,000 hectares (150,000 acre) section of the huge freshwater Lake IJssel in favour of the Waterman project to polder land between the Hoek of Holland and Kijkduin near The Hague on condition this is financed by private industry.

CSO: 3600/29

ECONOMIC

NORWAY

#### BUSINESS LEADERS DESCRIBE SOUTH AFRICA TRADE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Aug 85 p 5

[Article by Roar Ostgardsgjelten]

[Text] They are in business, not politics. That is how business leaders justify their continued trade with South Africa despite the boycott resolution and the recommendation to break economic ties with the country that practices apartheid.

Only fruit and vegetable importers and cheese producers seem to have yielded to pressure from public opinion to discontinue trading with South Africa. Some firms in other branches are looking around for other markets. For the ferroalloy and aluminum industries the continued importing of raw materials from South Africa is a prerequisite for maintaining production and employment in this country.

Industrial and commercial ties with South Africa have been overshadowed by the attention given by the media to the involvement of Norwegian shipping, especially oil shipments to that country. Shipping firms earn over half their money from our trade with South Africa.

#### Trade Worth Billions

But tankers do not represent the biggest share of shipping. The Norwegian Shipowners' Association estimates that annual freight income lies around 700-750 million kroner. Of this amount dry bulk cargo, primarily coal and ore shipments, account for 250 million kroner, liner service (two shipping firms) earns 230 million, chemical transport and other forms of special transport bring in a good 200 million kroner and tanker company earnings from transporting oil to South Africa are estimated at 50-80 million kroner.

In addition to shipping, Norwegian trade with South Africa last year was worth over 1 billion kroner. Imports amounted to 360 million kroner and exports had a value of 686 million kroner.

In the first half of this year imports from South Africa declined by 6.5 million kroner (3.6 percent) to 172.9 million kroner compared to the same

period last year. The value of Norwegian exports to South Africa increased in the same period by 4.3 million kroner (1.4 percent) to 310.4 million kroner.

Manganese ore and electrolytic manganese, used by the ferroalloy industry, Elkem and Tinfos Ironworks and aluminum producers Ardal and Sundal Works, Elkem, Norsk Hydro and Southern Norwegian Aluminum, are the most important raw materials imported. Various metals from the electrochemical and metallurgic industry, paper products and canned fish are the most important items exported from Norway to South Africa.

The political authorities are trying to reduce trade with South Africa without a legislative ban or an actual boycott measure. Starting on 1 August of this year a license is required for all imports of South African products. The experiences obtained from this arrangement will determine whether similar license regulations will be introduced on exports to South Africa.

Acting assistant secretary Sverre Lunde of the Ministry of Trade's division of export-import regulation told AFTENPOSTEN that there have been fewer requests for import licenses than expected since the regulation went into effect. So far the ministry has issued 40 licenses.

"This may indicate that importers are trying to meet the political objective of reducing imports from South Africa and are looking toward new markets instead," Lunde said.

#### Reluctant

Several business leaders with whom AFTENPOSTEN has been in contact were extremely reluctant to provide concrete information about trade with South Africa. Some refused to say whether they had any economic ties with that country at all out of fear of media attention and further pressure to cut off trade.

Administrative director Sverre K. Nedberg of Star Paper Mill in Drammen, which exports special types of paper to South Africa, said that in the last year his firm has run into unusually stiff competition from other West European paper producers on the South African market.

"I think that is due to the Norwegian policy toward South Africa which the South Africans are well aware of. Our market is simply drying up," Nedberg said.

Export chief Kjell Irgens of Sigurd Boe, Ltd. in Oslo, who is South Africa's consul general in Norway, said that no change in attitude had been detected yet among South Africans with respect to business ties with Norway.

"Trade has continued without restriction," said Irgens.

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ECONOMIC

NORWAY

## BUSINESS LEADERS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT ECONOMY PERFORMANCE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 13 Aug 85 p 33

[Article by Ole N. Hoemsnes]

[Text] Norwegian industry is now doing better than it has for a long time--with respect to both production and profitability. A survey of the Industrial League's member firms also revealed considerable optimism about the next 3 years with regard to export increases. Administrative director Knut Lofstad revealed this today when he briefed Norwegian ambassadors to other countries who are visiting firms in Alesund and Sunnmøre this week.

It is characteristic of the situation today that several firms in the market-sensitive export industrial sector are doing better than they were before. However there are big variations with regard to both production and profitability from branch to branch and especially from one firm to another within the same branch or the same region.

Director Lofstad told the diplomats of the goals both the Industrial League and LO [Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions] have for Norwegian industry. Up to the year 2000 industrial appreciation must increase by 50 percent if Norway is to maintain full employment and balance in its foreign economy. To achieve this goal average industrial growth must be around 2.5-3 percent a year. Thus the Industrial League and LO agree on the goal. The next phase is to agree on which methods to use to achieve it, Lofstad said.

### Domestic Market

While export industries were responsible for all the growth noted last year the domestic market industries are expected to make a positive contribution this year, according to Lofstad's report.

One cannot expect any substantial growth in traditional export industries beyond the level and the utilization of capacity that we already have. One cannot dismiss the possibility of some production decline in traditional export industries in 1986 but that of course will depend on developments in the international economy. The Industrial League's predictions for industrial production growth of 2 percent in 1985 and 1 percent in 1986 assume

a continued loss of market shares. "Naturally we hope that we are not right about this," said Lofstad.

#### World Market

What about Norwegian firms on the world market in the future? We can start off by saying that this will not be an easy job, the leader of the Industrial League said. All countries prefer to buy products from their own industries. Domestic suppliers have the natural advantage of being on the spot.

Norwegian firms have a number of odds against them when they venture onto the world market. For example it is not easy to compete in price because of our high cost levels. But Norway has firms who manage to do so, for example in our electrometallurgic and electrochemical industries. The biggest export industries can be found here. When it comes to silicon carbide, calcium carbide, aluminum, nickel, copper, ferroalloys and fertilizer Norway is a leading exporter, in some cases the biggest or second biggest supplier in the world," said Lofstad.

#### Our Strengths

As an example of one of our strengths in industry director Lofstad mentioned the skill of Norwegian firms in constructing electric ovens for metal production. There has been a big emphasis on exporting technical and commercial know-how in the development of industry in new countries.

Another area where Norwegian firms are international leaders involves systems for purifying smoke, gas and other emissions from the production process. Based on the strict Norwegian emission regulations our industry has developed a purification technology that makes it possible to export emission-purification systems to factories around the world.

#### Optimism

Director Lofstad concluded by referring to a survey among the members of the Industrial League in which members were asked what their export share is today and what they expect it to be 3 years from now. The answers revealed a high degree of optimism. Most firms are working on the assumption that they can substantially increase exports. The survey revealed an optimism and energy that are promising, director Lofstad said.

#### Exports Rising in 1985

The preliminary export figures for the first half of the year show a value increase of 12 percent compared to the first half of last year—despite the recent drop in oil and gas deliveries, according to a semiannual report prepared by the Norwegian Export Council. Total exports, excluding ships, amounted to almost 80 billion kroner.

In the first half of 1985 traditional export products amounted to 37.5 billion kroner, 11 percent more than in the same period in 1984. It is estimated that the average price increase from last year to this was 7 percent.

Monthly export values for North Sea products varied sharply in the first half of 1985 with by far the lowest figure occurring in May, the report said. But for the entire 6-month period both crude oil and gas had an export value that was 13 percent higher than last year's level.

The increase in value for crude oil is due to substantially higher average prices, estimated at a 9 percent increase, while the quantity delivered rose by around 4 percent--about the same rate as that for traditional products.

The exported quantities of natural gas in this half year seem to have been slightly lower, about 1 percent, than last year while the average price this year has been around 14 percent higher, the report said.

#### Geographic Distribution

The geographic distribution of product exports shows some shifts from 1984 to 1985 with regard to individual market areas. The May figures indicated a value increase of 20 percent to EFTA countries, 8-9 percent to EC lands, 11-12 percent to "other countries" (including the United States, Japan and Canada) and 22-23 percent to developing countries. Product exports to CEMA countries in the first half of the year fell by almost 4 percent compared to last year.

With respect to market area share of total exports from Norway the distribution for the first half of 1985 (1984 figures in parentheses) was as follows:

Exports to EFTA 23 percent (22), EC 51 percent (52), CEMA 1.5 percent (2.0), other industrialized nations 15.5 percent (15.5) and developing countries 9.0 percent (8.5).

Deliveries to EFTA lands were dominated by Sweden which accounts for 7/10 of our EFTA exports while 8/10 of exports to the EC area went to West Germany, Great Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands.

As far as one can judge product exports to developing countries had the largest relative value increase from 1984 to 1985, perhaps as much as 22-23 percent in the first half year.

The report from the Export Council is based on the preliminary leading figures from the Central Bureau of Statistics supplemented by the council's own estimates.

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ENERGY

BELGIUM

KNOOPS ON PROGRESS IN ENERGY DIVERSIFICATION

Brussels LA LIBRE BELGIQUE in French 13 Aug 85 p 3

[Article by Etienne Knoops, secretary of state for energy]

[Text] Will there be a shortage of energy? For some, this question seems totally irrelevant. Indeed, OPEC now meets, no longer to plan embargo operations or raise prices, but on the contrary, to ask its members to limit their production, and even agree on price reductions.

And yet, less than four years ago, in December 1981, when I accepted my ministerial responsibilities for energy, the risk of a shortage appeared obvious for a great majority of Belgians as well as Europeans.

And when in the parliament debate on energy, I stated that in my opinion this was an unjustified psychosis, there were those--and not only of the opposition--who considered me a naive optimist. Opinions have changed, and so has the situation.

The policy conducted by the European countries, and particularly by Belgium, has certainly played a strong role in effecting this change. This policy was in fact vital for our economy, an economy of large energy consumption. Supplies had to be assured at a price as moderate as possible, lest we destroy our standard of living and worsen unemployment.

The major guidelines of this policy, as approved by parliament, are:

1. Greater diversification of our sources of energy, and particularly less dependence on oil;
2. Better energy utilization;
3. Prices as moderate as possible, consistent with economic realities, meaning prices that are not manipulated by subventions costly for the treasury, and ultimately for the taxpayer.

These objectives were materialized in very specific actions.

For instance, our nuclear energy potential for peaceful purposes was strongly increased. Today, with a production capacity of 5500 megawatts from nuclear sources, we can produce more than 60 percent of the electricity that we consume. By comparison, 90 percent of our electricity in 1973 was derived from oil.

Efforts at energy savings were also increased both for consumers and business. Household consumption, particularly for heating, was reduced. Indeed, the impact of higher prices and their influence on household budgets was painful. But technical information from various sources made it possible to realize these savings. An ULB scientific study for instance, estimates that 1 billion was saved in households following the campaigns for better energy utilization, conducted by the energy conservation agency.

In addition, a ruinous contract for oil supplies has been terminated. This contract has cost the country 5 billion due to a total guarantee from the government, issued without much discernment by my predecessor. Five billion represent nearly 1.50 francs for each liter of gasoline sold in our country for an entire year.

Today, given the relative abundance on the energy market, and the drop in the dollar, we can hope for truly moderate prices and even for a reduction in Belgian francs.

Does this mean that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds, and that the energy file can be closed?

To adopt such an attitude would be as mistaken as to believe in a total and rapid shortage, or as to think that public supply of energy and the transfer forced by government to government contracts are panaceas.

We must not go from one extreme to the other.

It is equally as erroneous to believe today that the era of low cost energy has returned, or at least that it will soon return. To believe that the abundance existing on energy markets, or that the competition among producers in a sometimes desperate search for consumers, is again an eternal truth as it seemed to be during the golden sixties, would be to repeat past mistakes, and to suffer the same consequences in another few years. We must therefore continue the policy which we have started. Our country, which is almost totally devoid of energy resources, must thus further improve its nuclear equipment for peaceful purposes. A new nuclear plant must be put in operation during the next ten years. Those who, for partisan reasons have delayed the approval of the ten-year equipment plan, have undoubtedly done a disservice. Let us hope that once the election is over, they will recover their common sense and their sense of effectiveness.

We must also maintain our efforts for efficient energy utilization. Did you know for instance, that a boiler built today is at least 40 percent more efficient than one built ten years ago?

But if we continue our efforts, while adapting them to scientific and economic results, there is no danger to ourselves or our children, that we will run out of energy or that we will no longer be able to pay for it.

ENERGY

NORWAY

# ENERGY MINISTER DEFENDS TREATMENT OF STATOIL

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Aug 85 p 8

[Article by Morten Wang]

[Text] Oil and Energy Minister Kare Kristiansen made a strong attack at a press conference yesterday on what he called the Labor Party's confusion over oil policy.

The Labor Party has criticized the government for its shabby treatment of Statoil and for giving operator responsibility for block 34/8 to Hydro. Both criticisms are unfounded, according to Kare Kristiansen. In the first place Statoil will produce 17-18 million tons of oil equivalents in 1990. In comparison, Hydro will have a production of between 5 and 7 million tons and Saga a production of 2 to 3 million tons.

Kristiansen maintained that from an objective point of view there could be no doubt at all that Hydro is the company that would have the most trouble maintaining its activity level without the operator assignment. "This does not involve a downgrading of Statoil which has just been assigned as operator of the gigantic Statfjord field starting in 1987," said the oil and energy minister.

He was equally emphatic in pointing out that it is totally confusing to say that Norway loses billions when it allows foreign companies to work on the Norwegian continental shelf. "They are assigned tasks because we need them. The companies assume the risk, invest billions and provide our country with advanced technology that we would have a hard time getting our hands on otherwise," said Kristiansen. He emphasized the importance of the foreign companies as taxpayers. Kristiansen also stressed that the assignment of 34/8 would not delay the development of oil activities in the north, as Labor Party leader Gro Harlem Brundtland has charged.

The fact that the government has asked Hydro to indicate whether it needs technical assistance from Conoco or Elf Aquitaine does not mean that Mobil is unacceptable. However Kristiansen stressed the point that Mobil and the two others under consideration were very evenly matched in the competition. Many factors were evaluated, but Kristiansen did not conceal the fact yesterday that the rig Conoco plans to build at Trosvik in Brevik was a major consideration. He said yesterday that he is certain the rig will be built.

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